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Summary 
The study examines the economic development of and Norway’s economic links to Asia.1 During 
the latest decades, this region has grown to a major player in the world economy. Chapter 1 
shows that Asia grew  
 to 34 % of world GDP (2010) 
 to 28 % of world trade in goods (2010) 
 to 21 % (23 %) of world services exports (imports) (2010) 
 to 15 % of world inward FDI, and 12 % of world outward FDI (stocks, 2012). 
The growth of the region is characterised by regional production networks, with large and fast-
growing intra-regional trade in intermediate goods. Compared to Europe, there is less intra-Asian 
trade in consumer goods.  
Asia is more heterogeneous than Europe, with several countries poorer than Romania and 
Bulgaria at the low end of EU-27. The poorest countries have grown fastest, contributing to 
convergence, and this is expected to continue. Even with lower growth rates than in the recent 
past, the nominal GDP of the region may double by 2025, increasing further its importance of 
Asia in the world economy. For some middle-income countries, upgrading of skills and 
institutions is necessary in order to avoid the middle income trap and develop further into more 
skilled industries and services. 
Norway has maintained its share in the foreign trade of Asia-16; thereby following the 
exceptionally fast trade growth and maintaining balanced trade with the region, or a slight 
surplus if services are included. During the last decade, there was exceptionally high export 
growth to a number of Asian markets. Norway exports commodities and capital goods to Asia, 
and imports consumer and capital goods. Seafood exports to Asia remain significant but its share 
has decreased over time. Norway’s trade with China also grew fast during recent years, with a 
peak in 2009. After 2009 there was a general decline, affecting several sectors of imports as well 
as exports.  
Services trade represented 30 % of Norway’s exports of goods and services to Asia in 2012, and 
20 % of imports. Shipping and “other business services” were the main sectors in exports as well 
as imports. Singapore, followed by Australia, China, Korea and Japan were the largest trade 
partners for services. 
                                                          
1
 We generally cover the 16 countries planning to form the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership) agreement by 2015; including ASEAN, +3 (China, Japan, Korea) and ++3 (Australia, New 
Zealand, India). The Appendix to the report contains comprehensive data that may be used in the study of 
individual countries. 
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For services, sales from Norwegian-controlled enterprises in Asia was much larger than direct 
trade across borders. In 2011, there were 425 Norwegian-controlled enterprises in Asia, 
employing 48 000 people and having a turnover at 136 billion NOK. More than half was in the 
services sectors. FDI in the region increased from 2.5 to 11.4 % of Norway’s outward FDI stock 
during 1998-2011. Singapore was the major destination, with 80% of outward FDI to Asia, 
focusing on shipping, offshore and business services. Singapore may also serve as a hub for 
investments in other Asian countries. In addition to FDI, there was significant portfolio 
investment in Asia, with Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) investments in Asia-16 
representing 12.9 of the GPFG total value. This is lower than the share of Asia in world GDP, but 
due to new allocation rules from 2012, the share for Asia in GPFG’s stock is expected to rise 
gradually. For various reasons, investment from Europe into China is generally low 
(comparatively), and this also applies to Norway’s FDI as well as the Government Pension Fund.  
Outward FDI from Asia has accelerated recently and is expected to grow further in the future. 
Asia’s share has increased from 2.0 to 5.4 % of Norway’s inward FDI stock, and Singapore and 
China were the largest investors.  
Comparing Norway’s imports of goods from Asia with the corresponding exports to Norway 
reported by Asian countries, the value of the former is about twice as large as the latter, and the 
gap is growing over time. One possible explanation is statistical error: goods are shipped 
indirectly and the origin or destination are misreported. Another is that there is a price mark-up 
on the way to Norway, due to additional distribution costs or trade mispricing; the latter may 
occur for various motives (e.g. tax reasons). The analysis suggests that the two types of 
explanations are about equally important, and the “true” price mark-up is 37 % on average. 
Using these results, we conclude that Norway had about balanced trade with Asia-16, not a 
substantial trade surplus, as suggested by Asian data. 
On the whole, Norway has succeeded in expanding its economic links with Asia  parallel to the 
growth of Asia, with fast growth in trade and investment. A particular feature of Norway’s Asia 
relations is that ASEAN, and Singapore in particular, has a role for FDI and services trade that is 
disproportionally large compared to their economic size. 
For Norway, low-cost imports from Asia has contributed to lower price growth for consumer 
goods, and increased demand for oil and other commodities from Asia has led to higher prices 
for Norwegian exports. Summing this and comparing to the year 2000, there was a terms of 
trade gain equivalent to 27% of GDP in 2012, or a gift of 45 billion USD. Asia was a major factor 
behind this.  
In 2000, there were only a handful of free trade agreements (FTAs) in Asia but later, this has  
expanded rapidly into currently 71 FTAs and several more under negotiation. There has been 
considerable progress regarding the depth and coverage of agreements, but Asia still some way 
from a “single market”. Several plans have been launched in order to consolidate FTAs into 
comprehensive “mega-FTA”; with ASEAN+3 (including China, Japan and Korea) as one option or 
Asia-16, also including India, Australia and New Zealand, as another. The latter is reflected in the 
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plans for RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), to be negotiated by 2015. A 
partly overlapping and partly competing scheme is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), where 
negotiations involve 12 countries including the USA, but excluding China. There is currently a 
heated debate about the options and the expectation is that the formation of mega-FTAs in Asia 
will take time and evolve gradually. Agreement between China, Japan, Korea will be an 
important building block. There is rivalry concerning who should have the lead; China prefers 
ASEAN+3, RCEP is led by ASEAN but Japan has launched another initiative involving Asia-16. 
As part of this project, a separate study on FTAs in Asia (Park, 2013) studies FTAs in greater depth 
and concludes that there will be major welfare gains from a mega-FTA such as RCEP, and even 
larger gains if one can achieve a FTAAP (Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific), including RCEP+TPP 
countries. This is however politically some way ahead. 
For Norway, some policy issues and implications from the analysis are: 
 Norway has successfully adapted to Asia’s growth and succeeded developing its economic 
links with the region. This process will continue in the future, and be extended into new 
areas such as larger inward investment from Asia.  
 In the light of Asia’s greater economic importance, Norway should aim to expand further its 
FTA network in Asia. Norway should however also support multilateral agreements, in order 
to avoid an excessively complex network of bilateral FTAs, with different rules and 
regulations across the globe.  
 With slower progress in multilateral institutions such as the WTO, Norway should also 
explore “plurilateral” initiatives, including some countries but not all, inside the WTO or 
outside, e.g. by “revitalising” the OECD in the field of trade or investment policy. 
 In the new trade policy situation, Norway’s trade policy can no longer be “reactive” to the 
same extent as in the past:  a comprehensive and more proactive approach is needed where 
bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral approaches are combined to achieve trade policy goals, 
e.g. with respect to major regions such as Asia. For this purpose, the coordination and 
division of labour between relevant institutions (ministries) may also be re-examined.  
 While Norway has relatively large FDI in ASEAN, the opposite is true for Norwegian 
investment in China; for FDI and portfolio investment. The reasons underlying this are 
probably on the Norwegian side as well as the Chinese side, and should be examined further. 
In this context, the role of holding companies and indirect investment via other Asian 
countries is also of interest. 
 Norway should examine further why there is a huge and growing gap in trade data reported 
by Asia versus Norway. Depending on what is found about the causes, the policy implications 
could range from better statistical methodology to measures to combat tax evasion. 
Sammendrag på norsk 
Studien analyserer Asias økonomiske utvikling og Norges økonomiske forbindelser med Asia.2 I 
løpet av de siste tiårene har Asia vokst til å bli en hovedaktør i verdensøkonomien. Kapittel 1 
viser at Asia har vokst til å representere 
 34 % av verdens BNP (kjøpekraftsjustert, 2010) 
 28 % av verdenshandelen med varer (2010) 
 21-23 % av verdenshandelen med tjenester (2010) 
 15 % av verdens inngående direkteinvesteringer (FDI), og 12 % av utgående FDI (2012). 
Asias vekst er preget av regionale produksjonsnettverk, med betydelig og raskt voksende handel 
med innsatsvarer mellom landene i regionen. Sammenliknet med Vest-Europa er det mindre 
intra-regional handel med konsumvarer i Asia. 
Asia er mer heteogent enn Europe, med mange land på inntektsnivåer som er lavere enn de 
fattigste i EU-27 (Romania og Bulgaria). De fattigste landene har imidlertid vokst raskest. Dette 
har bidratt til inntektskonvergens mellom land i regionen, og denne trenden forventes å 
fortsette. Selv med noe lavere vekstrater enn før kan nominelt BNP i Asia fordobles til 2025, med 
ytterligere økt betydning for Asia i verdensøkonomien. For noen mellominntektsland er det 
nødvendig med oppgradering av kunnskap og institusjoner for at de skal unngå 
”mellominntektsfellen” og utvikle seg mot mer kunnskapsintensive industri-  og 
tjenestenæringer. 
Norge har opprettholdt sin andel av Asias utenrikshandel, og dermed holdt tritt med den 
eksepsjonelt raske handelsveksten i regionen. Norge har omtrent balansert samhandel med Asia, 
eller et lite overskudd dersom vi tar med tjenestehandelen. I løpet av det siste tiåret var det 
eksepsjonelt rask eksportvekst til mange asiatiske markeder. Norge eksporterer råvarer og 
kapitalvarer til Asia, og importerer konsum- og kapitalvarer. Sjømateksporten til Asia er fortsatt 
betydelig, selv om dens andel av eksporten har falt noe. Norges handel med Kina har også vokst 
hurtig de senere år, til et toppunkt i 2009. Etter 2009 har det vært en generell nedgang, for flere 
sektorer i både eksport og import. 
Tjenestehandel representerer 30 % av Norges eksport av varer og tjenester til Asia, og 20 % av 
importen. Skipsfart og ”andre forretningstjenester” er de viktigste sektorene for både eksport og 
import. Singapore, etterfulgt av Australia, Kina, Korea og Japan, er de viktigste handelspartnerne 
for tjenester. 
                                                          
2
 Generelt dekker vi de 16 landene som planlegger å etablere avtalen om RCEP (Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership) innen 2015, det vil si ASEAN (10 land), Kina, Japan og Korea (av og til omtalt som 
”+3”), samt India, Australia og New Zealand. Tabellvedlegget inneholder omfattende tallmateriale som kan 
brukes til analyse av enkeltland. 
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For tjenester er salg fra norsk-kontrollerte selskaper i Asia mye større enn den direkte eksporten 
over grensene. I 2011 var det 425 norsk-kontrollerte selskaper i Asia, som sysselsatte 48 000 
personer og hadde en omsetning på 136 milliarder NOK. Mer enn halvparten av dette var i 
tjenestenæringene. Direkteinvesteringer (FDI) i Asia økte fra 2.5 til 11.4 % av Norges samlede 
utenlandsinvesteringer fra 1998 til 2011. Singapore er det viktigste landet, med 80 % av samlet 
norsk utgående FDI til Asia. Singapore kan også være mellomledd for investeringer relatert til 
andre asiatiske land. I tillegg til direkteinvesteringer var det betydelige porteføljeinvesteringer i 
Asia, med Statens Pensjonsfond Utland som den viktigste aktør. Investeringer i Asia utgjorde ved 
utgangen av 2012 12.9 % av fondets samlede verdi. Dette er lavere enn Asias andel i verdens 
BNP, men som følge av nye forvaltningsregler i fondet fra 2012 forventes Asias andel å stige over 
tid. Av ulike grunner er Europas investeringer i Kina relativt sett lave, og dette gjelder også for 
Norges FDI så vel som pensjonsfondet. 
Utgående direkteinvesteringer fra Asia har i det siste skutt fart, og forventes å øke ytterligere i 
framtida. Asias andel i Norges inngående direkteinvesteringer har økt fra 2.0 til 5.4 %, med 
Singapore og Kina som de største investorene. 
Hvis vi sammenlikner Norges vareimport fra Asia med de asiatiske landenes motsvarende 
statistikk for eksport til Norge, finner vi overraskende at eksporten er om lag dobbelt så stor som 
eksporten. En mulig forklaring er datafeil: varene sendes indirekte og opprinnelses- eller 
bestemmelsesland blir feilrapportert. En annen mulighet er at det er et prispåslag på veien, som 
følge av påløpte kostnader eller feilprising i handelen;  det siste kan skje på grunn  av ulike 
motiver (for eksempel  skattemotivert). Analysen viser at de to typene forklaring er omtrent like 
viktige, og det ”sanne” prispåslaget for importen fra Asia er på 37 % i gjennomsnitt. Ved å bruke 
disse resultatene finner vi at Norge har omtrent balansert varehandel med Asia; ikke et betydelig 
handelsoverskudd – slik statistikken fra Asia tyder på. 
I det store og hele har Norge lyktes i å øke det økonomiske samkvem med Asia parallelt til 
regionens økonomiske vekst, med rask økning i samhandel og investeringer. For investeringer og 
tjenestehandel er det et spesielt trekk ved Norges økonomiske forhold til Asia at ASEAN, og 
spesielt Singapore, har en svært høy andel sammenliknet med deres økonomiske størrelse. 
For Norge har import fra Asia med lave priser bidratt til lavere prisvekst for konsumvarer, og  økt 
etterspørsel fra Asia etter olje og andre råvarer har bidratt til høyere priser for Norges eksport. 
Hvis vi oppsummerer dette og sammenlikner med året 2000 finner vi at det var en gevinst i 
bytteforholdet med utlandet som tilsvarte 27% av BNP i 2012, eller en gave på 45 milliarder 
dollars. Asia var en viktig faktor bak dette. 
I år 2000 var det bare en håndfull frihandelsavtaler i Asia, men senere har antallet eksplodert, til 
71 avtaler i dag og mange flere under forhandling. Det har vært betydelige framskritt for 
avtalenes omfang og graden av liberalisering, med det er fortsatt et stykke fram til et ”indre 
marked” i Asia. Flere planer er lansert for å konsolidere froihandelsavtalene i omfattende 
regionale ”mega-frihandelsavtaler”: med ASEAN+3 (dvs. Med Kina, Japan, Korea) som ett 
alternativ og Asia-16, med India, Australia og New Zealand i tillegg, som et annet. Det sistnevnte 
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er planen i RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) som skal forhandles innen 
2015. En delvis overlappende og delvis konkurrerende avtale er TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), 
der forhandlingene omfatter 12 land inkludert USA, men ikke Kina. Det pågår for tiden en intens 
debatt om de ulike mulighetene men forventningen er at det vil ta tid å få på plass en mega-
frihandelsavtale og dette vil skje gradvis medd flere skritt. En avtale mellom Kina, Japan og Korea 
vil være en viktig byggestein. Det er rivalisering om hvem som skal lede an; Kina foretrekker 
ASEAN+3, RCEP ledes av ASEAN men Japan har lansert et annet initiativ for de samme 16 
landene. 
Som en del av prosjektet er det utarbeidet en egen artikkel (Park 2013) som analyserer 
frihandelsavtaler i Asia mer grundig. Den konkluderer at det vil være betydelige velferdsgevinster 
fra en mega-avtale som RCEP, og enda mer å hente hvis man går lenger og danner FTAAP (Free 
Trade Area of the Asia Pacific), med landene i RCEP+TPP inkludert. Politisk sett er imidlertid dette 
et stykke inn i framtida. 
For Norge reiser analysen en del implikasjoner og politiske spørsmål: 
 Norge har med suksess hengt med i Asias vekst og utviklet de økonomiske koblinger til 
regionen. Dette vil fortsette i framtida, og spres til nye områder, som eksempelvis større 
inngående investeringer fra Asia. 
 I lys av Asias økende betydning bør Norge utvikle videre sitt nettverk av frihandelsavtaler i 
regionen. Norge bør imidlertid også støtte utviklingen av multilaterale avtaler, for å unngå et 
altfor komplekst system av tosidige avtaler, med ulike regler og reguleringer på kryss og tvers 
av kloden. 
 Med svakere framskritt i multilaterale institusjoner som WTO bør Norge også se på 
muligheten for ”plurilateraler” avtaler der noen men ikke alle land deltar. Dette kan skje 
innenfor eller utenfor WTO; for eksempel ved å revitalisere OECD på det handels- og 
investeringspolitiske felt. 
 I den nye handelspolitiske situasjonen kan Norges politikk ikke være ”reaktiv” på samme 
måte som før; en bred og mer proaktiv tilnærming trengs for å utnytte mulighetene som bi-, 
pluri- og multilaterale spor gir for å oppnå handelspolitiske mål, for eksempel overfor viktige 
regioner som Asia. For dette formål kan det også være hensiktsmessig å revurdere 
arbeidsdelingen mellom de relevante institusjonene (departementene).  
 Mens Norge har betydelige direkteinvesteringer i ASEAN, er det motsatte tilfelle for norske 
investeringer i Kina; både direkte- og porteføljeinvesteringer. Årsakene til dette kan ligge 
både i Norge og Kina, og bør undersøkes nærmere. Betydningen av holdingselskaper og 
indirekte investeringer via andre land i Asia er her også av interesse.  
 Man bør undersøke nærmere hvorfor det er et stort og voksende gap mellom 
handelsstatistikk fra Asia versus Norge. Avhengig av hvilke årsaker man finner, kan aktuelle 
tiltak være alt fra bedre statistikk-metode til kamp mot skatteunndragelse. 
 
1: Introduction 
During the last four decades, the most dramatic change in the world economy has been the rise 
of Asia, with rapid economic growth lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty and making Asia 
a giant region in the world economy. This study examines the economic development of Asia, 
focusing on four aspects; the role of Asia in the world economy; the heterogeneity of Asia and 
future growth prospects; the process of intra-regional integration in Asia; and Norway’s 
economic links to Asia. The countries studied cover about half the world’s population, 34 % of 
world GDP (PPP), and 28 % of world trade. In the report, we show that integration in Asia occurs 
in a setting that is different from post-war Europe, and highlights some major differences 
between post-war European integration and the current Asian process: 
 First, there is currently greater heterogeneity between countries in ASEAN+6 than among 
EU/EEA countries in terms of income levels. This is a two-way relationship: heterogeneity 
makes integration more difficult since countries may have different economic needs or 
interests. On the other hand, integration may contribute to convergence. For example, EU 
enlargement has clearly contributed to income convergence between European countries 
(Melchior 2011). 
 Second, post-war integration in Europe happened, at least during the early stages, in a 
setting with predominantly national production systems. In contrast, Asian growth and trade 
is partly driven by international investment (FDI), with a strong role for international 
production networks. Whereas Western Europe thrived through massive expansion of two-
way trade in similar consumer products (intra-industry trade, e.g. VW vs. Peugeot), intra-
Asian trade is to a larger extent characterized by vertical specialization – trading 
components and raw materials against consumer goods. For consumer goods, markets 
outside Asia are still more important.  
Chapter 2 sets the stage by examining the rise of Asia in the world economy, focusing on the 
role of Asia in world trade in goods and services as well as FDI, and the increasing role of intra-
Asian trade and production networks. 
Chapter 3 focuses on growth and the heterogeneity of Asia, has there been income convergence 
or divergence? Focusing on income growth; patterns of trade and industrial change; and long-
term determinants of growth and development such as skills, institutions and inequality, we 
present growth forcasts and future growth prospects.   
Chapter 4 maps Norway’s economic links to Asia, covering trade in goods and services, FDI and 
portfolio investments, and how Norway is linked to Asian value chains. The chapter also analyses 
the large statistical discrepancies found between Asian and Norwegian statistics for bilateral 
trade flows. 
Norway, Asia and the Global Value Chains 
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In chapter 5, we discuss implications of the analysis, with a particular focus on trade policy and 
the emerging pattern of free trade agreements in Asia, and how Norway relates to this.  
A separate paper on FTAs in Asia (Park 2013) is also published as part of the project. This 
contains a comprehensive analysis of FTAs in Asia and is the primary project output in that area. 
In the analysis, an objective is to present comprehensive and up-to-date statistics and data 
analysis, and the Appendix includes 28 tables with such information in all the fields covered by 
the analysis. Some of this is used directly in the analysis, but the intention is also to provide a 
comprehensive set of data that may be used for more detailed study of individual countries.  
The study focuses on the countries involved in the most recent initiative for comprehensive 
trade integration in Asia; the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership). RCEP 
involves the 10 countries of ASEAN; the +3 group (China, Japan and Korea); and what we may 
call ++3 (Australia, India, New Zealand). We generally refer to this as Asia-16 or ASEAN+6. In 
some contexts, we also use data including Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao (Asia-19); given their 
geographical location and (especially for Hong Kong and Taiwan) importance for trade and 
financial flows. Sometimes data availability is limited so we may end up with undesired groups, 
we then use terms such as Asia-15 etc. to indicate data coverage. 
With respect to time period, the aim is to provide an updated analysis with the most recent data 
available, but also show trends over the last decade, or longer if data permits. The time 
coverage varies across chapters, depending on data availability and the purpose of the analysis.  
2: Asia in the world economy: global value chains and Asian 
production networks 
2.1. Asia’s share of the world economy 
For several decades, Asia – in particular East and South East Asia, had fast economic growth and 
increased their share of the world economy; starting with Japan, later followed by other 
countries in the region, and then China. While South Asia is still far behind, India joined the club 
of fast-growing economies from the 1990s. The Asian miracle is well known; in this chapter we 
will review it in a compact way, adding new data and some qualifications to the story. In short: A 
brief portrait of the Asian miracle, focusing on recent decades. 
Figure 1 shows that the share of Asia in the 
world economy increased rapidly from 1990 
to 2010.3 The pace of this change, however, 
depends strongly on whether we use 
ordinary exchange rates (“Nominal” in the 
graph), or constructed exchange rates that 
correct for differences in purchasing power 
parity across countries (PPP). According to 
PPP data, Asia’s share rose from 23 to 34% of 
the world economy; with nominal exchange 
rates it increased from 26 to 30%.  
Using PPP data is appropriate in this context, 
but there is more uncertainty about data 
since such data depend on extensive collection of price data across the globe, undertaken in the 
International Comparison Program.4 This is however not an easy task, and the problems were 
illustrated when the World Bank, after obtaining new price data from the 2005 ICP round of data 
collection, suddenly adjusted the real income level of China down by 40% (see e.g. Ravaillon 
2013 for a discussion)! Similar adjustments were made for a number of other developing 
countries, and this reveals the fragility of PPP data. Note that ICP data are collected on a regional 
basis, and a couple of countries are used as links from one region to the others. If anything goes 
wrong with these “ring leaders”, it can affect the outcome for the whole region. Hence there is 
some uncertainty about the reliability of PPP data and the speed of Asian growth, but there is no 
reason to doubt the existence of the Asian miracle, as it is corroborated by other indicators, e.g. 
global market shares.  
                                                          
3
 Own calculations based on data from World Development Indicators. Comparable data for Cambodia is 
missing; therefore Asia (18). 
4
 See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPEXT/Resources/ICP_2011.html.  
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When comparing GDP levels across countries, it is important to recall that GDP does not only 
measure private consumption, but also includes investment and government consumption. This 
is particularly important in the context of Asia, where a comparably high share of GDP has been 
investment. While gross savings in the OECD in 2012 was at 17 % of GDP, China had 52 % and a 
number of other Asian countries were above 30 %. An implication of this is that Asia’s share of 
world consumption has risen less than its share of world GDP. This is important to recall in 
discussions about global convergence and world inequality: GDP figures capture the economy 
and not only consumption. Fast growth in emerging countries in Asia has contributed to global 
convergence across countries, measured by GDP per capita, but if we use consumption per 
capita this trend is somewhat weaker (but still present).  
2.2. Asia’s role in world trade in goods 
Asia’s growth has been intrinsically 
linked to manufacturing exports; 
several countries have started 
exporting labour-intensive goods and 
gradually moving into more capital- 
or skill-intensive sectors. Asia is the 
“world’s manufacturing workshop”. 
Figure 2 shows the shares of Asia-19 
in world trade in goods 1970-2010. 
The underlying data are presented in 
Appendix Table 1, which also 
distinguishes between manufactures 
and commodities. 
Undertaking a similar analysis with 
the world divided into six major 
regions, Melchior (2012) shows that intra-Asian trade was one of the fastest growing 
components of world trade. For Asia-16 this share grew from 4 to 13 %. Asia’s exports to the rest 
of the world (ROW) also grew rapidly, and more rapidly than the corresponding imports. Adding 
the three components, we find that the total share of Asia-16 in world trade increased from 12% 
in 1970 to 28% in 2010. Appendix Table 1 shows that in trade with ROW, the developments for 
manufacturing and commodities were different: Manufacturing exports to ROW, and commodity 
imports from ROW, grew faster.  
2.3. Asia’s share of world FDI 
For Asia’s manufacturing expansion, FDI has played an important role, especially for machinery 
and transport equipment. Textiles production has more often been nationally owned, but often 
in the form of production for multinational companies. With this growing role of global value 
chains (GVCs), FDI as well as NEF (Non-Equity Forms of relationships to GVCs) are key 
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ingredients. Figures 3a and 3b show the share of Asia-19 in the world’s FDI stocks, 1980-2010, 
based on data from UNCTAD. Observe that there was strong growth in FDI during the period, so 
a falling share does not imply falling FDI.  
Fig. 3: Shares of world FDI stock 1980-2012 for major regions. Data source: UNCTAD. 
  
 
Asia’s share in world inward FDI fell strongly before 1998. A major reason was the disinvestment 
in Hong Kong before the 1997 transition; Hong Kong’s share of world inward FDI fell from 25% in 
1980 to 5% in 1997. Showing Asia-18 without Hong Kong in Fig. 3b (the lower curve), it 
resembles the corresponding curve in Fig. 3a; with a steady growth over the period and 
particularly during the last decade. Asia-18 now has a share of world outward/inward FDI at 
13/15 %. The corresponding figures for Asia-19, including Hong Kong, is 22 % (inward) and 19% 
(outward). With Asia growing richer and some countries (e.g. China) having large current 
account surpluses, growing 
international investment is likely. 
Appendix Table 2 shows FDI shares for 
each Asia-19 country. In Asia-19, Hong 
Kong, Japan, China, Singapore and 
Australia are the largest FDI actors, 
with significant inward and outward 
FDI. Japan has little inward investment; 
whereas  for Australia, China and 
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
%
 o
f 
w
o
rl
d
 t
o
ta
l 
(a) Outward 
Asia-19
EU-27
United States
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
%
 o
f 
w
o
rl
d
 t
o
ta
l 
(b) Inward Asia-19
EU-27
United States
Asia-18
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
%
 o
f 
w
o
rl
d
 t
o
ta
l 
Fig. 4: The share of China and India in world FDI 
stocks 
China-in
China-out
India-in
India-out
Norway, Asia and the Global Value Chains 
13 
 
Singapore, inward stocks are larger than outward.  
In the light of recent debates on China’s and India’s FDI in some countries, Fig. 4 also shows the 
shares of these two giants in world FDI stocks over time. Both have increased; China’s levels are 
about four times larger than those of India; and inward is about twice as large as outward FDI 
stocks for both. During the last five years, outward FDI has taken off. This was to be expected, 
especially for China which has a large current account surplus. India, however, has a deficit and 
this makes the growth of outward FDI from India less certain. Among Asia-16, several other 
countries also have larger outward FDI than India.   
From Figures 3a and 3b we may also observe the asymmetry between the USA and the EU-27: 
EU has steadily expanded its FDI but there is a strong decline for the USA during the last decade. 
For the EU, intra-European investment is a key driver.  
In Chapter 5 we also show that a very large share of China’s inward FDI is intra-Asian. It is likely 
that some of this is indirectly from outside Asia; using other Asian countries as hubs for 
investment in China. A closer look at company structures and the use of holding companies 
would be of interest; this is however outside the scope of this study. 
2.4. Asia and global value chains: Trade in value added  
As noted above, FDI and NEF are the two major forms of linking Asia’s economy to GVCs (global 
value chains). UNCTAD (2013, 138) shows that the FDI inward stock is a strong predictor about 
countries’  participation in GVCs. The presence of FDI in Asian GVCs implies that a lot of cross-
border trade is intra-firm trade: According to UNCTAD (ibid., 135), 80 % of world trade is related 
to multinational enterprises (MNEs); in the form of intra-firm trade, or NEF (non-equity forms 
such as franchising, licensing etc.) transactions, or arms-length transactions. The report contains 
some information on Asia (ibid., 136):  
 In China, foreign affiliates accounted for 50% of exports and 48% of imports in 2012. 
 In Japan, national MNEs accounted for 85% of exports of goods and services, and foreign 
affiliates another 8%.  
 Japenese MNEs export about 40% of their goods and services to their own affiliates abroad. 
 Intra-firm traded generally accounts for 30% of a country’s exports, with large variation 
across countries.  
Evidence is more systematic concerning the use of imported inputs in production for exports. 
The general point here is that gross trade flows imply a double-counting of trade due to the use 
of imported inputs. For example, Thailand’s automobile industry imports many components 
from other countries, and the gross value of a car therefore includes value added created in 
other countries. Since trade in components is doble-counted, an effort has recently been made 
to “clean out” this double-counting in order to provide evidence on “trade in value added”. 
Different initiatives exist for this purpose, e.g. UNCTAD has its own database (UNCTAD-Eora GVC 
database); there is the TiVA (Trade in Value Added)  from the WTO/OECD and available on their 
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website; and some data are available on the web page of WIOD (World Input-Output Database, 
www.wiod.org), built on a recent EU research project (for info, see Timmer et al. 2012). We will 
here use an illustration based on TiVA, since 16 out of Asia-19 are included. Figure 5 shows the 
foreign value added share of gross exports for these 16 countries, plus Norway, USA and an 
average for Norway based on data for 26 EU countries.  
This shows how much of e.g. 
Norway’s exports that is not “Made in 
Norway” but made abroad. This share 
is influenced by various aspects (see 
e.g. UNCTAD 2013 for a discussion): 
 The sector composition of 
exports; commodity producers 
typically do not import many 
components. On the other hand, 
this share may be very large for 
e.g. cars and electronics. For 
example, 75% of the value added 
in the Thai automotive industry is 
made abroad. 
 Large countries may have lower 
shares, since their value chains 
may be more domestic. 
 The extent of FDI or NEF 
involvement in value chains: This 
has increased over time, also 
increasing the share of foreign components in production. 
In line with this, we find low foreign shares for commodity exporters such as Australia, Norway 
and New Zealand, and for the USA which is a large country. EU is intermediate, with a 
considerable share of foreign value added, probably due to large intra-European FDI. Asian 
countries generally have high shares, with Singapore (also an entrepot trader, in addition to large 
FDI and small size) on top. China is an intermediate case, and India lower. Both are large 
countries but according to several sources, India is weakly integrated in the Asian value chains 
(Sen et al. 2012). 
The calculation of such figures is a very challenging task and without going into detail on the 
technicalities, it may be noted that existing estimates vary considerably for the same countries; 
e.g. UNCTAD (2013, 133) put Singapore at 64% and India at 10% (for 2010), deviating from the 
TiVA results. The figures should therefore be considered as rough indications rather than precise 
measures. 
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An issue is whether the foreign share of value added is intra-regional or sourced from other 
continents. According to UNCTAD (2013, 132), 42% of the GVC trade flows of East and South-East 
Asia are intra-regional. Another proxy can be obtained from the regional distribution of FDI. 
Appendix Table 3 shows regional distribution of greenfield investment in East and South East 
Asia in 2011-2012. About half of inward FDI was from Asia-19, with Japan as the largest investor. 
This evidence suggests that about half, or a bit less, of Asia’s sourcing of inputs is intra-Asian. 
As a result of the growing role international production networks and trade in intermediate 
goods, Asia has a trade pattern that differs from Europe:  a considerable part of intra-Asian trade 
growth is due to trade in intermediate and capital goods, not consumer goods. Using UNCTAD’s 
classification of trade into raw materials, intermediates, consumer goods and capital goods5, 
Table 1 shows the pattern of trade in 2010, and growth rates 2000-2010 for each flow.6 
  
                                                          
5 Classifying goods in this way is not an easy task and a brief comment on this is warranted: Parts and final 
goods are often classified together in the same item of the classification, so one cannot distinguish 
intermediates from the final product. Second; a product, say a car, may be used as an input into 
production or as a private consumption goods.  Hence the classification made by UNCTAD should be 
considered as a rough approximation. Observe also that many mechanical components, e.g. car bumpers 
or gear boxes, are classified as capital goods by UNCTAD, and not as intermediates. 
6
 The years 2000 and 2010 are chosen due to better ccountry coverage of data. All EU-27 countries are 
included. For Asia, Brunei, Lao PDR and Myanmar are missing but Hong Kong, Macao and Tawan are 
included; i.e. data covers 16 countries among Asia-19. 
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Table 1: Trade in goods: Trade patterns of Asia-16 and EU-27, 2000 and 2010 
ROW=Rest of the World 
Shares of intra- and extra-regional trade in total trade for each product (%) 
 
Intra-Asia 16 Asia-16 with ROW Intra-EU EU with ROW 
  Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Raw materials 78 28 22 72 75 30 25 70 
Intermediate goods 63 57 37 43 66 67 34 33 
Consumer goods 41 63 59 37 66 61 34 39 
Capital goods 55 72 45 28 56 57 44 43 
Total trade 54 57 46 43 64 58 36 42 
Trade composition: share of each product for each trade flow (%) 
  Intra-Asia 16 Asia-16 with ROW Intra-EU EU with ROW 
  Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Raw materials 10 11 3 37 7 7 4 22 
Intermediate goods 23 22 16 22 22 24 20 16 
Consumer goods 22 22 38 17 38 37 34 32 
Capital goods 43 44 41 23 28 26 38 27 
Total trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Annual growth of trade 2000-2010 (%) 
  Intra-Asia 16 Asia-16 with ROW Intra-EU EU with ROW 
  Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Raw materials 12.4 12.2 7.0 12.0 6.0 4.6 4.2 7.1 
Intermediate goods 9.5 8.3 9.9 8.9 4.1 4.3 5.2 5.2 
Consumer goods 9.1 7.3 8.3 8.3 4.7 4.8 6.5 7.8 
Capital goods 9.0 9.0 6.2 4.1 2.5 2.6 5.2 3.1 
Total trade 9.5 8.8 7.6 8.4 3.9 3.9 5.7 5.6 
Source: Own calculations based on data from WITS/COMTRADE. 
 
From the bottom row, it is evident that Asia’s trade in goods grew much faster than that of 
Europe, and the component with most rapid growth was intra-Asian trade. More than half of 
exports and imports are now intra-Asian. Whereas 64% of the exports of EU-27 in 2010 were 
intra-regional, the corresponding share for Asia is 54%. 
A major difference between Asia-16 and EU-27 is that consumer goods has a lower share of 
intra-regional trade; with a correspondingly higher share for capital goods (including mechanical 
components, see footnote 2). This is illustrated by the shaded cells in the table, and is an 
illustration of the importance of international production networks in the region.   
The table also illustrates the rapid growth in Asia’s trade and consumption for raw materials; this 
was the product group with fastest growth in 2000-2010. Here it should be recalled that trade 
growth rates in Table 1 are based on value, and therefore also driven by commodity price 
increases during the period. 
It should be recalled that inputs, domestic or foreign, are not only physical components but also 
services. A growing share of GVCs is in services. As known from the WTO terminology, services 
can be traded internationally via different modes, where direct cross-border trade (such as a 
Norway, Asia and the Global Value Chains 
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telephone call, or transport services) is one important mode, and trade via affiliates or FDI is 
another. In this perspective it is important that a large and growing share of FDI in Asia is in 
services sectors. Appendix Table 4 shows the sector composition of greenfield FDI in 2011-2012, 
and shows that more than half of inward as well as outward FDI in East and South East Asia in 
2012 was in services. According to UNCTAD (2013, 156) “more than half of value added in 
exports comes from service-related activities, which is more than twice the share of services in 
worldwide gross exports”.  
Observe also that GVCs do not stop at the border of the exporting country; it extends to the 
consumer in the destination market, and various services may be added on the way. For Norway 
as a shipping nation, this is particularly important and we will see in Chapter 4 that transport 
services exports, related to Asia’s trade in goods, is an important aspect of Norway’s relations to 
Asia.  
For trade in goods, transport costs are reflected in the so-called “cif-fob margin: Imports are 
reported in the importing country on a “cif” (cost, insurance, freight) basis, while exports are 
reported ”fob” (free on board) in the exporting country; i.e. excluding transport costs. Using 
“mirror data” (comparing figures reported by the two trade partners), we can construct these 
ratios. Ww expect the cif-fob ratio to be somewhat above 1 since transport and possibly other 
services are added on the way. The expectation is nevertheless that the ratio should not be very 
large; transport costs are often below 10% and insurance cost is normally modest in comparison. 
For years, the IMF used 10 % as a rule of thumb for filling in missing observations in their 
balance-of-payments statistics.  
In this perspective, it is shocking to take 
a look at real mirror data; the cif-fob 
ratios vary wildly and for some 
countries, they are consistently far 
higher than 1.1. As an illustration for 
Asia,  Figure 6, based on Melchior 
(2013, forthcoming) shows average cif-
fob ratios for trade with China during 
1990-2010, for about 100 countries.7 
The average values were very high until 
about 2000; around 1.6 for China’s 
exports and 1.4 for imports. Later, the 
value has fallen to 1.2-1.3. One possibility is that China has moved “up the GVC” and taken over 
more of the services production, and this is reflected in the export value. With China’s trade at 
3724 billion USD in 2012, 25% amounts to almost 1000 billion USD. Is this transport costs, 
statistical error, payment for other services, or trade mispricing? The interesting issue is what 
                                                          
7
 The number of countries depends on data availability and varies from 75 to 154 countries over the 
period, so some (a modest part) of the variation over time may be due to changing country coverage. See 
Melchior (2013) for details. 
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explains these high ratios, since average transport costs are hardly in that range. In Chapter 4 
(section 4.8) we will examine Norway’s trade with Asia and present some new evidence. 
A possibility with ever more important GVCs is that MNEs can undertake transfer pricing or trade 
mispricing in order to avoid taxes or tariffs, or to transfer money. Or prices may be adjusted as 
goods are sold via middlemen. Adjusting trade prices is a powerful method to transfer money 
across borders. According to UNCTAD (2013, 156), the growing share of services in GVCs makes it 
difficult to control  for trade mispricing: The price of a physical good may often be checked but 
services prices are more tricky. With the large role of FDI in Asian GVCs, an important issue is 
what the owners do with profits from their activity; are these reinvested or repatriated to other 
countries? While a limited part of value added (1/20 of value added, according to UNCTAD 
(2013, 154)) is repatriated, it is possible that more is transferred via trade transactions. That, 
however, is mere speculation. 
2.5. Asia in world trade in services 
Apart from its role in GVCs, Asia’s  services trade is also a component of growing importance in 
their trade. As noted above, a significant share of Asian FDI, inward and outward, is in services, 
so a considerable part of services trade occurs in this mode. In addition, there is growing direct 
trade, ranging from tourism to information technology services. Also for services, Asia’s share 
has increased over time. Due to variable data availability, we present only a short time series 
(Fig. 7). 
Fig. 7: Asia – share of world services trade 2005-2010. Data source: IMF and national sources. 
 
Recalling that Asia had about 31% if world trade in goods in 2010 (see e.g. Appendix Table 1), Fig. 
7 shows that Asia’s share in world services trade was a bit lower, but increasing over time. Also 
for services, China, Japan and Korea have a large share of Asia’s trade; about double of ASEAN. 
Considering individual Asian countries, Table 2 shows trade in commercial services by country. 
Appendix Table 5 presents more detailed evidence on services trade by sector. The largest 
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services exporter is China,  followed by India, Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong. The share of 
services in goods+services trade varies substantially across countries, with China at 9-13% among 
the lowest. For India, that has missed out on some of the opportunities in manufacturing 
production and trade, an issue is whether the surplus in services is larger than the deficit in 
manufacturing. From this perspective it is good to see from Table 2 that India, Hong Kong and 
Macao have significant trade surpluses in services. However, for India it is unfortunately not 
large enough to compensate for a much larger deficit in goods trade. 
Table 2: The services trade of Asian countries, 2011 (million USD) 
 
Services trade 2011 Goods trade 
balance 
Services as % of 
goods+services trade 
Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports 
Australia 51852 60994 -9142 35912 16 21 
Brunei 915 1434 -519 9429 7 29 
Cambodia 
   
576 n.a. n.a. 
China 184763 238909 -54146 277608 9 13 
Hong Kong 91497 74259 17238 -494008 84 13 
India 138528 125041 13487 -160920 31 21 
Indonesia 21844 31519 -9675 26252 10 15 
Japan 137350 175780 -38430 -32197 14 17 
Korea, Rep. 95257 101107 -5850 30804 15 16 
Lao PDR 550 331 219 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Macao SAR 40027 10693 29334 -7475 99 58 
Malaysia 36145 38174 -2029 39448 14 17 
Myanmar 672 1090 -419 3461 8 21 
New Zealand 11212 11869 -657 279 24 25 
Philippines 17858 12575 5283 -15651 27 16 
Singapore 116160 115466 694 43733 22 24 
Taiwan 45920 42026 3894 10230 14 13 
Thailand 41573 52136 -10563 2642 15 19 
Viet Nam 8879 11859 -2980 -9844 8 10 
       
Asia (16) 871706 833540 38167 -239721 14 13 
ASEAN (9) 244596 264584 -19989 100046 16 19 
China/Japan/Korea 417370 515796 -98426 276215 11 15 
AUS NZ India 201592 197904 3688 -124729 25 21 
HK, Macao, TWN 177444 126978 50466 -491253 37 14 
Data source: Services data from IMF, downloaded from CEIC-data. Goods trade data from WITS/COMTRADE. Note: For some 
countries, deviating years have been used: Brunei: services 2009, goods 2012. Macao: goods 2012. Myanmar: goods 2010. 
 
The services sector is a major contributor to income growth as well as job creation; e.g. even in 
China, more jobs were created in services than in manufacturing (180 vs. 100 mill.). A major issue 
for Asia is that services productivity is far below the OECD level (Noland et al. 2012). Within 
countries, there may also be huge variation in productivity; e.g. India is the world’s leading 
exporter of Computer and related services, but at the same time has a massive “informal” 
services sector with low income levels and productivity. Also in Asia, the share of services in GDP 
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increases with income levels, but there is large heterogeneity across countries – with e.g. Brunei 
below 40% and Singapore above 70%. For an overview, see Noland et al. 2012.  According to 
Park (2012), developing country Asia remains trapped in traditional services with limited 
potential for value addition. Even advanced nations such as Korea have relatively low 
productivity in services, in spite of their efficiency and success in manufacturing. In the context of 
international trade, it may also be noted that several countries in developing Asia are among the 
most restrictive when it comes to trade protection (ibid.). 
3: The heterogeneity of Asia: growth – and convergence? 
3.1. Asian heterogeneity 
In Chapter 2, we have given an overall portrait of Asia and its phenomenal growth and development. It 
is important to recall that there is considerable variation across countries. In this Chapter, we will take 
a look at this variation: Have the poorest caught up with the richer ones? Will the success stories 
continue, or will they slow down and end in the “middle income trap” like some emerging countries 
have done in the past, e.g. in South America? As an illustration of the diversity of Asia, Figure 8 shows 
per capita income in 2012 for a selection of countries in Asia-19 and EU/EEA where data were 
available.8 
 
The greater disparities within Asia are evident: The richest countries in Asia are at par with the 
richest in Western Europe, but the poorest countries in EU/EEA are three times richer than 
several major Asian countries and are still above China. The relative differences in Asia are in fact 
even larger for economic size, where e.g. China and Japan in 2012 were 900 and 640 times larger 
than Laos, respectively! Within Western Europe, small countries have been given larger than 
proportional voting power in EU bodies. This is perhaps more difficult when differences become 
so large.  
Have income level differences within Asia decreased or increased over time? Figure 9 plots 
growth rates 1996-2012 against initial income levels, and suggests that the differences 
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 Data from World Development Indicators/World Bank, downloaded November 2013. 
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decreased: there was income convergence. The diagram compares GDP per capita (PPP) annual 
growth rates  1996-2012 (vertical axis) and the initial income level in 1996 (horizontal axis).  
There was on the whole significant 
convergence over the period, with 
poor countries growing faster. 
Appendix Table 6 reports 
regression analysis of convergence 
in more detail. We find that there 
are clear signs of convergence using 
different approaches, particularly in 
the period after 2000. As seen from 
Fig. 9, China led the pack, whereas 
some important ASEAN countries 
(Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Philippines) had slower growth 
during the period. Macao, 
influenced by China, tourism and 
casinos, was an outlier.  
Will this process of growth and convergence continue, or is there a danger of some countries 
falling behind? In Fig. 9, some of the countries with modest income levels also had more modest 
growth (Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia). Will these countries also take off or will they 
lag behind? Among the success stories, we have also seen that e.g.  India struggles with 
competitive performance in manufacturing, and is weakly embedded in Asian production 
networks. For China, there is a consensus that the growth path of the past, relying on low-or 
medium-skill manufacturing, can not sustain similar growth rates in the future. Hence GDP 
growth rates for China are expected to fall, and further growth depends on China’s ability to 
develop its skills and upgrade technologies. According to World Bank/DRC (2012), China’s GDP 
growth rate is expected to fall gradually towards 5% in 2030. There is nothing dramatic in this; 
5% is still significant growth and one simply cannot grow at 9-10% forever. 
3.2. Medium-term forecasts and their implications 
Foreseeing the future is a difficult endeavour, but this chapter will examine some indicators and 
trends.Table 3 shows the growth forecasts from IMF, OECD, ADB, EIU for 2018 for the first two 
and 2014 for the third and 2017 for the latter. It seems the four organizations to a large extent 
agree on their growth forecasts, which may reflect that they use fairly similar tools to predict 
growth. Brunei and Singapore are expected to have 2-3 % annual growth whereas the poorer 
countries are expected to maintain growth levels well above 5 % with China, Laos and Cambodia 
having the highest numbers approaching 8 %. 
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Fig. 9: Income convergence within Asia 1996-2012 
Source: Calculated from data from World Development 
Indicators. 
Norway, Asia and the Global Value Chains 
23 
 
Table 3: Predicted growth levels (Source: IMF, OECD, ADB, EIU) 
Country IMF 2018 OECD 2018 ADB 2014 EIU 2017 
Australia 3.0 
  
3.1 
Brunei Darussalam 3.5 2.4 2.0  
China 7.0 7.5 8.0 6.3 
Indonesia 6.0 6.1 6.6 6.3 
India 6.7 6.1 6.5 6.5 
Japan 1.1 
  
1.1 
Cambodia 7.5 7.1 7.5  
Korea 4.0 
  
4.2 
Lao P.D.R. 7.9 7.5 7.7  
Myanmar 7.1 7.0 6.7  
Malaysia 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.7 
New Zealand 2.5 
  
2.9 
Philippines 5.5 5.9 5.9 5.7 
Singapore 3.9 3.1 3.7 4.9 
Thailand 4.7 5.3 5.0 5.4 
Vietnam 5.5 6.0 5.6 6.3 
 
Fig. 10 plots the IMF forecast against 
current income levels (GDP/capita 
2012, PPP). The figure resembles Fig. 
9.9 Also, with the exception of 
Singapore and Brunei whose succeses 
can hardly be replicated, there is a 
strong pattern of convergence where  
all the lower left outliers have been 
lifted: no growth failures at the lower 
end. Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand are lifted, whereas China has 
been reduced to 7%. These forecasts 
nevertheless suggest continued 
convergence in Asia, with higher 
growth at the lower end if the income 
range. Hence this is a “harmonious” 
prediction about future growth.  
As a hypothetical experiment, let us assume that these growth rates will continue until 2025. 
What will be the implications for Asia as a whole, and its role in the world economy? For China, 
we use the predicted growth rates from World Bank /DRC 2012; assuming that China’s GDP 
growth will gradually be reduced to 5% in 2030. The result is that the nominal GDP of Asia-16 will 
grow by 81% from 2012 to 2025, and its share of world GDP will increase from 27.8 to 29.3 %. 
This expansion is even more impressive if we exclude Japan: For Asia-15 without Japan, GDP is 
more than doubled and the share of world GDP rises from 19.5 to 24.3 %. Growth in this order 
                                                          
9
 Myanmar is not included in the two graphs since PPP income data is missing. 
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Fig. 10: IMF growth forecast  2018 vs. 
GDP/capita 2012.  
Data source: IMF. 
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will apply to China as well as ASEAN and India. While such extrapolations are uncertain and 
should be treated with caution, they illustrate that Asia, especially emerging Asia, is likely to 
increase further its share in the world economy.  
3.3. Economic growth and structural change in manufacturing 
Asia faces two types of growth problems: At the lower end, there is the potential  for “dropouts” 
that do not succeed in structural transformation or who are trapped in low growth because of 
weak institutions or other other bottlenecks. In the intermediate range, there is the “middle 
income trap” – when the scope for “extensive” growth based on labour force growth and capital 
accumulation in low- or medium-tech industries. This is a challenge faced by e.g. China; hence 
the expectation of gradually lower growth rates in the future. 
To a large extent, the “dropout problem” and the “middle income trap” are just two parts of a 
continuum; about productive capacity, skill upgrading and structural change. Indeed Asia has 
been characterised by fast structural change, with several countries starting with labour-
intensive production and gradually transforming into other industries. An interesting question is 
therefore how Asian countries along the income distribution have fared recently: Have they 
climbed the ladder as we would expect? According to Lie (2012), an empirical study building on 
the Japanese economist Akamatsu (1932), several manufacturing sectors has an an inverse U-
shaped relationship to income: 
production and exports increase until a 
certain income level and thereafter falls. 
According to this, there will be structural 
change as countries grow, with 
corresponding changes in industrial 
structure.  
In order to shed light on the country and 
product pattern of trade specialization in 
Asia, we use a slightly different 
classification of goods into eight main 
sectors; sometimes aggregated further to 
three or four sectors. This classification is 
shown in Appendix Table 7. Using this 
classification, Appendix Tables 8-10 show 
the sector and country composition of 
Asia’s trade, as well as the growth rates 
for each trade flow during 2000-2010. 
Table 10 shows the country shares and 
growth rates of trade by country, split 
into intra- and extra-Asian trade.  
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In order to get the proportions right, observe from Figure 11 that a few countries represent a 
large share of Asia’s trade. China, Japan and Korea are clearly the largest traders in goods, with a 
combined share of 61.4% of exports and 52.1% of imports in 2010. Japan’s share has however 
fallen sharply over time; from 29.7/23.6% of exports/imports in 2000 to 16.8/15.0% in 2010. 
Observe that contrary to other city states or entities, Singapore is a major manufacturing 
exporter with a strong position in intra-Asian production networks. At the other end, Hong Kong 
has almost abandoned manufacturing but maintained a role as a major importer. Given that 
Hong Kong is a well known entrepot for China’s trade, a cautionary note is that its imports may 
include trade that is destined for China. 
Appendix Table 10 differentiates between intra- and extra Asian trade and shows that for the 
majority of countries, the share in intra-Asian exports is higher than in extra-Asian exports. The 
counterbalance here is China, for which exports to the rest of the world is more important.  
Some countries stand out with particularly high export growth: China, India, Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Australia. For India, however, imports grew even faster, especially from other Asian 
countries. For this reason, India has developed a considerable trade deficit with Asia, especially 
for trade in machinery. But even for some labour-intensive industries, India has a trade deficit. 
For describing the performance of individual countries by sector, a useful measure is the Balassa 
index or net export ratio, which has the form 100*(x-m)/(x+m), where x denotes exports and y 
imports. This index varies from -100 (only imports) to 100 (only exports), and equals 0 if trade is 
balanced (imports and exports are equal).10 Figures 12 and 13 plot such indexes vs. per capita 
income levels, for two aggregated sectors; machinery and transport equipment, and light 
industries (textiles and 
other industries) (see 
Appendix Table 7 for 
definitions). This 
aggregation is somewhat 
crude but serves the 
purpose of providing a 
compact summary 
measure of specialization 
and change. Building on 
earlier literature, we 
expect low-income 
countries to have better 
export performance in 
light (labor-intensive) 
                                                          
10
 Observe that this index is naturally biased to be negative since exports are reported ”free on board” 
while cost, insurance and freight are included in import figures that are reported ”cif”.  For example, if the 
transport cost or cif-fob difference is 10% we will have a Balassa index for a balanced trade flow at -0.05. 
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industries, and the relationship may be the opposite for more capital- or skill-intensive 
industries. These may be U-shaped relationships, with a peak at some specific income level (that 
may change over time because of technological change).   
Starting from the lower end, Fig. 12 shows specialization in intra-Asian trade for light industries 
in 2010. There is an inverse U-shaped relationship, which is actually statistically significant 
(p=.01) according to the Lind/Mehlum test.11 It seems the Balassa index for trade in light 
industries is highest for income levels around 8840 PPP$, i.e. around the income level of China 
and Thailand. There are only a handful of countries being net exporters: Indonesia, China, 
Thailand, Malaysia. At the lower left we find Cambodia, India, Philippines and Vietnam as net 
importers, together with richer countries – ranging from Korea to Macao. Among the low-income 
net importers, Philippines also had slow growth in GDP as well as trade (cf. Chapter 2 and Table 
1); the other three had particularly fast trade growth as well as GDP growth; the issue is that 
imports grew faster than exports. 
For machinery and transport 
equipment, Fig. 13 shows a 
different pattern: The richer 
countries are split in two: 
Japan, Korea and Singapore 
have the highest value of the 
Balassa index, showing a 
positive relationship between 
export performance and 
income levels, perhaps also 
here with a U-curve emerging, 
with a peak for Korea and 
Japan.12 Rich but easy-to-
interpret outliers are the cities 
Hong Kong and Macao which 
have become pure importers 
and services exporters, and 
the commodity producers New Zealand and Australia. For the remaining observations, there is a 
positive relationship; with the net export ratio rising with income.  
Figures 12 and 13 show a static picture, and there may be many idiosyncratic features that 
affects the ranking of a country, e.g. the special features of city states (Hong Kong and Macao, 
services traders) or commodity traders (Australia, New Zealand) or services exporters (India). In 
order to confirm the relationship statistically, we should preferably use a larger sample to correct 
                                                          
11
 This is a statistical test for the existence of such a U-shaped relationship. 
12
 From a statistical point of view, there is also in this case a significant (p=.03) inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the Balassa index and log per capita income. 
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for other aspects, and such analysis is beyond the scope of this report. As a shortcut, however, 
we will consider the changes in specialization during 2000-2010, to see if this sheds light on 
whether countries succeed with industrial transformation. Table 4 shows the change in Balassa 
indexes during 2000-2010, for the two sectors and the residual group (commodities):  
 
A consistent pattern of upgrading from light industries to machinery would be to have a positive 
value for machinery and transport equipment, and a negative value for light industries. A weaker 
version would be to have a clearly more positive development for machinery than for light 
industries. The shaded cells show these cases. Only for Korea and Vietnam is there marked 
upgrading for intra- as well as extra-Asian trade. Indications of upgrading are also found for 
Taiwan (intra-Asian trade) India, Cambodia, Thailand and China (extra-Asian trade only). In spite 
of moving up the industrial ladder, China is even improving its trade balance for the light 
industries at the same time. While India had an improving exports of machinery equipment to 
ROW, its manufacturing balance in Asia is weaker, with light industry goods flowing in without 
compensating gains for machinery.  
Some countries do much better in intra-Asian trade than in trade with ROW (Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand); whereas others perform better in trade with ROW: Australia, India, 
Indonesia, partly the Philippines. For some countries, the switch between intra- and extra-
regional trade is more significant. Probably due to the Asian production networks, Singapore has 
improved its manufacturing performance within Asia, but with the opposite development in 
trade with ROW. The opposite seems to be the case for Indonesia, where there was a dramatic 
Table 4: Net trade ratios (Balassa indexes) for 15 countries among Asia-19. 
 
Intra-Asian trade Trade with rest of the world (ROW) 
Balassa indexes 2000 Change 2000-2010 Balassa indexes 2000 Change 2000-2010 
Mach/ 
transp. 
Light 
Comm- 
odities 
Mach/ 
transp. 
Light 
Comm- 
odities 
Mach/ 
transp. 
Light 
Comm- 
odities 
Mach/ 
transp. 
Light 
Comm- 
odities 
Asia (15) -5 -13 -4 1 9 2 30 31 -45 5 8 -1 
Australia -66 -11 59 -13 -13 2 -57 -33 17 -5 6 -23 
China -15 31 -18 14 12 -15 11 68 -37 35 3 -17 
Hong Kong -89 -86 -89 -9 -4 1 -73 -17 -94 -21 -59 -2 
Indonesia 10 44 37 -57 -34 -10 6 72 -15 -33 -4 6 
India -67 29 -10 -3 -46 -2 -28 25 -38 21 -29 5 
Japan 38 -35 -17 -5 9 15 58 -21 -57 4 21 -9 
Cambodia -92 -26 -94 24 20 3 -91 89 -93 74 -5 68 
Korea, Rep. 2 20 -3 21 -30 -5 37 33 -69 15 -20 7 
Malaysia 0 9 12 2 -6 7 20 48 -16 -11 -3 12 
New Zealand -66 10 26 -4 -10 -3 -69 1 22 9 -22 7 
Taiwan -6 35 -15 25 -22 12 24 55 -61 -2 -9 0 
Philippines 7 -45 -40 -25 25 45 27 65 -69 -19 -23 46 
Singapore -2 -28 24 19 23 -7 19 -5 -41 -22 -16 21 
Thailand -8 1 8 5 17 -10 23 51 -20 21 -15 -15 
Vietnam -57 -21 5 10 0 -30 -65 75 18 61 -1 -19 
Source: Own calculations based on data from WITS/COMTRADE. 
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deterioration of the intra-Asian trade balance, from surplus to deficits. In trade with ROW, 
however, Indonesia still has a considerable surplus for light industries. 
In the former growth analysis, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines were “question 
marks” with less impressive growth among the relatively less wealthy countries. The analysis 
here indicates that Malaysia and Thailand performed well, but more question marks are added 
for Indonesia and the Philippines. India has structural change in the right direction but on the 
other hand, overall manufacturing exports are not impressive – as also seen in Chapter 2. 
Another “problem” is that China performs “too well” in the light industries, with more exports 
than expected from its income level, and this may limit light industry expansion in other 
countries. One possible explanation is that China is like 31 countries and not one; so new 
provinces may expand in the light industries when the richer ones along the coast upgrade to 
more skill-intensive production. 
From another angle, observe also that Indonesia and the Philippines had a negative correlation 
between trade openness and economic growth during the last decade (Fig. 13).13 
 
While most other Asian countries had a clear positive correlation between the two variables, 
with income levels and trade openness increasing in parallel, Indonesia and the Philippines (and 
to some extent Malaysia) are exceptions.  
3.4. Long-term determinants of growth, and the middle-income trap 
As a third approach concerning growth performance and prospects, we will consider long-term 
determinants of growth and the ability of countries to avoid the middle-income trap. 
The typical example of the “middle income trap” is a number of Latin American countries that 
grew and reached middle income levels, but then stagnated. For some Asian countries, a 
challenge is that the strategies employed to reach middle income levels are no longer viable to 
go beyond this level. Countries that have had prosperous exporting industries due to an 
abundance of cheap labor cannot continue paying minuscule wages when average incomes 
                                                          
13
 Data source: World Development Indicators online. GDP per capita is PPP, 2005 international $. The 
trade variable is exports + imports of goods and services/GDP, based on value data in current USD. 
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increase unless inequality is to skyrocket. If the workers are to take part in the increased 
prosperity of the country, wages necessarily have to increase. This means that labor becomes 
less cheap, and the competitive advantage is eroded.  
The solution to escaping the middle income trap is to increase productivity and use high 
productivity instead of cheap labor as the competitive advantage. There are several ways to do 
so.  One way is to accumulate more capital. When more capital is available per worker, 
productivity goes up. However, this is only an efficient policy up to a certain limit. A better policy 
may be to increase the human capital of the average worker. Better educated workers are more 
productive and better able to employ advanced production techniques. Moreover, enhanced 
infrastructure facilitates specialization and is believed to be a key driver of transition into high 
productivity. Finally, to reach the global frontier, and active R&D sector is necessary, but may not 
necessarily yet be a key determinant of success for the poorer Asian countries. 
Table 5 shows some indicators of countries’ potential to escape the middle income trap and 
maintain high growth levels. Savings rates, here measured as gross saving, are a key determinant 
of investments in physical capital, and are high in most countries. China’s savings rate of about 
50 % is of course very high. But the levels above 30 % seen in many countries are higher than 
most countries. The OECD average, for instance, is about 17 %. 
Regarding human capital investments, primary enrollment rates are high in all countries. 
Although some of the poorer countries have modest literacy rates, literacy rates among the 
young (people aged 15-25) are reasonable high in all countries with India as a potential 
exception. Secondary enrollment is weak in Cambodia, and also fairly weak in Myanmar and 
India. Tertiary enrollment is still low in many of the poorer countries including China, but is quite 
high in Thailand and Malaysia as well as the rich countries. This implies that most of the 
countries should have a labor force with basic schooling, but many of the countries may lack a 
substantial labor force with higher education. 
One measure of the quality of infrastructure is simply the amount of roads. As larger countries 
naturally have more roads than smaller countries, we report the number of km of roads per 1000 
km2 of land area. Notice that densely populated areas would have high numbers on this 
measure, explaining e.g. Singapore’s very high score as well as Australia’s low score. Still we see 
that the road density in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are so low that access to transportation is 
likely to be an obstacle to sustained economic development.  Next, a measure of the fraction of 
roads that are paved is presented. Some of the caveats related to population density apply here 
as well. The conclusions are fairly similar, although the Philippines also have a large share of 
unpaved roads.  As one would expect, the richer countries have more motorized vehicles per 
1000 persons, and again Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia stand out with the lowest numbers.  
Regarding internet usage, which may also be seen as a measure of infrastructure development, 
Myanmar has very low shares together with Cambodia. The shares in China and particularly 
Vietnam are high relative to the income level of the countries. 
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Table 5: Variables affecting the potential for escaping the middle income trap. 
 Data source: World Development Indicators. Data for 2012. 
 
Austra-
lia 
Brunei 
Darus. 
Cam-
bodia 
China India 
Indo-
nesia 
Japan 
Korea, 
Rep. 
Lao 
PDR 
Malaysia 
Myan-
mar 
New 
Zealand 
Philip-
pines 
Singa-
pore 
Thai-
land 
Viet-
nam 
Variables related to investments in physical and human capital 
Gross savings 24.53 50.90 10.61 52.67 31.43 34.66 21.93 31.55 17.35 34.61 
 
15.99 23.15 45.58 33.57 33.01 
Primary enrollment 105.07 105.06 125.64 113.06 111.97 118.35 102.83 105.62 126.00 96.28 125.59 101.22 105.83 
 
90.68 106.33 
Secondary enrollment 131.29 111.84 44.38 81.36 63.21 80.75 102.20 97.08 45.80 69.10 54.28 119.08 84.82 
 
78.22 57.17 
Tertiary enrollment 79.92 19.63 14.50 26.79 17.87 24.89 59.74 103.11 17.67 42.28 14.82 82.56 28.23 
 
46.42 24.38 
Literacy (%) 
 
95.22 73.90 94.27 62.75 92.58 
  
72.70 93.12 92.29 
 
95.42 95.86 93.51 93.18 
Literacy among 15-25 
 
99.72 87.13 99.40 81.13 99.47 
  
83.93 98.42 95.82 
 
97.75 99.75 98.05 96.94 
Variables related to infrastructure 
Km roads per 100 km
2
 10.66 52.50 21.88 41.75 125.00 25.00 89.06 105.00 17.00 43.65 5.08 35.22 67.00 475.63 35.00 48.00 
Paved roads (%) 43.50 81.10 6.29 53.50 49.50 56.90 78.22 79.30 13.70 80.40 11.90 66.20 9.90 100.00 98.50 47.60 
Vehicles per 1000 pers. 694.91 510.00 21.00 57.72 18.35 59.59 590.81 363.11 20.00 361.02 7.18 711.55 30.40 148.67 156.92 13.00 
Internet users per 1000 pers. 79.00 56.00 3.10 38.30 10.07 18.00 79.53 83.80 9.00 61.00 0.98 86.00 29.00 71.00 23.70 35.07 
Variables related to technology and R&D 
R&D expenditures (% of GDP) 2.37 0.04 0.05 1.70 0.76 0.08 3.36 3.74 0.04 0.63 0.16 1.30 0.11 2.43 0.21 0.19 
Scientific publications per  
1 000 000 persons 
834.23 25.71 1.81 54.80 16.11 1.06 389.04 445.38 1.84 46.21 0.19 719.09 2.31 788.12 30.44 3.67 
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Table 6: Institutional features (Source: Acemoglu et al. 2001, Heritage Foundation, Transparency international, WGI 
Country name 
Threat of 
expropriation 
(Acemoglu  
et al) 
Heritage foundation 
Transparency 
international Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Overall 
score 
2013 
Property 
Rights 
Freedom from 
Corruption 
Score Rank 
Control of 
Corruption 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Political Stability 
and Absence of 
Violence 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of Law 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Australia 9.32 82.6 90.0 88.0 85 7 2.00 1.61 1.00 1.77 1.75 1.50 
Brunei Darussalam  
   
55 46 0.64 0.83 0.92 1.16 0.81 -0.49 
China 7.77 51.9 20.0 36.0 39 80 -0.48 0.01 -0.54 -0.26 -0.49 -1.58 
Indonesia 7.59 56.9 30.0 30.0 32 118 -0.66 -0.29 -0.57 -0.28 -0.60 0.03 
India 8.27 55.2 50.0 31.0 36 94 -0.57 -0.18 -1.25 -0.47 -0.10 0.35 
Japan 9.73 71.8 80.0 80.0 74 17 1.61 1.40 0.94 1.12 1.32 1.09 
Cambodia 
 
58.5 30.0 21.0 22 157 -1.04 -0.83 -0.14 -0.35 -0.97 -0.98 
Korea, Rep. 8.64 70.3 70.0 54.0 56 45 0.47 1.20 0.17 0.89 0.97 0.69 
Lao PDR 
 
50.1 15.0 22.0 21 160 -1.04 -0.88 0.04 -0.84 -0.83 -1.58 
Myanmar 5.77 39.2 10.0 15.0 15 172 -1.12 -1.53 -0.96 -1.87 -1.35 -1.65 
Malaysia 7.95 66.1 55.0 43.0 49 54 0.30 1.01 0.00 0.55 0.51 -0.34 
New Zealand 9.73 81.4 95.0 95.0 90 1 2.32 1.79 1.36 1.84 1.88 1.64 
Philippines 5.45 58.2 30.0 26.0 34 105 -0.58 0.08 -1.16 -0.06 -0.55 -0.04 
Singapore 9.32 88.0 90.0 92.0 87 5 2.15 2.15 1.34 1.96 1.77 0.08 
Thailand 7.64 64.1 45.0 34.0 37 88 -0.34 0.21 -1.21 0.23 -0.17 -0.34 
Vietnam 6.41 51.0 15.0 29.0 31 123 -0.56 -0.29 0.25 -0.68 -0.50 -1.38 
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The last part of the tables looks at R&D efforts. R&D expenditures as a share of national 
income are minuscule in the poorer countries, probably for good reasons. Both China and 
India have fairly high numbers. A second measure we present is a measure of scientific 
output, measured as the number of scientific publications per 1 000 000 persons. The 
number is obviously highest in the richest countries with the highest R&D expenditures. 
Brunei does surprisingly well, particularly in light of its low R&D expenditure. China and to 
some extent India also fare quite well on this measure. Again, the poorest countries have 
very low scientific output. 
Table 6 shows a number of measures of institutional quality for the Asian countries. The first 
is the measure of institution used by the seminal paper by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001), and captures the average ranking of protection against expropriation compiled by 
Political Risk Services over the period 1985 to 1995.Although the measure is somewhat old, 
institutional qualities tend to change slowly so this is probably still a relevant measure. The 
measure goes from 0 for the highest risk to 10 for the best institutions. The conservative 
Think Tank Heritage Foundation also compiles a number of indices of freedom, including 
measures of protection of property rights and absence of corruption. This measures go from 
0 to 100 where 100 is the most free.  Another widely used measure of corruption is the index 
compiled by Transparency international. The index goes from 0 for the most corrupt to 100 
for the last corrupt. Included is also each country’s ranking in the total list which comprise 
176 countries. Finally, the World Bank has supported a project to create a set of indicators of 
good governance labeled Worldwide Governance Indicators (see Kaufmann et al. (2010) for 
details).14 These indicators go from -2.5 for the worst outcomes to 2.5 for the best. 
The measures show strikingly similar results with the exception of the Heritage Foundation’s 
Overall freedom index.15 First, the rich countries New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Japan, 
and South Korea do best (in this order) as one would expect. Malaysia and probably Brunei 
do almost equally well, although fewer indices are available for Brunei so the ranking is less 
clear. Next comes a large group comprising Thailand, India, Indonesia, China, Philippines, and 
Vietnam (in that order), and with the worst institutional rankings come Myanmar, Cambodia 
and Laos. As institutions seem to have a major impact on the possibility for sustained growth, 
it does indicate that the latter group of countries face challenges unless they manage to 
improve their institutions. Countries like Vietnam and China also fare quite badly on this 
measures, possible casting doubt on the possibility of maintaining current levels of growth. 
Appendix Table 12 also shows some measures of income inequality and poverty. Empirically, 
countries with high levels of inequality have been found to grow more slowly.16 The main 
theoretical justification is that in inegalitarian countries, large groups of poor are excluded 
from productive investment opportunities. However, in very poor societies, some inequality 
may be required to get investments to take off. The Gini coefficient is a well-known measure 
of inequality which goes from 0 for perfect inequality to 100 for extreme inequality. For 
actual countries observed today, the measure goes from about 20 to about 65. Japan is 
                                                          
14
 Updated data available at http://www.govindicators.org/ 
15
 A factor analysis of the table shows one clearly dominant factor and a second factor essentially 
picking up the Heritage Foundation Overall index. 
16
 See Lamøy (2013) for an updated overview of this evidence.  
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among the most egalitarian countries in the world, with inequality levels at par with the 
Scandinavian countries. South Korea also has a fairly equal distribution of income. 
Particularly Malaysia, but also China, Singapore and the Philippines have fairly high levels of 
inequality, although much lower than say many of the countries of Latin America. Included 
are also measures of the shares going to each income quintile, i.e. the poorest 20 % of 
society, the next 20 % and so on. The poorest 20 % get between 5 % and 8 % of total income 
in most countries whereas the richest 20 % get close to half of national income in some 
countries such as Malaysia, Philippines, and China.  
This indicates that the high levels of 
inequality are an obstacle to growth in 
the area. Some of the countries, maybe 
particularly Malaysia, but also China 
and the Philippines still have high 
levels that may indicate that large 
groups are banned from 
entrepreneurial activities, or inequality 
may increase the risk of social unrest. 
On the other hand, some countries had 
high growth in spite of similar rankings 
in the past, so further study is required 
to obtain firm conclusions about how 
growth is affected at the country level. 
The Table also shows some measures 
of poverty using the World Bank’s two poverty levels, 1.25 PPP$/day for extreme poverty and 
2 PPP$/day for poverty. The head count measure simply counts the fraction of the 
population living below the poverty line, whereas the poverty gap also takes into account 
how far below they live below the poverty line. The richer countries have no poor according 
to this definition. In India and Laos, about 2/3 of the population live in poverty, half of these 
in extreme poverty. Indonesia, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have slightly less than 
half their populations in poverty and well below 20 % in extreme poverty. The largest pool of 
absolute poverty worldwide is in India, and it would certainly improve the growth prospects 
of India if income, education and health among the poor would be improved. 
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Fig. 14: Inequality and institutional quality 
Source: Own calculations 
4: Norway’s economic relations with Asia 
Corresponding to the expansion of Asia, the region’s position in Norway’s external relations 
has also been growing over time. With intra-Asian trade growing faster than other trade 
flows, we would expect noin-Asian partners to have a slightly falling share of their trade. Has 
this been the case? Has Norway kept pace with the Asian miracle, or fallen behind?  
4.1. Trade in goods with Asia: A Norwegian export miracle? 
Norway is, relative to Asia, a peripheral 
trading partner with a modest share of 
their trade. Figure 15 shows Norway’s 
share in Asia’s trade in goods 1996-2012: 
Not a superpower, but still a significant 
trader. With these shares fluctuating 
around 0.2-0.3% for imports, and around 
0.15% for exports after 2000, they are 
below Norway’s share in world GDP. This 
was at 0.34% in 2010 measured in 
purchasing power-adjusted (PPP) data, or 
0.48% in nominal dollars. Geographical 
distance is likely to be a major 
explanation; given that trade falls with distance and Asian countries trade more and more 
with their neighbours.  
Seen from the other end, we recall that the share of Asia (17) in nominal world GDP rose 
from 26 to 30% during 1990-2010. During the same period, the region’s share of world trade 
grew from 19 to 29%. We expect a corresponding increase for Asia in Norway’s trade flows. 
For Norwegian exports, most oil and gas is exported to Europe; so the share of Asia depends  
on whether oil/gas is included or not. In Fig. 16, we therefore show these shares separately 
for total exports and non-oil exports. The share in non-oil trade increased in parallel 11 to 17-
18% during the period. Given Asia’s more 
intensive trade with their neighbours, we 
observe also hare that the share is below 
the region’s share of world GDP. There 
was a particularly rapid trade growth after 
2006, and it is of interest to examine the 
driving forces underlying this.  
Table 7 shows annual trade growth in % 
by sector, based on underlying data in 
constant USD. For sectors, we use the 
aggregation/classification into eight 
sectors shows in Appendix Table 7. Given 
the faster recent trade growth observed 
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Fig. 15: Norway's share in Asia's 
trade in goods 1996-2012 
Source: Own calculations based on data from 
WITS/COMTRADE. 
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Fig. 16: Asia (19) share in Norway's 
trade in goods, 1996-2012 
Source: Own calculations using data from 
WITS/COMTRADE. 
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above, we show developments for 1996-2012 and 2005-2012 separately.17  
Table 7: Sector shares, and growth rates by sector for Norway's trade with Asia-19 
 
Sector shares of trade (%) Annual growth rates (%) 
 
Exports Imports 1996-2012 2005-2012 
 
1996 2012 1996 2012 Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Total 100 100 100 100 7.8 6.6 13.8 8.0 
Seafood 18.7 10.6 0.5 0.7 4.1 8.2 6.6 10.8 
Agriculture 1.7 0.4 2.1 2.1 -0.9 6.8 5.6 10.1 
Chemicals 5.5 8.2 3.6 5.1 10.6 8.9 14.0 12.7 
Oil&gas 7.6 26.1 0.0 0.1 16.5 17.5 33.9 55.5 
Metals/min. 9.3 8.8 3.4 2.5 7.5 4.5 7.7 15.0 
Textiles 0.7 0.3 17.7 16.4 0.7 6.1 -0.6 6.9 
Machinery 29.0 32.8 30.1 40.0 8.7 8.5 14.1 8.2 
Transp. Eq. 3.5 2.2 26.1 14.8 4.7 2.8 -12.2 7.2 
Other  6.6 5.8 15.9 18.1 7.0 7.4 10.8 7.1 
Source: Own ccalculations based on data from WITS/COMTRADE. 
 
Hence oil and gas, chemicals and machi-
nery had the fastest export growth, 
whereas chemicals and machinery had 
the highest import growth. Observe that 
seafood imports grew faster than sea-
food exports, in both periods, and that 
the share of seafood in exports fell con-
siderably, from 19% in 1996 to 11% in 
2012. 
Figure 17 shows Norway’s trade growth 
by country in the region, for 2005-2012. 
Appendix Tables 13-15 contains more de-
tail on the performance by sector and 
country, and back to 1996. The reversal 
of roles for Japan and China is evident; 
with Japan’s share falling from 35 to 
around 13%, and China growing from 8 to 
20% for exports, and from 18 to 55% for 
imports from Asia-19. Hence more than 
half of Norway’s imports from Asia are 
now from China. Korea and Singapore are 
other big traders; however with imports 
                                                          
17
 Observe that the USD/NOK rate was 6.45, 6.45 and 5.82 in 1996, 2005 and 2012, respectively. 
Expressed in NOK, trade growth in 2005-2012 would therefore be 1.47% lower, and in 1996-2012 
0.65% lower per annum. Observe also the figures are based on the US GDP deflator and not detailed 
price indexes for trade, so they are do not express ”volume growth”.  
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from Singapore shrinking during the first half of the period. 
There was very fast Norwegian export growth in a number of markets, especially during the 
most recent years. Fig. 17 shows annual growth rates 2005-2012, based on data in constant 
dollars. While some percentage growth figures are inflated due to a low starting point (e.g. 
Brunei, Myanmar), export growth rates 2005-2012 at 15 % to China, 19 % to Indonesia, 26 % 
to Korea, 27 % to Malaysia, 19 % to Taiwan and 29-30 % to the Philippines and Thailand show 
that exports have increased rapidly. Appendix Table 13 shows the product composition of 
trade in 1996, 2004 and 2012 for all countries. Observe that oil and gas exports were 
somewhat erratic, with considerable changes from year to year, and mainly directed towards 
China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. For example, U.S. sanctions on Iran led to a shift in suppliers 
and exceptionally high exports of crude oil from Norway to Korea in 2012.  
4.2. Norway in Asian  production networks 
Fig. 18 compares Norway’s trade with Asia and with the EU, using UNCTAD’s classification 
into four sectors. 
  
Norway is a significant raw material exporter viz. Asia as well as the EU. Towards Asia, we are 
net importers of consumer goods as well as capital goods, but for capital goods there are also 
significant exports. Towards the EU, Norway is surprisingly a significant consumer goods 
exporter, according to the UNCTAD classification.  
In addition to the exports of raw materials and capital goods (including mechanical 
components, cf. earlier note on this classification), an interesting part of production 
networks is related to distribution, where we have observed that the average cif-fob ratio for 
Norway’s imports from Asia is at 31%. Assuming this represents real costs in transport and 
distribution,  it is an important part of the value chain. We do not have information telling 
whether this part of the value chain is supplied by Norwegian firms or services suppliers from 
other countries; further research is necessary to determine this.  
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4.3. Trade with China: Have there been Nobel Peace Prize effects? 
Given the speculation about whether China has limited trade with Norway informally, by 
means of network effects and non-tariff barriers such as intensified border inspections, we 
briefly present some additional evidence on China-Norway trade.  
Figure 19a and 19b show Norway’s share of China’s  exports and imports. Figure 18b 
excludes oil and transport equipment, where trade is more varying over time.  
Fig 19: Norway’s share of China’s total exports and imports. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from WITS/COMTRADE. 
  
Norway’s exports to China accelerated strongly in 2009 so it is hard to tell how much of the 
decline in 2010-2012 is due to a cyclical effect. Curves for exports as well as imports show a 
falling trend towards the end of the period. Appendix Table 16 shows Norway’s trade shares 
(in China’s total trade) by sector. This reveals that there was a noticeable decline in the share 
for four out of eight sectors, both for exports and imports. We present no statistical proof 
here that this is a Nobel Peace Price effect, but if this turns out be the cause underlying the 
recent decline, it apparently has affected trade in both directions.  
For seafood exports, a complementary hypothesis is that non-tariff barriers in China could 
also have an element of trade protection: they observed the increase and pulled the brake. 
Recently, a new licensing regime was also introduced for seafood imports, which makes it 
more difficult for large exporters since shipments are approved within individual quantity 
ceilings which are rather small for large traders. The traders can apply for new licenses when 
a certain share of the current license has been used, but it may may take several weeks to 
have a new approved license and this represents a barrier to trade. 
4.4. Norway’s FDI and Asia 
Recalling from Chapter2 that Asia-16 currently have about 1/5 of world outward and inward 
FDI stocks and these shares have grown recently, one would expect a growing share of Asia-
16 in Norway’s outward as well as inward FDI. As shown by Fig. 20, this is indeed the case.  
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Given that Norway  is a rich 
country with a large current 
account surplus, it is to be 
expected that outward flows 
are larger than inward flows. 
Asia’s shares in Norway’s  FDI 
are lower than their shares in 
world FDI; which may be due 
to geography and perhaps 
the sector pattern of FDI. The 
figure also shows that 
Singapore is the most 
important Asia-16 country for 
FDI; especially for the Norwegian outward stock where 9.1% out of the 11.4% share of Asia-
16 was by Singapore. Appendix Tables 17 and 18 show more details, by country and sector. 
For FDI, available statistics are by country or by sector, but not both at the same time. Hence 
we do not know how Norway’s FDI in Asia was allocated by sector. For total Norwegian 
outward FDI in 2011, 28% was about oil and gas and 22% in manufacturing. Oil and gas has a 
similarly high share also for inward FDI. Looking at the returns from FDI, oil and gas had an 
even higher share of the total (61% for outward and  53% for inward FDI). The share of Asia-
16 in returns from FDI were 2.5% for outward and 2.3% for inward FDI; i.e. much lower than 
their share of the stocks. This indicates that little of Norway’s outward FDI in Asia is in oil and 
gas as such. It is however likely that oil and gas-related services are important. For example, 
Norwegian oil and gas firms sourcing their oil/gas platforms in Asia may undertake FDI in Asia 
related to this. It is likely that a lot of Norway’s manufacturing outward FDI is in Asia. In 
addition, sectors related to trade, such as transport and communication (including shipping), 
and trade, hotels and restaurants (including trade affiliates), are of importance. Appendix 
Tables 19 and 20 contain more detailed information on returns to FDI by region and country. 
Another source of information related to FDI, where we have information by country and 
sector, is on Norwegian-controlled enterprises abroad.  Appendix Tables 21 and 22 contain 
information by region and sector, respectively, and Appendix Table 23 on the number and 
size of these enterprises by country. Such data has been provided since 2008 but the sample 
size has increased over time so some of the change over time, especially for the number of 
firms, may be affected by the sampling. Figures by region shows that Asia-16 had a share of 
turnover in 2011 at 11.2 % and a share of enterprises at 12.2 %, which is close to the share 
observed for the outward FDI stock (11.4%). Hence we may assume that information on the 
country and sector distribution for Norwegian-controlled enterprises abroad is also relevant 
for FDI. Here we may observe (Appendix Table 21) that Singapore and China had significant 
shares; 3.7 and 2.4 % of Norwegian enterprises abroad, respectively. In 2011 there were 119 
enterprises in Singapore and 77 enterprises in China. Direct information about the 
Norwegian-controlled enterprises in Asia is available from various sources. For Singapore, the 
list of firms provided by the Norwegian business Association shows that shipping and 
shipping-related services are important, but we also find a variety of business services, 
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several firms with oil and gas-related services, and some manufacturing firms.18 For example, 
Jotun – a large producer of paints and coatings– is strongly present in Asia with 17 affiliates 
in Asia-16, of which 10 with production.19 
Figures for the sector distribution of Norwegian-controlled firms in Asia confirms that the 
largest individual sector was manufacturing (36.4% of total turnover). Taken together, 
however, services represented more than half. Table 8 shows evidence for 2011: 
Table 8: Norwegian-controlled enterprises in Asia: Key facts 
  
Enterprises 
Employed 
people 
Turnover 
  2011 2011 2011 
All industries 425 48317 135748 
Share of global (%) 13.2 19.3 13.0 
  % of total for Asia 
All industries 100 100 100 
Mining and quarrying 6.8 2.3 14.9 
Manufacturing 37.4 35.9 36.4 
Services 55.8 61.8 48.7 
   Wholesale and retail trade 4.2 1.2 1.1 
   Transportation and storage 25.4 11.6 11.4 
   Information and communication 9.6 n.a. n.a. 
   Financial and insurance act. 2.1 0.1 0.5 
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 8.2 7.5 2.7 
Data source: Statistics Norway. 
 
There were 425 Norwegian-controlled enterprises in Asia in 2011; with an average of 99 
employees and average turnover at 298 mill. NOK, with some variation in firm size across 
countries: Singapore has on average 45 persons per firm, Hong Kong and Japan 13, and in the 
upper range  we find China (119) and India (209) (see Appendix Table 21 for details).  Table 
10 confirms that manufacturing is more important for FDI in Asia than for Norway’s outward 
FDI in general (manufacturing share: 22 %).  Mining and quarrying includes oil so there is 
some FDI in Asia here but relatively less than for outward FDI in general, and the share of 
persons employed is very low. The largest share, more than half of firms and staff, was for 
services. Transportation and storage is an important sector; including shipping as well as 
other trade-related transportation. There is reason to believe that services FDI is more 
important with respect to Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan, but we do not have data on 
sector distribution by country. 
Observe that the largest FDI partners worldwide are Sweden and the Netherlands: These two 
countries alone have 27% of outward as well as inward FDI. Why is this the case? It is 
certainly not for outsourcing in manufacturing, and the Volvo agreement never came by. 
While there may be many underlying reasons (e.g. border trade establishments in Sweden), 
                                                          
18
 For Singapore, NBAS (Norwegian Business Association Singapore, www.nbas.org.sg) provides 
information about about 140 firms. For China, the Norwegian Chinese Chamber of Commerce provides 
links to Norwegian business communities in Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong on www.nccc.no. 
However, only the Hong kong link worked when we tried. 
19
 See http://www.jotun.com/no/en/corporate/about-jotun/worldwide/index.aspx.  
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an interesting observation in our context is that these two countries are among the largest 
entrepot nations in Norway’s foreign trade, together with Denmark and Hong Kong (Melchior 
et al. 2012). Less than half of China’s exports to Norway are shipped directly from China to 
Norway; the rest is shipped via entrepot countries (ibid.). A possibility is that this is a core 
ingredient of Norway’s GVCs: Investment in services provision related to transport and 
distribution. This enables firms to handle all the practical issues, but also creates new 
opportunities for tax planning and capital transfer. For the Netherland, the tax regime may 
also play a role. 
A considerable part of Norway’s imports from Asia is likely to be part of MNE operations. The 
MNEs have affiliates different places and often organise their sales on a European basis. An 
interesting issue is how MNE-related GVCs are different from NEF-type transactions; to what 
extent are NEF-type GVCs managed directly from Norway or via international trade hubs or 
affiliates. Studying in greater depth how trade with Asia is organised would be interesting, 
and perhaps also help us sort out the huge gaps in trade statistics that we will demonstrate 
and examine further in section 4.8 below. 
In addition to FDI, we will also revert to portfolio investment; see section 4.6. 
4.5. Norway’s trade in services with Asia 
Given the sizeable FDI in services in Asia, a considerable share of Norway’s services trade 
with Asia is conducted via investment; i.e. mode 3 in the WTO services trade terminology. 
Statistics on services trade as such include mode 1 (cross-border trade); mode 2 
(consumption abroad, e.g.  tourism) and partly mode 4 (temporary movement of services 
providers).  
For services, it is important to observe that statistics provision is much more complicated 
than for goods; there is no counting machine at the border, and statistics are collected by 
means of surveys etc. Until 2004, the main source of statistics was the “currency statistics” 
(“valutaregisteret”) of Norges Bank (National Bank of Norway); however in 2005 this was 
discontinued so services statistics are mainly based on statistical surveys. According to the 
currency statistics, the country classification of trade depended on the nationality of the firm 
involved in the payment transaction. Especially for shipping, this is crucial since e.g. 
transporting oil from the Middle East to Asia by Exxon would count as services exports to the 
USA (since Exxon is from the USA). From 2009, however, this would count as services exports 
to the Middle East or Asia, since shipping trade statistics is based on port registries. Because 
of this, there is a dramatic shift in country allocation of shipping trade from 2004 to 2009 (the 
next available year of statistics). This creates a large question mark regarding the 
development of services trade with Asia over time. Figure 21, showing regional shares of 
Norway’s services exports, illustrates the point. 
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Fig. 21: Regional shares of Norway’s services exports 2001-2004 and 2009-2010.  
Data source: Statistics Norway. 
  
There was a dramatic fall in North Americas share from 2004 to 2009, from 33 to 9% of total 
services exports. In panel (b), where shipping is excluded, there is still a fall, but it is a bit 
more modest: from 21 to 10%. For Asia, the share increased from 6 to 13% (panel a) or from 
3 to 13 (panel b). Fig. 20 therefore suggests that the observed increase for Asia is not inflated 
by the change in shipping statistics, but actually larger if shipping is excluded. There might be 
other caveats here regarding statistical comparability; perhaps Statistics Norway should 
provide an extended explanation since services trade is of growing importance and we need 
reliable data. 
With this cautionary note on statistics in mind, we may proceed to Table 9, which shows 
Norway’s services trade with Asia in 2012. Appendix Tables 24-25 present more detailed 
information by sector, country and region. 
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Table 9: Norway’s trade in services with Asia in 2012 (mill. NOK) 
 
Exports Imports Balance 
Australia 5948 3006 2942 
Brunei 693 3 689 
Cambodia 0 2 -2 
China 4829 2577 2252 
India 1535 1051 484 
Indonesia 737 495 242 
Japan 2525 2486 38 
Korea 3618 2826 791 
Lao PDR 14 1 12 
Malaysia 1514 666 847 
Myanmar 0 0 0 
New Zealand 235 96 139 
Philippines 138 263 -125 
Singapore 6016 5110 906 
Thailand 433 1689 -1256 
Vietnam 114 114 0 
Hong Kong 246 637 -391 
    
Total Asia-16 28349 20385 7959 
ASEAN 9659 8343 1316 
Japan, Korea, China 10972 7889 3083 
Australia, New Zealand, India 7718 4153 3565 
Memo items 
Good trade with Asia-16 65776 81523 -15747 
Services % of goods+services with Asia-16 30.1 20.0 
 
Asia-16 share in Norway’s trade in goods 7.0 16.1 
 
Norway: Total services trade 2012 249593 282376 -32783 
Asia-16 % of total Norway services trade 11.4 7.2 
 
Data source: Statistics Norway. 
 
Norway’s services trade is quite focused on Europe, with a share of 66% for exports as well as 
imports in 2012. Table 9 shows that Norway has a trade surplus with Asia in services, and 
services constitute a relatively large share of goods + services exports. Australia, China, 
Singapore and Korea are the largest services trading partners, followed by Japan, Malaysia 
and India. The sector composition of services trade with each country is presented in 
Appendix Table 24. Table 10 shows sector composition for Asia-16 as a whole.  
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Table 10: The sector composition of Norway’’s trade in services with Asia-16 in 2012. 
Sector 
Mill. NOK % of total 
Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Total Services 28349 20385 100 100 
Transport 12955 6982 45.7 34.3 
Travel 140 3339 0.5 16.4 
Communication 222 45 0.8 0.2 
Construction 620 1916 2.2 9.4 
Insurance 125 47 0.4 0.2 
Financial 243 6 0.9 0.0 
Computer & Information 743 743 2.6 3.6 
Royalties & License fees 143 19 0.5 0.1 
Other Business services 13071 7164 46.1 35.1 
Personal, Cultural & Recreational 9 204 0.0 1.0 
Data source: Statistics Norway. 
 
Hence transport services and other business services were the “giants”, with more than 90 % 
of exports and about 70 % of imports, taken together. For both these sectors, Norway has a 
trade surplus. On travel, on the other hand, there was a substantial deficit, indicating that 
Norwegians travel more to Asia than the other way around. 
Appendix Table 25 lists the most important Asian trading countries for each sector. Transport 
services follows goods trade so the large goods traders are also important traders for 
transport services. Korea, China and Japan are also amongst the top 5 most important 
partners in all services sectors for both import and export. For financial and insurance 
services, Hong Kong enters the scene, although not massively. India is the leading supplier of 
Computer and information services worldwide, and – not surprisingly – also to Norway.  
As noted earlier, a large part of services trade with Asia is in Mode 3; using FDI. In Chapter 2, 
it was observed that Asia’s services sector is crucial for further growth and at the same time 
hampered by low productivity and a bias towards sectors with relatively low productivity 
(Park 2012). For Norway, an implication is that FDI may play a key role for transforming this 
pattern, and there is scope for more FDI in various services fields. Norway is already involved 
in offshore activity in Asia, and Asia’s demand for energy-related services is set to increase 
significantly over time. The nature of this demand will depend on “how green” Asia will turn; 
see e.g. Lee et al. (2013), but energy-related services is a candidate for future trade growth in 
services with Asia. 
4.6. Portfolio investment and the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) 
By the end of 2012, Norway’s stock of portfolio investment abroad was at 4996 billion NOK 
or 858 billion USD. This can be compared to the stock of outward FDI which was 1169 billion 
NOK in 2011. Hence portfolio investment was four times larger. The main reason for this 
large volume of foreign investment is the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), which 
had a stock of 3812 billion NOK at the end of 2012, or 76 % of the total. The fund’s return in 
2012 was 13 percent – the second-best performance in history, and the fund`s market value 
amounted to 140 percent of Norway’s mainland GDP (GPFG Annual Report, NBIM 2013). As 
seen from Fig. 22, Asia held 12.9 percent of the total market value and Oceania 2.3.   
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Fig. 22: The Norwegian Pension Fund – regional shares of market value, Dec. 2012. Source: NBIM (2013). 
 
Considering that North America and Western and Central Europe had nominal shares of  
world GDP in 2010 at 32 and 26 %, respectively, North America has a share of the pension 
fund that is proportional to its economic size, whereas Europe has a disproportionately high 
share. As seen from Chapter 1, Asia-18 had 30 % of nominal world GDP in 2010, and its share 
of the fund investments is considerably lower. In this section, we use GDP shares for 
comparison and illustrative purposes, but it has to be recalled that investment is guided by a 
number of other considerations.  
The fund had only invested in 11 out of the Asia-16 countries and only 5 of the 10 ASEAN 
countries; Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Table 11 shows the 
magnitude of the fund’s investments in these 11 countries.  
Table 11: The fund’s investments in Asia-11, with comparison to shares in FDI and GDP 
Note: All except FDI calculated in 2012. 
Country 
Total market value of 
investment 
(in billion NOK) 
Percentage share of 
the fund’s total 
investments in the 
world  
Percentage share of 
total investments in 
Asia & Oceania 
Country`s share of 
total world GDP 
(current US$) 
Country`s share of 
total incoming 
world FDI 
Indonesia 13 051 0.34 % 2.2 % 1.2 % 1.12 % 
Malaysia 15 612 0.41 % 2.7 % 0.42 % 0.70 % 
Singapore 18 077 0.47 % 3.1 % 0.38 % 3.24 % 
Thailand 12 484 0.33 % 2.1 % 0.51 % 0.45 % 
Philippines 3 285 0.09 % 0.6 % 0.35 % 0.11 % 
China 43 648 1.14 % 7.5 % 11.5 % 16.24 % 
India 21 684 0.57 % 3.7 % 2.6 % 1.87 % 
Japan 230 281 6.04 % 39.5 % 8.3 % 0.0046 % 
South Korea 62 796 1.65 % 10.8 % 1.6 % 0.28 % 
Australia 83 156 2.18 % 14.3 % 2.1 % 3.82 % 
New Zealand 4 546 0.12 % 0.8 % n/a 0.25 % 
Source: NBIM (2013) and World Development Indicators (WDI). 
 
Together the 5 ASEAN countries held only 1.6 % of the total fund, whereas China, Japan and 
South Korea (“+3”) held as 8.8 percent, or more than half (58 %) of the fund’s investment in 
Asia-16. Most of this was in Japan, which alone held 6 percent of total market value. 
Appendix Table 26 also shows how this investment is divided into fixed income assets and 
equity.  
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Using the last two columns in 
Table 11, Figure 23 plots each 
country’s share in the pension 
fund value against its share in 
world GDP (nominal). For the 
majority of countries, the share 
in world GDP is not 
dramatically different from 
their share in the fund. This 
applies to Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Japan, Korea and 
Australia. The biggest outlier is 
China, with a share of world 
GDP at 11.5% but only 1.14% 
of the fund’s value. We find a 
similar difference, although in 
smaller scale, for some of the 
relatively poorer countries (Indonesia, Philippines, India). For China, it should be observed 
that Europe and North America also have very low shares of foreign portfolio investments in 
China.20 In Chapter 5, we will also see that Europe’s share of FDI into China has been very 
low: at 5-6% recently. The low GPFG share for China is therefore not only an NBIM issue, it is 
part of a broader pattern where China’s regulation of foreign investment may be a key issue. 
Poorer countries generally have less developed stock markets and this reduces their share of 
portfolio investments. Due to a larger share of companies listed on the national stock 
markets in developed countries, a natural asymmetry will emerge. This asymmetry between 
rich and emerging markets has also been embedded in the fund`s investment strategy. Until 
2012, a regime of fixed regional weights was applied where each region had a specific share 
assigned; Europe 50 %, America and Africa 35 %, and Asia and Oceania 15 percent. This was 
abandoned in 2012, and replaced with market weights reflecting each country`s share of the 
world`s stock market. This will bring the share of Asia and Oceania up to19 %, and with the 
new system from 2012, Asian countries’ shares of the fund’s investments are expected to 
increase over time. In this new regime, the emerging countries of Asia will still be 
underweighted according to GDP, but their share may increase naturally over time as their 
stock markets evolve further. 
In the debate before deciding on the new equity benchmark, it was discussed whether Asia 
and emerging markets should have a larger than market weight share of the investments, to 
secure the fund’s part of these countries rapid growth. This was decided against as risk and 
other factors implied to keep the weights at market value (Ministry of Finance 2012). With 
the new scheme the portion invested in developed Europe remains higher than market 
weights and the portion in developed North America remains lower, whereas developed Asia 
                                                          
20
 Table 6-14 in China Statistical Yearbook 2012, by National Bureau of Statistics of China, distinguishes 
between Foreign Direct Investment and “Other Foreign Investment”. For the latter, Europe and North 
America each had about 1% of the total. It is however possible that statistics are incomplete.  
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and Oceania and emerging markets (globally) will be in line with market weights. This gives a 
distribution of; 41 percent Europe, 40 percent America and Africa and 19 percent Asia and 
Oceania. Out of this emerging markets will account for 10 percent as opposed to 6 in the old 
regime21. China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand all fall under the latter 
category22. The rest of the ASEAN countries will also if (or when) entered into the portfolio 
fall under the “emerging market” category. 
4.7. Norwegian aid to Asia 
With Asia ranging from richness to massive extreme poverty, and Norway being a rich 
country aiming to provide generous development assistance, aid is also part to the economic 
interaction. As shown in Appendix Table 27, Asia-16 in 2012 received 10% of Norway’s aid, or 
2.7 billion NOK. In earlier time, more aid was also provided to India and Korea in the 1960s, 
and Vietnam in the 1970s, so over 
the period 1960-2012 Asia received 
75.2 billion NOK (constant 2012 
value), or 14% of total aid. The 
pattern of aid recipients during 
recent years is shown in Fig. 25, 
with Viet Nam, India and China on 
top among the 11 countries.  
Fig. 25 shows what were the types 
of aid. The share of emergency 
assistance increased considerably 
during this period, compared to 
2000-2005. More details on aid 
types by country are provided in 
Appendix Table 28.  
Fig. 25: Norway’s aid to Asia 2006-2012 by type 
Data source: NORAD. 
 
 
                                                          
21
Emerging markets will also be included in the fund`s fixed income reference index gradually, as of 
2012. Source: Ministry of Finance 2012. 
22
South Korea is grouped as “developed country” by FTSE, and as “emerging” by MSCI in the 
companies’ respective equity indexes. Source: Ministry of Finance 2012. 
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4.8. Statistical mysteries: Who has a trade surplus? 
In the analysis os services, we have already seen that there are considerable problems 
related to international trade statistics. This is also the case for trade in goods, where data 
gaps seem to be growing over time. In this section, we analyse the fact that Norway’s 
imports from Asia are actually about twice as large as the corresponding exports to Norway 
reported by Asian countries. The problems are partly due due globalization and a more 
borderless firms, with trade involving firms in different countries.  
With ever improving access to data on trade, an interesting possibility is to compare reported 
trade at the two ends; e.g. China’s reported exports to Norway should in principle 
correspond to Norway’s imports from China. Data with such double observations of trade are 
called mirror data. International trade statistics have common classification down to the 6th 
digit of the Harmonised System (HS) classification. Hence one may compare at a detailed 
product level, or aggregated for all bilateral trade.  
Using such mirror data immediately reveals 
a lot of shocking discrepancies. In principle, 
reported imports should be a little higher 
than reported exports since imports are 
reported “cif” – i.e. cost, insurance, freight 
are added, while exports are “fob” (free on 
board) without these cost components. For 
its balance of payment statistics, the IMF 
often used a rule of thumb at 10% to fill in 
missing observations. Looking at Norway’s 
trade using mirror data reveals another 
story. Melchior et al. (2012) reported the 
cif/fob ratios for Norway’s total imports 
from 122 countries in 2009, and found a 
median value of 1.82 – Norwegian reported 
imports were in this case 82% larger than reported exports. Values may be higher or lower. 
As an illustration for Asia, Fig. 26 shows cif/fob ratios for Norway’s imports and exports from 
China. Imports into Norway were generally more than twice as large as exports from China, 
whereas the gap in the other direction is somewhat smaller. 
A gap so large is important, whatever is the reason behind. In e.g. trade negotiations, the two 
parties may have completely different perceptions about reality because their trade data are 
different. As another illustration, Fig. 27 shows Asia’s trade balance with Norway, from the 
Asian side (i.e. a positive value = trade surplus for Asia), but using either Asian or Norwegian 
data. According to Asian data, they had about balanced trade with Norway in 1996, but 
thereafter developed a growing deficit (7 billion USD in 2012). According to Norwegian data, 
however, the deficit was clearly in the opposite direction, with an Asian trade surplus of 
more than 2 billion USD in 2012, i.e. a gap of almost 10 billion USD compared to the Asian 
data. These “raw” trade balances are biased due to the cif-fob factor; if they are adjusted (i.e. 
the cif cost is deducted from import values), the two curves would be closer. As an 
illustration, curves are also shown where exports from Asia have been adjusted by a cif-fob 
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factor of 1.37, and trade from Norway to Asia by 1.1 (see explanations below for these 
figures). In this case, Norway has about balanced trade with Asia according to Norwegian 
data, but still a substantial trade surplus according to the Asian data. There is still a gap of 
about 5 billion USD. With total 
imports from Asia-19 into 
Norway at about 15 billion 
USD, this is a considerable 
uncertainty. 
There are essentially four 
main explanations of these 
gaps: 
 The first is that there are 
high costs added on the 
way, to the cif-fob factor 
is indeed much higher 
than 10%. This may not 
necessarily be transport 
costs, but price mark-ups to middlemen or trading affiliates of multinational companies.  
 The second is that reported import prices are higher as a result of deliberate 
misreporting, e.g. as a result or transfer pricing or the like. By adjusting the price, traders 
may move large funds across borders. 
 A third possibility is that the country of origin or destination is erroneously reported by 
mistake. For example, a lot of Asia-Europe trade may be coordinated via trading hubs, 
and China may sometimes even not know whether the goods are finally ending in 
Norway or Sweden or other countries. This is sometimes called the “Rotterdam effect” 
due to the role of the Netherlands as a trading entrepot.   
 Fourth, the cif-fob difference could be due to deliberate or arbitrary errors in reporting. If 
this is the reason, the gaps might not be stable and persistent over time. 
So far, some but limited research has been undertaken on the explanations. Hummels and 
Lugoovsky (2006) show that cif-fob ratios are correlated with transport costs but deviate 
substantially from true transport cost. Melchior et al. (2012) show, for China-Norway trade, 
that prices are doubled for exports that are shipped indirectly from China to Norway. This 
may be in conformity with explanation one or two above. Melchior (2013) show that the 
“Rotterdam effect” is the major explanation for high cif-fob ratios for India’s exports to 
Norway. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to fully explore the reasons underlying the statistical gap 
we have observed, but one effort will be made to get a bit closer. Observe that the two first 
explanations above should affect the price of trade, whereas the third and partly the last 
should affect volumes.  By checking whether the value gap is due to volume or price 
deviations, we can distinguish between price and volume effects and find out whether the 
“Rotterdam effect” or the price-related explanations is more important.  
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We therefore calculate price index-
es for each country/year/trade 
flow.23 As an illustration, Fig. 28 de-
composes the cif-fob ratio for im-
ports from China in this way. Here 
the price ratio has increased but 
recently been relatively stable 
around 1.5, whereas the volume 
ratio has fluctuated strongly but in-
creased to close to two recently. 
According to this, the “Rotterdam 
effect” may explain a considerable 
part of the cif-fob ratio for China, 
but there is also a substantial mark-up well above the standard IMF expectation of about 
10%. 
Figure 29 presents results where the total cif-fob ratios are decomposed into a quantity and 
price component, for select-
ed Asian countries.24 Here 
figures have been expressed 
in percentages; e.g. a cif-fob 
ratio of 2 is equivalent to 
100 (100% mark-up). Hence 
it varies across countries to 
what extent price or quanti-
ty deviations explain the 
high cif-fob ratios, and for all 
countries except Australia 
and New Zealand, both 
quantity and price effects 
are important.  
                                                          
23 Using detailed data at the 6-digit product level For Norway’s trade with Asia-19, we start out with 
data sets of 210 000 observations for imports, and 81 000 for exports. We proceed with 
countries/observations where we also have mirror data (more than half of the observations 
disappear). Next, we have to check that the quantity unit for each product/country observation is 
similar, and delete further observations. Finally, there are many extreme observations and we delete 
all observations where the average unit value (=value/quantity) is more than  five times larger or 
correspondingly smaller (<0.2 of) than the mirror observation. In this way, we finally end up with data 
sets of 50 000 observations for imports, and 10 600 for exports. We calculate Marshall-Edgeworth 
price indexes of the form P=∑kpk*(qk+qk-mirror)/ ∑kpk-mirror*(qk+qk-mirror) i.e. we use volumes from both 
sides of reporting as weights (or the average, which is equivalent. If we denote the value cif-fob ratio 
as V, we can then derive a quantity index as Q=V/P. For Fig. 29, we use the average for 2007-2011. 
24
 We use 2007-2011 since there are fewer observations for 2012 and 2012 data are sometimes 
preliminary. 
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For countries where the quantity explanation is important, it is likely that the quantity of 
exports is underreported. If we assume that the whole quantity effect is due to the 
“Rotterdam effect”, we can assume that import figures are generally more reliable. 
According to this, we can use the measured price index as the true cif-fob ratio, and we 
might calculate a hypothetical adjusted export figure. Figure 19 suggests that the quantity of  
exports is severely misreported in many cases. The price-related “true” cif-fob ratio varies 
from 12 to 67%. In table 12 we use the estimated price indexes to recalculate export values 
for 2010, for 12 Asian countries where we have data and P estimates. 
Table 12: A hypothetical recalculation of export values from Asia to Norway, 2010 
 
Imports 
Mirror 
data 
Ratio import/mirror data Recalculated 
"true 
exports" 
cif-fob 
value 
Estimated P 
Quantity 
ratio 
Japan 1694 1072 1.58 1.09 1.45 1554 
Vietnam 313 71 4.43 1.11 3.99 282 
Thailand 378 174 2.18 1.15 1.89 329 
India 366 165 2.22 1.23 1.80 298 
Indonesia 144 53 2.71 1.25 2.17 116 
Australia 102 44 2.33 1.31 1.78 78 
Malaysia 340 85 3.99 1.31 3.04 260 
Singapore 438 49 8.98 1.31 6.86 334 
New Zealand 37 12 2.95 1.34 2.20 27 
China 6561 2821 2.33 1.41 1.65 4653 
Philippines 36 7 5.46 1.57 3.48 23 
Korea, Rep. 2343 1927 1.22 1.69 0.72 1386 
       All 12 12753 6480 1.97 1.37 1.44 9340 
Data source: Own calculations. 
 
This calculation is made under the assumption that reported import quantities are correct; 
i.e. that Asian export quantities to Norway are underreported due to the “Rotterdam effect”. 
According to this, the table suggests that trade quantity is severely misreported in some 
cases, with Singapore (only 1/7 reported) as the extreme case. For these countries taken 
together, imports were 12.8 billion USD and exports about half (6.5 billion), and the 
estimates  suggest that quantity underreporting represent a bit more than half of this gap for 
the 12 countries combined, and the average “true cif-fob ratio” should be 1.37. This is the 
figure used for imports in Figure 20 above. 37% is a significant cost of trade, which shows 
that international transport and distribution may be a large component in international value 
chains. With complex international GVCs and a lot of trade via intermediates, the cif-fob ratio 
may include substantial services trade that is not appropriately recorded in the statistics.  It is 
possible that some of our goods imports from Asia are actually services imports from Europe, 
or services delivered by Norwegian-owned firms in Europe or other locations. More research 
is needed to confirm to what extent this is the case.  
For exports from Norway to Asia, cif-fob ratios are much more erratic and for the sake of 
brevity we drop further detail on this. Hence we do not have a reliable estimate on the 
adjusted cif-fob ratio for exports to Asia; perhaps data for other countries with more 
observations may provide a clearer picture. In Figure 20 we arbitrarily used a cif-fob ratio for 
Asia’s imports from Norway at 1.1; this may perhaps be larger but we do not know exactly. 
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Due to the importance of quantity gaps, the “Rotterdam effect” is likely to be important, and 
this suggests that Norwegian import data are more reliable than Asian export data to 
Norway. According to this, it is likely that Norway-Asia trade is roughly balanced and has 
been so for the period after 1996, with some fluctuations. 
The analysis also reveals that the uncertainty about trade data seems to increase over time. 
This may be a consequence of the more borderless world, with multinationals operating in 
many countries, and trade flowing more freely in Europe and other regions due to trade 
liberalization.  
5: Implications and trade policy issues  
5.1. Asia and Norway’s terms of trade 
The most obvious implication of Asia’s economic growth and rising share of the international 
economy is simply that Asia becomes more important, in one area after another. For Norway 
and other countries, it is necessary to adapt to this change; in government, institutions and 
business. Norway has generally fared well in this respect, with fast expansion of trade and 
contacts with Asia. This process will surely continue and expand in new areas.  
Norway phased out labour-intensive manufacturing at a relatively early stage but was, in 
spite of this, one of the most protectionist countries in the world for textiles and clothing 
during the 1980s, with a very strict quota regime. This was however gradually lifted and 
abandoned before the 2005 deadline set by the WTO. With substantial tariff reductions on 
top, Norway was changed into one of the most liberal countries in the field of textiles trade 
(see e.g. Melchior 2006).  Furthermore, we do not have as much to lose in the manufacturing 
field as other Western countries, with large car and machinery industries. Hence Norway has 
been able to expand trade with Asia without major pains of transition. There are exceptions 
(e.g. solar panels), but they are modest compared to most other Western countries. 
Norway has benefited from Asia’s growth in two major ways: higher commodity prices and 
lower consumer prices. As seen from Chapter 2, Asia’s commodity imports grew faster than 
other trade flows and this growth in demand contributed to higher commodity prices 
worldwide. For consumer goods, it is well documented that imports from Asia in general, and 
China in particular, contributed to lower price inflation in Norway. In 2012, the export price 
index was at 81% above the level in 2000, whereas the import price index had risen by 11%. 
Hence during the last decade, there was a huge terms-of trade gain for Norway. A back-of-
the envelope calculation, using trade and GDP in 2000 as basis, suggests there was a 27% 
gain due to this terms of trade effect only.25 This is equivalent to an annual gift of 45 billion 
USD. 
The fairytale of the last decade can hardly continue forever. With USA reducing its energy 
deficit through shale gas, Norwegian gas export prices are already under pressure. With 
slower growth in Asia, commodity prices could take new turns. On the other hand, Asia will 
continue to grow and, as seen in Chapter 3, even slower growth adds substantially to world 
GDP and demand. While ups and downs are to be expected, the longer-run outlook is 
continued growth in demand for Norwegian goods and services from Asia. 
                                                          
25
 Writing GDP = Consumption + Investment + Exports – Imports and taking into account that exports 
and imports had shares of GDP in 2000 at 35.6 % and 20.4 %, respectively, net trade in 2000 was at 
15.2 % of GDP. Scaling up trade with the prixe indexes, 1.81 for exports and 1.11 for imports, revised 
net trade becomes 41.8% of GDP, i.e. a difference equivalent to 26.6% of GDP. Data sources: Price 
indexes from Statistics Norway, GDP from WDI, trade from WITS/COMTRADE. 
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5.2. Norway: A focus on ASEAN 
Taking into account the rising importance of Asia is the first step of ”getting proportions 
right”. This is relevant in a number of contexts related to economic and policy decisions. A 
second step is to have the right priorities across countries within Asia. With BRICS attention 
and media focus on China and India, the rest of Asia may fall in the shadow.  In real business,  
we have seen from earlier chapters that many other countries are important. As an 
illustration, Table 14 sums up the importance for Norway of different sub-groups within Asia-
16, in the fields studied in Chapter 4. We split up Asia-16 into ASEAN and the other two 
country groups within Asia-16; the ”+3” large ones (China, Japan, Korea) and the remaining 
three (India, Australia, New Zealand; “Other” in the graph). Figure 30 shows the allocation 
across the three country groups within Asia-16 for the various components studied earlier, 
with the share in Asia-16 GDP (PPP and nominal) shown as comparison, at the bottom. 
 
For trade in goods, China, Japan and Korea have 70-76% of Norway’s trade with Asia-16, very 
close to these countries’ combined share of Asia-16 GDP. ASEAN has only 8-13% of the 
economic mass of Asia-16, measured by GDP, and a similar share in goods trade and portfolio 
investment. For services trade and FDI, however, ASEAN plays a much larger role, with shares 
of Norway-Asia-16 interaction ranging from 34 to 88 %. Table 13 shows that Singapore is a 
hub for Norwegian activity in Asia. In the light of the recent focus on BRICS, we may also 
observe that India is not yet a major player in Norway’s relations with Asia. In some fields, 
such as computer services imports and telecom investment, India is already important but in 
general, the share of India in Norway’s economic relations to Asia is lower than proportional 
to its economic mass.  
An implication of this distribution is that for FDI, Norway is a small player in China. To some 
extent, this is part of a broader pattern: Most of China’s inward FDI is from Asia and Europe 
has a low share. Figure 31 shows regional shares of FDI flows into China 2000-2011. Europe 
as well as North  America have small and declining shares. On top of this, Norway is a small 
player compared to other similar countries. This is shown in Fig. 32.  
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Table 13: Getting proportions right: The relative importance of Asia and its subgroups of countries 
 
Goods trade 
FDI 
outward 
stock 
Norwegian-controlled 
abroad 
FDI 
inward 
stock 
Services trade 
Pension fund 
value 
GDP shares 
Exports Imports Firms Turnover Exports Imports PPP Nominal 
Year 2012 2012 2011 2011 2011 2011 2012 2012 2012 2010 2010 
Asia-16 % of Norway total 17.9 17 11.4 12.2 11.2 5.4 11.4 7.2 12.9 
  Asia-16 % of world total 
     
 
   
32.4 28.3 
Shares of Asia-16 total 
Asia-16 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100.0 100.0 
ASEAN 18.0 13.5 88.4 50.9 68.5 40.8 34.1 40.9 12.3 12.9 8.4 
   Singapore 10.1 3.1 80.1 30.1 38.4 35.4 21.2 25.1 3.6 1.2 1.4 
China/Japan/Korea 69.6 75.9 4.1 29.1 13.3 49.9 38.7 38.7 66.2 65.8 77.9 
   China 19.9 54.5 2.5 19.5 10.5 25.4 17.0 12.6 8.6 41.9 27.9 
   Japan 12.6 13.8 0.5 5.3 1.2 11 8.9 12.2 45.3 17.9 43.1 
   Korea, Rep. 37.1 7.6 1.2 4.3 1.6 13.4 12.8 13.9 12.3 6.1 6.9 
India 3.0 3.9 0.89 9.1 4 0.08 5.4 5.2 4.3 17.3 8.3 
Australia + New Zealand 3.5 1.1 5.5 10.9 14.1 9.3 21.8 15.2 17.2 4.0 5.4 
Source: Based on calculations and data in earlier chapters and Appendix Tables. 
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Compared to Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark, Finland and Norway are at the bottom, with 
no sign of an increase. Given the importance of government contacts and approval in China, 
the current Norway-China impassé will not help. Norway’s position may to some extent be 
caused by industrial structure: China is the manufacturing locomotive of Asia and a large 
share of FDI in China is in manufacturing (45% in 2011); another large FDI sector in China is 
real estate (23% in 2011).26 Norway has significant manufacturing investment in China and 
Asia, but still of modest size compared to many other countries.  
For e.g. shipping and offshore, it is possible that other Asian countries can serve as hubs, also 
for the Chinese market. Hence heavy investment in Singapore may be related to Asia more 
generally, and not only Singapore. If Norway want to take part in the broader development 
of services in China, including energy-related services, more FDI may be necessary in the 
future. This makes it even more important for Norway and China to reestablish their normal  
government interaction.  
5.3. Implications of Global Value Chains 
Asia’s growth is intrinsically linked to FDI and GVCs. The prevalence of GVCs has a number of 
implications for analysis and policy. One obvious implication is that also here we should ”get 
proportions right” and avoid relying on gross trade data in order to evaluate trends and 
policy priorities. For example, seafood farming and catch are different in terms of value 
added chains, and one should take this into account for policy considerations, when the 
purpose is to affect national real income or welfare. GVCs also imply that bilateral gross trade 
data can give a distorted picture; inflating the trade success of or threat from GVC-based 
exporters such as China.  
A second implication of GVCs is that protection for intermediate goods hurts yourself. This is 
an old argument: for example the notion of ”effective rates of protection” illustrates that 
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 See Table 6-16 in China Statistical Yearbook 2012, by National Bureau of Statistics of China.  
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true protection should be calculated in % of value added and not the gross value.27 This has 
been a traditional argument for tariff escalation in import-competing industries. With 
international production networks, tariffs on intermediate goods imports reduces value 
added in final goods production. According to Baldwin (2012), this was a main driving force 
behind unilateral and negotiated tariff cuts in a number of emerging economies.  
A related phenomenon is that with international production networks, rules of origin (RO) 
become more critical in trade policy. With predominantly national production systems, a 
larger share of the goods are made in the exporting country. With international production 
networks, the share made in the exporting country is lower. ROs say that in order to be 
entitled to some tariff preference, e.g. in FTAs or GSP systems, a certain minimum of 
production has to be undertaken in the exporting country. In practice, ROs are generally of 
three types: (i) Value thresholds, i.e. that a certain percentage of the ”fob” export price has 
to be domestic value added; (ii) process rules, i.e. that a certain part of the production 
process (e.g. sewing a shirt from fabrics that may be imported) has to be undertaken in the 
exporting country; and (iii) classification rules, i.e. that change from one position to another 
in the tariff scedule, from imported inputs to exported outputs, is enough to be certified as 
originating in the exporting country. In multi-country FTAs, there may also be rules on 
”cumulation”, i.e. allowing the process to be undertaken in more than one participating 
country.  
With international production networks, ROs may create several problems. First, they may 
imply that tariff preferences in FTAs are not applicable (see below) since trade does not fulfil 
the RO criteria. Second, there is considerable variation in ROs internationally and this may 
create costs related to complexity and information requirements. Third, small countries may 
be at a disadvantage since they have more limited domestic supply of intermediates. Fourth,  
problems of fulfilling ROs may create a stronger incentive for trade fraud; e.g. trade 
misclassification if RO classification rules are used, or trade mispricing if value thresholds are 
used. 
For trade and trade policy, we showed in Chapter 2 that Asian production networks are quite 
intra-regional, with a high share of intra-Asian trade in components. This also applies to 
European production networks, stimulated by EU enlargement and massive intra-European 
FDI. As shown by Baldwin (2012), China is the only major GVC player with large trade outside 
the regional ”factories” of Asia, North America and Europe. Hence the GVCs may stimulate a 
stronger intra-regional focus in international trade policy. 
Beyond trade policy issues, GVCs raise a large number of issues related to each country’s 
participation in GVCs and the benefits therefrom. This involves e.g. investment policies, tax 
rules, infrastructure, technology and more; see e.g. UNCTAD (2013) for a broad discussion. 
Stan Shih, the founder of Acer in Taiwan, introduced in the 1990s the concept of the ”smiling 
curve”, suggesting that value added was higher in the lower and upper parts of the value 
                                                          
27
 If e.g. a good costs 100 but inputs cost 50 (and can be imported), a tariff of 20% on the final good 
raises the price to 120 and domestic value added from 50 to 70, i.e. by 40% which is the effective rate 
of protection. Now if a tariff of 10% is also levied in inputs, the input cost will increase to 55 and new 
value added in domestic production of the final good will be 120-55=65, so the effective rate of 
protection is 15/50 or 30%. 
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chain; including technology, patents and component production in the lower range, and  
branding, services and marketing in the upper end. Hence the fear was that emerging 
countries could be stuck in assembly in the middle, with lower value added and profitability. 
According to this, Asia has mostly been at the lower or middle portion of the ”smiling curve”, 
having to rely on Western MNEs and firms for their access to markets. With growing intra-
regional markets, Asian outward FDI and skill upgrading, this pattern may change over time 
as Asian firms become their own masters in international trade and countries develop their 
own MNEs. This process has begun, but will take time and vary across countries.   
In discussions on policy implications of GVCs, it is often forgotten that a large part of the 
value chains are in distribution. Hence even if a country is a pure importer, it may generate 
value added by being involved at the upper end of the ”smile curve”. In the study, we have 
shown that the value of trade flows may be multiplied by two or three on the way from Asia 
to Norway. To the extent that this is due to real costs and value added on the way to Norway, 
an issue is how Norwegian firms are able to participate in this part of the ”smile curve”. 
Norway has few major MNEs in consumer goods, but still opportunities for trading firms that 
expand internationally. 
The large trade data gaps we have illustrated also raise the issue about whether GVCs have 
rendered international trade statistics useless and unreliable. One possible answer is to say 
yes; in the era of globalization we can no longer record international trade flows accurately 
so we should just let it go, just like we do not record when people go to the shop. A more 
plausible response is to look more into the issue, check what are the reasons, and what can 
be done about it. GVCs also create opportunities for tax and tariff evasion, and the system of 
governance should make an effort to follow the traders. On the other hand, we may have to 
accept that reliable data for international transactions become more difficult when firms 
have operations in many countries. 
5.4. FTAs in Asia: From the ”noodle bowl” to the ”five snake soup”? 
In a separate paper from this project (Park 2013), the development of FTAs in Asia is 
analysed.28 We will not repeat its rich evidence and analysis, but use it as a platform for a 
brief discussion of issues that are relevant in this context. This accompanying paper is 
recommended as the main source of information on Asian FTAs from the project.  
Parallel to their post-war economic miracle, countries in East and South East Asia were for a 
long time reluctant to enter into bilateral or regional free trade agreements (FTAs). Until the 
turn of the century, they preferred a multilateral approach to trade and trade policy, 
supporting the WTO (World Trade Organization) and having just a handful of FTAs. During the 
last decade, the pattern has changed dramatically. Driven by economic needs from 
expanding trade and inspired by the worldwide proliferation of FTAs, countries in East and 
South East Asia changed their minds and started negotiating FTAs, within the region and 
beyond. Figure 33 shows the new “noodle bowl” of FTAs as of July 2013, for 16 countries in 
Asia plus Australia and New Zealand.  
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 Park, Innwon, 2013, Regional Trade Agreements in East Asia, NUPI Working Paper. 
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With Singapore on top with 21 FTAs, aiming at 38, the diagram demonstrates the rapid 
expansion of such agreements, given that only five of these agreements existed in 2000 (see 
aric.adb.org, the FTA databank of the Asian Development Bank). With varying coverage, 
liberalization and rules, this network of agreements stimulates trade but at the same time 
creates a complex system, with business having to cope with a large variety of regulations 
and rules. Using the now standard jargon, this is the “noodle bowl” of Asia’s trade (building 
on Bhagwati’s original “spaghetti bowl” expression).  
An issue is to what extent Asia is currently integrated. How deep are the FTAs, and to what 
extent are they effectively implemented? The extent of tariff elimination in Asian FTAs varies 
from 76 to 100%, according to Park (2013). According to Kawai and Wignaraja (2013, 17), 
preference utilisation rates in Asia are relatively low. While it has been argued that complex 
ROs that differ across countries are an Asian problem, this study also indicated that only 1/5 
of the firms perceived this to be a serious problem. About the depth of Asian FTAs, it is of 
interest to note that 46% of Asian FTAs in 2012 had comprehensive coverage of agriculture 
(at least 85 % of tariff lines included), and 41% had comprehensive coverage of services (at 
least five key sectors covered). Hence on the whole, FTAs in Asia have made large progress 
during the last decade, but further consolidation into a comprehensive plurilateral 
agreement is a difficult process that may take time.  
There is an ambitious agenda for new “plurilateral” trade agreements that may replace the 
“noodle bowl”: 
 First out was the ASEAN+3 plan, including ASEAN plus China, Japan and Korea, with a 
dialogue starting in 1997. 
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 Recently, in August 2013, the Ministers of ASEAN+6, adding Australia, New Zealand and 
India, agreed to implement the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) by 
2015.  A parallel initiative for the same group of countries (led by Japan) is CEPEA 
(Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia).  
 A parallel and partly competing initiative is the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership): Building 
on the 2005 FTA between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore; eight more 
countries have been added in the current negotiations for an ambitious trans-Pacific FTA. 
Covering seven of the 16 CEPEA countries  (Brunei, New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, 
Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam) and five others (Chile, Canada, Mexico, Peru, USA), the TPP 
aims to accelerate the process of trans-Pacific integration after the slow process in APEC 
for similar goals (the Bogor goals). 
 As if this was not enough, some have proposed to go even further and create an even 
wider FTA that covers RCEP as well as TPP. This Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific 
(FTAAP) is still a remote possibility, but nevertheless already included in discussions and 
serious analysis of future integration. 
There is a strong drive for further trade integration in Asia, but there are obstacles that have 
to be overcome. The negotiations involve strong players: China, India, Japan, USA, followed 
by Korea, Indonesia and others. There is currently considerable rivalry at the Asian FTA scene, 
with ASEAN and the +3 three of East Asia (China, Japan, Korea) seeking the ”first mover 
advantage” (Park 2013), and the USA luring at the side via TPP. This is our “five snake soup”: 
A traditional Cantonese dish, with meat from five different snakes, which were difficult to 
find at the same time and location. But if they are all present, the result will be superb and 
success granted.  A similar question applies for the FTAs: Will the major players be able to 
join forces, forget agonies from the past or current conflicts about sea territory, and agree on 
the path to wider Asian integration?  
A danger for Asia may be that comprehensive integration takes time and there are too many 
intentions that do not materialise. The failure of the Bogor goals of APEC is one case in point. 
It took 25 years from the establishement of ASEAN to the establishment of AFTA (ASEAN Free 
Trade Area) in 1992, and almost two decades more until the planned tariff cuts were 
completed. With the even greater heterogeneity in RCEP, there is a risk that trade policy 
integration takes very long time. The same could be the case if e.g. the EU was to make a 
new FTA with Russia and Turkey. Europe may nevertheless be an example to follow, in the 
sense that bold steps such as EU enlargement have been taken with resolve and 
determination. According to Park (2013), the formation of an FTA between China, Japan and 
Korea could be a building block but even if negotiations started in 2013, it is likely that the 
process will take time. The ASEAN-led RCEP plan is another main track, where the stated 
ambition is to reach an agreement by 2015, building on the existing ASEAN+1 agreements.  
While RCEP includes China, the TPP is an initiative that only includes parts of Asia, and not 
China. According to Baldwin (2012), the plurilateral ”mega-FTA” approach faces a major 
problem if China and other emerging economies are left out. In that case we might have a 
new trade policy era with a partially stagnant WTO, and mega-FTAs in Asia, Europe and North 
America that do not involve all the important countries. We might add that for smaller or 
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larger countries outside the reach of these mega-FTAs, it will clearly be a disadvantage to be 
left out.  
For EFTA and Norway, the rise of Asia has created a need for new agreements with countries 
in the area. EFTA currently has FTAs with Hong Kong (entry into force 2012), Korea (2006) 
and Singapore (2003), plus ongoing or about-to-start negotiations with India and four more 
ASEAN countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. Switzerland and Iceland have 
concluded bilateral agreements with China; whereas the China-Norway negotiations have 
been inactive since late 2010, for well-known reasons.29 Switzerland also has an agreement 
with Japan (from 2009).30 For EFTA and Norway, an issue is which countries that should be on 
the agenda; another issue is whether only bilateral agreements should be pursued, or is 
plurilateral agreements such as EFTA-ASEAN is an option. From 2012, Norway and 
Switzerland were also included as participants in ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting), an informal 
dialogue forum of the EU plus Norway, Switzerland, Russia, and 19 Asian countries (Asia-16 
and  Bangladesh, Pakistan and Mongolia). 
Figure 34 shows, as an illustration, 
how much of Asia-19 that is 
covered by current and potential 
future FTAs. We use nominal GDP 
to measure the economic size of 
countries. The current three 
agreements cover 8% of nominal 
GDP in Asia-19, and the share will 
rise to 24% when the five 
agreements under negotiations are 
completed. Including China and 
Japan will in  a big leap bring 
coverage up to 88%, and we have 
seen that Switzerland is already 
there. Australia will bring the share to above 95 %. Adding also Taiwan, Philippines and New 
Zealand, 99 % will be passed.  
Assuming that EFTA succeeds with the five countries under negotiation, the major omissions 
for Norway will be China, Japan and Australia. For these three trading partners, there are  
distinct challenges: 
 The Norway-China FTA negotiations depend on recovering from the Nobel peace prize 
effect on Norway-China relations. 
 For Japan, liberalization of seafood trade is a sensitive issue and that is the reason why 
earlier contacts about an FTA have not succeeded. 
 Australia is also a significant trade partner, e.g. for services, but has not been on EFTA’s 
or Norway’s agenda so far. If an FTA is negotiated, agricultural issues will surely be a 
                                                          
29
 Norway-China was in November 2013 still listed by the Chinese government as ongoing 
negotiations; see  (http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/ennorway.shtml ). 
30
 An EU-Japan FTA is also under negotiation. 
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sensitive issue since Australia is a major agricultural producer and liberalisation would be 
met by resistance by Norwegian producers.  
For China and Japan, only the bilateral option seems possible, but for Australia, an 
agreement could in principle be made by EFTA. However, Switzerland and Iceland also face 
political issues on agriculture that might interfere. 
According to Melchior et al. (2009) the trade impact of tariff reductions for trade in goods are 
clearly larger for China compared to Japan and Australia. From Table 10, Chapter 4 we have 
also seen that Australia is a relatively large market for Norwegian services exports. More 
than half of this was in transport (shipping), but a significant part was also ”other business 
services” (see Appendix Table 24).  In general, the economic gains from an FTA depend on 
the magnitude of bilateral trade flows and the reductions in trade costs undertaken, so more 
information about trade barriers is needed to assess the gains from services trade 
liberalisation in FTAs with Asia. Potentially, however, there could be significant gains from 
FTAs with these three Asian countries. 
An issue is whether Norway or EFTA should aim for comprehensive agreements with groups 
of countries in Asia, or stick to a bilateral one-to-one approach. The main arguments in 
favour of a plurilateral approach is (i) standardisation across countries, avoiding the “noodle 
bowl effect”; (ii) inclusiveness, covering not only the large and more important partners; and 
(iii) potentially using cumulative ROs (rules of origin) and thereby facilitating trade with 
production networks. The main negative aspect is that negotiations become excessively 
complex and ambitious results are difficult to obtain. Another drawback could be the 
heterogeneity across countries; perhaps the poorest countries are not yet ready for free 
trade so inclusiveness may be of mixed value. 
For Norway and Asia, TPP is currently not a real option; Norway-USA trade relations have to 
be pursued across the Atlantic rather than the Pacific. Pending the successful conclusion of 
RCEP or other mega-FTAs in the future, the issue here is therefore whether Norway or EFTA 
should try to obtain an agreement with ASEAN. The EU started such negotiations with ASEAN 
in 2007, but after seven rounds of negotiation, this track was dropped in 2009 and EU re-
engaged in bilateral negotiations.31 Within Asia, China, Japan and Korea follows the ASEAN+1 
track, and Australia and New Zealand concluded in 2009 the AANZFTA (ASEAN-Australia-New 
Zealand Free Trade Agreement). Australia also maintains bilateral FTAs with three ASEAN 
countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore) and negotiates with Indonesia; showing that 
plurilateral and bilateral FTAs may be combined. For Norway or EFTA, a closer assessment 
has to be made in order to sort out whether a plurilateral approach is worthwhile; beyond 
the scope of this study. 
 
                                                          
31
 The EU concluded an FTA with Singapore recently, but negotiations continue on investment 
protection issues. In addition, there are negotiations about FTAs with Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam. 
For information, see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/agreements/.  
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5.5. Post-DDA trade policies: Need for a new master plan? 
With ever increasing international integration, the slower progress of the WTO and the 
partial failure of the DDA (Doha Development Agenda) is generally a problem; even if the 
existing WTO takes care of many trade issues. In the light of international production 
networks, issues related to investment, taxation and IPR are e.g. of great importance, and 
there is a need for international coordination in governance. Another field is the proliferation 
of health or sanitary regulations in international trade; EU and the USA have developed 
complex and comprehensive systems of inspection and approval, and other countries such as 
Russia and China are currently developing theirs. In some years, there may be a veterinary 
”noodle bowl” as well, with inspectors from all over the planet coming on regular visits to 
test every food exporter.  While this field is already covered by the WTO, new disciplines may 
be needed but not easily achieved by the WTO. The partial success of the WTO at Bali 
December 2013  was a relief, but the DDA round has weakened the appetite for new major 
reforms through the WTO. 
An issue is whether plurilateral agreements beyond the mega-FTAs can take care of the 
needs for global governance in the trade field, if the WTO fails to address the new issues. 
Baldwin (2012) has argued for a WTO 2.0, as he calls it, apparently a kind of ”Singapore issue 
WTO” without special and differential treatment (SDT).  
The current negotiations on a plurilateral services agreeement represent a test of sectorwise 
plurilaterals; the TISA negotiations held among 50 WTO members (23 if the EU is counted as 
one). Among Asia-19, five countries participate (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Australia, 
New Zealand), and China has recently expressed the interest to join. Three parties had, at the 
end the most recent (4th) round of negotiations in early November 2013, tabled market 
access offers, and all participants had to do so by the end of November. TISA will be an 
interesting test of such plurilaterals.  
An alternative idea would be to revive the OECD as a tool for trade issues; OECD was crucial 
for international integration in the financial area around 1990, establishing new codes of 
great importance.32 The OECD has expertise on issues such as services trade, and tax and 
capital flows, which are core issues related to the governance of international value chains. 
Participation does not necessarily have to be restricted to OECD members; the OECD was a 
hub for some successful “OECD+” initiatives about 15 years ago, e.g. OECD hosted the 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), established 1989 by G-7, where 
currently eight Asian countries are members.33   
With an increasingly complex mix of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral approaches to 
trade policy, an issue is how small countries shall be able to mobilise the institutional 
capacity and versatility to take care of trade policy in all fields: The large players such as the 
EU and the USA have greater capacity, but small countries cannot have bilaterals with all 
WTO members; and they cannot check human rights in every corner and for every economic 
transaction. For Norway, issues within Western Europe are dealt with in the EEA/EU setting. 
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 These were the OECD codes for Liberalization of Capital Movements, and Code of Liberalization of 
Current Invisible Operations. See www.oecd.org for information. 
33
 See http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/faq/moneylaundering/.  
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Beyond Western Europe, however, we mainly have to be our own masters. This is especially 
important for strategies related to large and important areas such as Asia and Eastern 
Europe; being heterogeneous but including very important trade partners. With reduced 
appetite for grand design reforms through the multilateral system, we must rely on a mix of 
different approaches. Traditionally, global trade policy in small countries such as Norway was 
to a large extent ”reactive”, responding to the agendas agreed in the multilateral fora. With a 
weaker capacity for reform in the multilateral system, we need to a larger extent to develop 
our own  ”masterplan” for trade, being proactive rather than reactive. We should become a 
bit more like Magnus Carlsen – the chess master; not being stuck on one track at the time, 
but being versatile and always seeing the possibilities on the other side of the board – or in 
the other trade policy arena. 
With trade policy unfolding in bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral settings, a proactive 
approach means to focus on more on themes rather than institutions: What should e.g. be 
the aims on investment protection, and how should it be pursued at the different arenas? If 
tariffs are not reduced by the WTO, who else could do it? In order to support such a more 
coordinated approach across trade policy arenas, one may also consider how government 
offices are organised. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Norway handles 
multilateral trade issues while the Ministry of Trade and Industry takes care of the bilaterals. 
Due to this division of labour, the MFA could become more interested in multilateral 
approaches while  the ”MITI” thinks bilaterally. With a declining reform capacity of the WTO, 
the MFA may also become less important in trade policy over time. In order to promote 
institutional capacity and ”versatility” in the new trade policy situation, a reconsideration of 
coordination and/or the division of labour across ministries could therefore also be 
warranted.  
Being proactive in trade policy and Asian strategies also requires knowledge and a strong 
analytical capacity, within the government and beyond. In this study, some aspects of Asian 
economic development and Norway have been examined, but many issues have been left 
out. There is ample room for more work, and an aim should be to maintain a continuous 
focus on important issues in the international economy.  With respect to Asia and commerce, 
issues related to global value chains and trade pricing; the organisation of trade and the role 
of intermediates; institutional issues  related to FTAs; and investment issues (e.g. what 
explains relatively low investment in China); are among many topics that deserve further 
attention. Within the broader field of economic development in Asia, a long list could be 
added, including issues of poverty and welfare that were only briefly addressed in Chapter 3.  
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Appendix Table 1: The share of Asia-16 in world trade 1970-2010 
(% of total world trade) 
 
Total trade in goods 
 
 
Intra-Asian trade Extra-regional exports Extra-regional imports 
1970 3.6 8.6 8.8 
1980 4.8 9.7 9.8 
1990 6.2 13.6 11.3 
2000 8.7 15.2 10.7 
2010 12.6 18.4 13.7 
 
Manufacturing 
 
 
Intra-Asian trade Extra-regional exports Extra-regional imports 
1970 2.7 9.2 6.5 
1980 3.8 12.4 6.2 
1990 5.2 15.3 9.3 
2000 8.8 18.0 8.9 
2010 12.9 23.0 10.1 
 
Commodities 
 
 
Intra-Asian trade Extra-regional exports Extra-regional imports 
1970 5.4 7.5 13.0 
1980 6.4 5.6 15.3 
1990 9.5 8.1 17.8 
2000 8.3 6.8 16.0 
2010 11.7 7.5 22.5 
Source: Own calculations based on the data set described in Melchior (2012). Original 
trade data from WITS/COMTRADE. 
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Appendix Table 2: Asia-19 and selected countries: 
Share (%) in world FDI stocks. Data source: UNCTAD. 
 
Inward FDI stock 
 
 
1980 1990 2000 2010 2011 2012 
Asia-19 33.45 19.32 16.23 20.00 20.89 21.57 
          China 0.15 1.00 2.57 2.88 3.41 3.65 
          China, Hong Kong SAR 25.47 9.70 6.55 5.70 5.67 6.24 
          China, Macao SAR 0.40 0.14 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 
          China, Taiwan  0.34 0.47 0.26 0.32 0.27 0.26 
          Korea, Republic of 0.16 0.25 0.58 0.66 0.64 0.65 
          India 0.06 0.08 0.22 1.01 0.99 0.99 
          Brunei Darussalam 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 
          Cambodia 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 
          Indonesia 0.65 0.42 0.33 0.79 0.89 0.90 
          Japan 0.47 0.47 0.67 1.05 1.08 0.90 
          Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
          Malaysia 0.74 0.50 0.70 0.50 0.55 0.58 
          Myanmar 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
          Philippines 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.14 
          Singapore 0.77 1.47 1.47 2.91 3.00 2.99 
          Thailand 0.14 0.40 0.41 0.70 0.72 0.70 
          Viet Nam 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.28 0.31 0.32 
          Australia 3.55 3.87 1.58 2.52 2.65 2.68 
          New Zealand 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 
Outward FDI stock 
 
1980 1990 2000 2010 2011 2012 
Asia-19 7.13 14.44 12.72 16.74 18.42 18.88 
          China 0.00 0.21 0.35 1.50 1.98 2.16 
          China, Hong Kong SAR 0.03 0.57 5.43 4.92 5.27 5.55 
          China, Macao SAR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          China, Taiwan  2.37 1.45 0.83 0.90 0.99 0.96 
          Korea, Republic of 0.02 0.11 0.27 0.68 0.80 0.83 
          India 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.46 0.51 0.50 
          Brunei Darussalam 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          Cambodia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          Indonesia 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.05 
          Japan 3.57 9.63 3.47 3.93 4.49 4.47 
          Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .. 
          Malaysia 0.06 0.04 0.20 0.46 0.50 0.51 
          Myanmar 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          Philippines 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 
          Singapore 0.14 0.37 0.71 1.67 1.76 1.70 
          Thailand 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.19 0.22 
          Viet Nam 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          Australia 0.91 1.79 1.20 1.96 1.77 1.80 
          New Zealand 0.00 0.21 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.08 
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Appendix Table 3: Regional composition of FDI in East and South East 
Asia in 2011-2012 
 
 
Value in million USD 
 
East and South East 
Asia as destination 
East and South East 
Asia as investor 
2011 2012 2011 2012 
World 206049 147608 115133 118476 
Developed economies  133212 99091 16726 43863 
European Union  58072 38248 7299 18768 
Germany 22308 12020 1129 249 
United Kingdom  11621 8372 1175 15003 
United States 32580 27628 5961 21525 
Australia  2230 1473 1410 2070 
Japan 30416 24646 533 677 
Developing economies  71605 47824 91844 69246 
Africa  400 166 12630 4616 
East and South-East Asia  55390 43666 55390 43666 
South Asia  10973 2388 9197 8211 
Transition economies  1232 694 6563 5368 
 
 
% of total for the region 
 
East and South East 
Asia as destination 
East and South East 
Asia as investor 
2011 2012 2011 2012 
World 100 100 100 100 
Developed economies  64.65 67.13 14.53 37.02 
European Union  28.18 25.91 6.34 15.84 
Germany 10.83 8.14 0.98 0.21 
United Kingdom  5.64 5.67 1.02 12.66 
United States 15.81 18.72 5.18 18.17 
Australia  1.08 1.00 1.22 1.75 
Japan 14.76 16.70 0.46 0.57 
Developing economies  34.75 32.40 79.77 58.45 
Africa  0.19 0.11 10.97 3.90 
East and South-East Asia  26.88 29.58 48.11 36.86 
South Asia  5.33 1.62 7.99 6.93 
Transition economies  0.60 0.47 5.70 4.53 
Source: Data in Million USD from UNCTAD (2013), 44. 
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Appendix Table 4: Sector composition of greenfield FDI in East and South East Asia, 2011-
2012. 
 
Value in million USD 
 
 
Asia as destination Asia as investor 
 
2011 2012 2011 2012 
Total 206049 147608 115133 118476 
Primary  4444 363 5158 3022 
   Mining, quarrying and petroleum  4444 363 5158 3022 
Manufacturing 127673 70614 73297 43443 
   Chemicals and chemical products  21615 9886 6495 10733 
   Metals and metal products  16836 8902 14522 6799 
   Electrical and electronic equipment 21768 9361 11455 11468 
   Motor vehicles and other transport equipment  17578 17716 9022 4797 
   Other manufacturing 49876 24749 31803 9646 
Services  73932 76632 36678 72011 
   Electricity, gas and water  4567 4507 7697 22813 
   Construction  7021 19652 3840 29147 
   Transport, storage and communications  19730 13096 7653 2950 
   Finance  16651 13658 5371 6074 
   Other services 25963 25719 12117 11027 
 
% of total for the region 
 
 
Asia as destination Asia as investor 
 
2011 2012 2011 2012 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Primary  2.16 0.25 4.48 2.55 
   Mining, quarrying and petroleum  2.16 0.25 4.48 2.55 
Manufacturing 61.96 47.84 63.66 36.67 
   Chemicals and chemical products  10.49 6.70 5.64 9.06 
   Metals and metal products  8.17 6.03 12.61 5.74 
   Electrical and electronic equipment 10.56 6.34 9.95 9.68 
   Motor vehicles and other transport equipment  8.53 12.00 7.84 4.05 
   Other manufacturing 24.21 16.77 27.62 8.14 
Services  35.88 51.92 31.86 60.78 
   Electricity, gas and water  2.22 3.05 6.69 19.26 
   Construction  3.41 13.31 3.34 24.60 
   Transport, storage and communications  9.58 8.87 6.65 2.49 
   Finance  8.08 9.25 4.67 5.13 
   Other services 12.60 17.42 10.52 9.31 
Source: Data in Million USD from UNCTAD (2013), 44. 
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Appendix Table 5a. Asia`s share of world service sector trade, 2005-2011 (BPM5, annual data ending Dec each year, million USD). 
  
ASIA-19 
 
ASIA-16 ASEAN (10) ASEAN (5) 
China, Japan, Korea, 
Rep. 
Australia, New 
Zealand, India 
Year Relative 
Export 
Relative 
Import 
Relative 
Export 
Relative 
Import 
Relative 
Export 
Relative 
Import 
Relative 
Export 
Relative 
Import 
Relative 
Export 
Relative 
Import 
Relative 
Export 
Relative 
Import 
2005 20,9 % 22,8 % 17,1 % 20,1 % 4,6 % 5,5 % 4,3 % 5,3 % 9,0 % 11,1 % 3,5 % 3,4 % 
2006 21,3 % 22,7 % 17,5 % 20,1 % 4,7 % 5,6 % 4,4 % 5,3 % 9,0 % 11,0 % 3,8 % 3,5 % 
2007 21,9 % 22,7 % 18,1 % 20,3 % 5,0 % 5,5 % 4,7 % 5,3 % 9,2 % 11,1 % 3,9 % 3,6 % 
2008 22,6 % 23,2 % 18,9 % 20,9 % 5,0 % 5,6 % 4,8 % 5,3 % 9,8 % 11,3 % 4,1 % 3,9 % 
2009 22,4 % 23,2 % 18,6 % 20,8 % 5,2 % 5,5 % 5,0 % 5,2 % 9,3 % 11,5 % 4,0 % 3,9 % 
2010 25,1 % 25,5 % 20,6 % 22,9 % 5,7 % 6,0 % 5,4 % 5,7 % 10,3 % 12,1 % 4,7 % 4,8 % 
 
2011 11,4 % 11,4 % 7,6 % 9,0 % 1,8 % 2,3 % 1,6 % 2,0 % 5,5 % 6,5 % 0,2 % 0,3 % 
Source: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (through the CEIC database) and Word Development Indicators. Some variation in data availability for the independent countries the 
last years (2009-2011): Brunei has data only up to year 2009, Australia, Cambodia, China, India, Lao, Macao, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand have data up until year 2010. The 
remaining countries have a full series. Especially for year 2011, for the largest aggregates, the relative values will thus be incomplete. They are added for information. 
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Appendix Table 5b: Asia - services trade by sector and country – value in million USD, 2012 (BPM6), and shares of total for exports. 
For net trade: net export ratios (x-m)/(x+m) (NET) 
Country 
Total 
Services 
Manuf. 
Services 
on 
Physical 
Inputs 
Owned by 
Others 
Mainten. 
& Repair, 
n.i.e. 
Trans-
port 
Travel 
Const- 
ruction 
Insurance 
& Pension 
Financial 
Charges for 
the use of 
Intellectual 
Property, 
n.i.e. 
Telecom. , 
Computer 
& Inform. 
Other 
Business 
Personal, 
Cultural & 
Recreational 
Governm. 
goods & 
Services, 
n.i.e 
Indonesia Balance/NET -10832 1,00 -0,67 -0,54 0,10 0,15 -0,96 -0,44 -0,94 -0,05 -0,01 -0,14 0,0043 
 Export 23627 1,69 % 0,48 % 
16,18 
% 
35,23 
% 
3,65 
% 
0,10 % 0,80 % 0,25 % 5,48 % 32,76 % 0,89 % 2,50 % 
 Import 34460 0,00 % 1,66 % 
37,56 
% 
19,65 
% 
1,83 
% 
3,18 % 1,41 % 5,22 % 4,19 % 22,77 % 0,82 % 1,70 % 
Malaysia Balance/NET -4536 - 0,07 -0,51 0,27 -0,28 -0,28 -0,44 -0,84 0,01 -0,04 -0,55 -4,28 
 Export 37884 0,00 % 0,70 % 
11,68 
% 
53,46 
% 
3,46 
% 
1,43 % 0,38 % 0,36 % 7,44 % 20,42 % 0,46 % 0,22 % 
 Import 42420 0,00 % 0,55 % 
31,80 
% 
27,22 
% 
5,54 
% 
2,25 % 0,87 % 3,61 % 6,48 % 19,76 % 1,41 % -0,32 % 
Thailand Balance/NET -3222 - - -0,65 0,69 0,32 -0,78 -0,02 -0,88 -0,03 -0,14 0,56 0,21 
 Export 49517 0,00 % 0,00 % 
12,07 
% 
67,92 
% 
0,89 
% 
0,77 % 0,75 % 0,49 % 0,98 % 15,28 % 0,17 % 0,68 % 
 Import 52739 0,00 % 0,00 % 
54,07 
% 
11,62 
% 
0,43 
% 
5,78 % 0,74 % 6,85 % 0,97 % 19,08 % 0,04 % 0,42 % 
Vietnam* Balance/NET -2980 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 Export 8879 0,00 % 0,00 % 
0,00 
% 
0,00 
% 
0,00 
% 
0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
 Import 11859 0,00 % 0,00 % 
0,00 
% 
0,00 
% 
0,00 
% 
0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Myanmar* Balance/NET -418,5 1,00 - -0,62 0,39 1,00 - - - - -0,70 -1,00 0,14 
 Export 671,76 20,35 % 0,00 % 
25,88 
% 
41,77 
% 
2,23 
% 
0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 5,09 % 0,00 % 4,69 % 
 Import 1090,2 0,00 % 0,00 % 
68,86 
% 
11,32 
% 
0,00 
% 
0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 17,65 % 0,01 % 2,17 % 
Philippines Balance/NET 3905 - -0,13 -0,51 -0,22 0,45 -0,60 -0,48 -0,97 0,76 0,73 0,40 -0,92 
 Export 18600 0,00 % 0,47 % 
8,48 
% 
21,58 
% 
0,60 
% 
0,48 % 0,58 % 0,04 % 13,54 % 53,74 % 0,42 % 0,06 % 
 Import 14695 0,00 % 0,78 % 
33,36 
% 
42,51 
% 
0,29 
% 
2,48 % 2,06 % 3,43 % 2,39 % 10,45 % 0,23 % 2,02 % 
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Continued, Appendix Table 5b: Asia - services trade by sector and country… 
 
  
Total 
Services 
Manuf. 
Services 
on 
Physical 
Inputs 
Owned by 
Others 
Mainten. 
& Repair, 
n.i.e. 
Trans-
port 
Travel 
Const- 
ruction 
Insurance 
& Pension 
Financial 
Charges for 
the use of 
Intellectual 
Property, 
n.i.e. 
Telecom. , 
Computer 
& Inform. 
Other 
Business 
Personal, 
Cultural & 
Recreational 
Governm. 
goods & 
Services, 
n.i.e 
Lao PDR* Balance/NET 218,93 - - 0,39 0,26 -0,32 -0,13 -0,42 - 0,57 - - 0,62 
 Export 549,64 0,00 % 0,00 % 
9,33 
% 
73,90 
% 
2,19 
% 
4,45 % 0,11 % 0,00 % 5,65 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 4,38 % 
 Import 330,71 0,00 % 0,00 % 
6,89 
% 
71,70 
% 
6,98 
% 
9,69 % 0,44 % 0,00 % 2,58 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 1,72 % 
Cambodia Balance/NET 999,85 - - -0,40 0,72 -0,80 -0,97 0,84 -0,49 0,07 0,39 -0,39 0,40 
 Export 2545,4 0,00 % 0,00 % 
14,02 
% 
70,70 
% 
0,65 
% 
0,06 % 2,38 % 0,15 % 1,78 % 6,64 % 0,10 % 3,53 % 
 Import 1545,6 0,00 % 0,00 % 
54,04 
% 
18,78 
% 
9,77 
% 
6,10 % 0,35 % 0,72 % 2,57 % 4,80 % 0,37 % 2,49 % 
Singapore Balance/NET 387,7 - 0,80 0,09 -0,08 0,34 -0,20 0,66 -0,82 -0,08 -0,10 0,02 0,21 
 Export 119075 0,00 % 5,74 % 
35,68 
% 
16,18 
% 
1,41 
% 
2,50 % 12,46 % 1,38 % 3,62 % 20,34 % 0,43 % 0,26 % 
 Import 118688 0,00 % 0,62 % 
29,76 
% 
18,88 
% 
0,70 
% 
3,77 % 2,54 % 13,91 % 4,30 % 24,92 % 0,41 % 0,17 % 
Brunei** Balance/NET -519,3 - - 0,01 -0,30 - -0,05 -1,00 -1,00 0,16 -0,18 - -1,00 
 Export 914,91 0,00 % 0,00 % 
49,38 
% 
27,80 
% 
0,00 
% 
1,43 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 2,37 % 19,02 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
 Import 1434,2 0,00 % 0,00 % 
31,00 
% 
33,27 
% 
0,00 
% 
1,01 % 0,49 % 0,53 % 1,09 % 17,35 % 0,00 % 15,25 % 
Korea Balance/NET 2676,2 - 0,69 0,14 -0,17 0,62 -0,25 0,52 -0,42 -0,14 -0,25 0,04 0,05 
 Export 110854 0,00 % 0,19 % 
36,96 
% 
12,84 
% 
19,76 
% 
0,45 % 2,88 % 3,10 % 0,95 % 20,64 % 1,13 % 1,11 % 
 Import 108178 0,00 % 0,03 % 
28,52 
% 
18,58 
% 
4,76 
% 
0,77 % 0,94 % 7,75 % 1,28 % 35,25 % 1,08 % 1,04 % 
Japan Balance/NET -50500 -0,90 -0,60 -0,16 -0,31 0,20 -1,11 0,18 0,23 -0,42 -0,28 -0,74 0,25 
 Export 134190 0,36 % 0,50 % 
29,92 
% 
10,87 
% 
8,64 
% 
-0,30 % 3,46 % 23,77 % 1,73 % 18,98 % 0,14 % 2,31 % 
 Import 184690 4,74 % 0,09 % 
29,97 
% 
15,11 
% 
4,20 
% 
3,99 % 1,75 % 10,77 % 3,07 % 24,37 % 0,65 % 1,01 % 
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Continued, Appendix Table 5b: Asia - services trade by sector and country… 
 
  
Total 
Services 
Manuf. 
Services 
on 
Physical 
Inputs 
Owned by 
Others 
Mainten. 
& Repair, 
n.i.e. 
Trans-
port 
Travel 
Const- 
ruction 
Insurance 
& Pension 
Financial 
Charges for 
the use of 
Intellectual 
Property, 
n.i.e. 
Telecom. , 
Computer 
& Inform. 
Other 
Business 
Personal, 
Cultural & 
Recreational 
Governm. 
goods & 
Services, 
n.i.e 
China Balance/NET -85753 1,00 0,16 -0,38 -0,34 0,54 -0,72 -0,01 -0,89 0,49 0,11 -0,64 -0,02 
 Export 196302 9,17 % 0,62 % 
19,82 
% 
25,49 
% 
6,24 
% 
1,70 % 0,96 % 0,53 % 8,28 % 26,64 % 0,06 % 0,50 % 
 Import 282055 0,00 % 0,31 % 
30,44 
% 
36,16 
% 
1,28 
% 
7,30 % 0,68 % 6,29 % 1,95 % 15,02 % 0,20 % 0,37 % 
India* Balance/NET 12733 - - -0,53 0,12 -0,15 -0,40 -0,14 -0,81 0,90 -0,08 0,06 -0,17 
 Export 137325 0,00 % 0,00 % 
12,75 
% 
12,76 
% 
0,61 
% 
1,87 % 4,54 % 0,22 % 45,70 % 15,79 % 5,33 % 0,43 % 
 Import 124592 0,00 % 0,00 % 
45,51 
% 
11,01 
% 
0,91 
% 
4,86 % 6,59 % 2,26 % 2,57 % 20,43 % 5,18 % 0,68 % 
Australia Balance/NET -9027 0,92 -0,82 -0,42 0,08 1,00 -0,24 0,21 -0,63 -0,06 -0,03 -0,31 -0,02 
 Export 51688 0,05 % 0,08 % 
12,46 
% 
60,92 
% 
0,15 
% 
0,81 % 2,64 % 1,78 % 3,37 % 14,36 % 1,69 % 1,70 % 
 Import 60715 0,00 % 0,70 % 
25,80 
% 
43,81 
% 
0,00 
% 
1,13 % 1,47 % 6,75 % 3,23 % 12,89 % 2,71 % 1,51 % 
New Zealand Balance/NET -980,1 - - -0,21 0,19 0,13 -0,88 0,15 -0,49 -0,04 -0,22 0,72 0,16 
 Export 11035 0,00 % 0,00 % 
18,33 
% 
49,54 
% 
0,16 
% 
0,30 % 4,17 % 2,81 % 5,60 % 13,91 % 4,55 % 1,46 % 
 Import 12015 0,00 % 0,00 % 
25,74 
% 
30,94 
% 
0,11 
% 
4,25 % 2,85 % 7,60 % 5,55 % 19,98 % 0,69 % 0,98 % 
Hong Kong* Balance/NET 16299 -1,00 0,60 0,28 0,18 0,29 -0,17 0,58 -0,63 0,27 0,05 0,67 -0,32 
 Export 90707 0,00 % 0,34 % 
35,42 
% 
30,50 
% 
0,16 
% 
0,94 % 16,06 % 0,51 % 2,42 % 13,07 % 0,52 % 0,08 % 
 Import 74408 24,08 % 0,10 % 
24,07 
% 
25,76 
% 
0,11 
% 
1,60 % 5,22 % 2,70 % 1,69 % 14,35 % 0,13 % 0,19 % 
ASEAN*** Balance/NET -16998,0 1,00 0,63 -0,24 0,24 0,02 -0,43 0,55 -0,84 0,06 0,0025 -0,15 0,01 
 Export 262263,71 0,20 % 2,78 % 
22,62 
% 
33,64 
% 
1,70 
% 
1,55 % 5,99 % 0,80 % 4,39 % 21,98 % 0,40 % 0,56 % 
 Import 279261,71 0,00 % 0,59 % 
34,81 
% 
19,42 
% 
1,52 
% 
3,61 % 1,64 % 8,59 % 3,66 % 20,74 % 0,51 % 0,52 % 
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Continued, Appendix Table 5b: Asia - services trade by sector and country… 
  
Total 
Services 
Manuf. 
Services 
on 
Physical 
Inputs 
Owned by 
Others 
Mainten. 
& Repair, 
n.i.e. 
Trans-
port 
Travel 
Const- 
ruction 
Insurance 
& Pension 
Financial 
Charges for 
the use of 
Intellectual 
Property, 
n.i.e. 
Telecom. , 
Computer 
& Inform. 
Other 
Business 
Personal, 
Cultural & 
Recreational 
Governm. 
goods & 
Services, 
n.i.e 
Japan, Korea, 
China 
Balance/NET -133577,0 0,36 0,32 -0,18 -0,31 0,47 -0,79 0,22 -0,12 0,22 -0,11 -0,31 0,14 
 Export 441346,00 4,19 % 0,47 % 
27,20 
% 
17,86 
% 
10,36 
% 
0,78 % 2,20 % 8,24 % 4,45 % 22,80 % 0,35 % 1,21 % 
 Import 574923,00 1,52 % 0,19 % 
29,93 
% 
26,09 
% 
2,87 
% 
5,01 % 1,07 % 8,01 % 2,18 % 21,83 % 0,51 % 0,70 % 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) (through the CEIC database). Net Export Ratio = (Export - Import/Export + Import). *2011. **2009. ***2011 & 2009 for ASEAN; Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, Myanmar, Brunei, Laos, Cambodia. 
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Appendix Table 5c. Asia-19`s share of world service sector trade by country, 2005-2011 (BPM5, annual data ending Dec each year, million USD). 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Australia % of Export 1 .19 % 1 .12 % 1 .15 % 1 .15 % 1 .17 % 1 .25 %  
 % of Import 1 .22 % 1 .15 % 1 .21 % 1 .29 % 1 .24 % 1 .39 %  
Brunei % of Export 0 .02 % 0 .03 % 0 .02 % 0 .02 % 0 .03 %   
 % of Import 0 .04 % 0 .04 % 0 .04 % 0 .04 % 0 .04 %   
Philippines % of Export 0 .17 % 0 .22 % 0 .28 % 0 .25 % 0 .31 % 0 .36 % 0 .36 % 
 % of Import 0 .23 % 0 .23 % 0 .23 % 0 .23 % 0 .26 % 0 .31 % 0 .29 % 
Hong Kong % of Export 2 .45 % 2 .47 % 2 .41 % 2 .34 % 2 .43 % 2 .73 % 2 .79 % 
 % of Import 1 .36 % 1 .33 % 1 .29 % 1 .25 % 1 .30 % 1 .38 % 1 .36 % 
India % of Export 2 .02 % 2 .37 % 2 .47 % 2 .71 % 2 .62 % 3 .18 %  
 % of Import 1 .89 % 2 .10 % 2 .15 % 2 .35 % 2 .39 % 3 .15 %  
Indonesia % of Export 0 .50 % 0 .39 % 0 .36 % 0 .39 % 0 .37 % 0 .43 % 0 .47 % 
 % of Import 0 .88 % 0 .77 % 0 .74 % 0 .75 % 0 .68 % 0 .70 % 0 .79 % 
Japan % of Export 4 .24 % 3 .98 % 3 .67 % 3 .77 % 3 .61 % 3 .64 % 3 .34 % 
 % of Import 5 .36 % 4 .85 % 4 .56 % 4 .52 % 4 .39 % 4 .25 % 4 .07 % 
Cambodia % of Export 0 .04 % 0 .04 % 0 .04 % 0 .04 % 0 .05 % 0 .04 %  
 % of Import 0 .03 % 0 .03 % 0 .03 % 0 .03 % 0 .03 % 0 .03 %  
China % of Export 2 .86 % 3 .13 % 3 .47 % 3 .73 % 3 .64 % 4 .40 %  
 % of Import 3 .35 % 3 .61 % 3 .94 % 4 .24 % 4 .69 % 5 .22 %  
Lao PDR % of Export 0 .01 % 0 .01 % 0 .01 % 0 .01 % 0 .01 % 0 .01 %  
 % of Import 0 .002 % 0 .001 % 0 .001 % 0 .003 % 0 .004 % 0 .01 %  
Malaysia % of Export 0 .75 % 0 .74 % 0 .84 % 0 .77 % 0 .81 % 0 .84 % 0 .81 % 
 % of Import 0 .88 % 0 .85 % 0 .87 % 0 .81 % 0 .81 % 0 .87 % 0 .92 % 
Myanmar % of Export 0 .01 % 0 .01 % 0 .01 % 0 .01 % 0 .01 % 0 .01 %  
 % of Import 0 .02 % 0 .02 % 0 .02 % 0 .02 % 0 .02 % 0 .02 %  
New Zealand % of Export 0 .33 % 0 .28 % 0 .27 % 0 .24 % 0 .23 % 0 .23 % 0 .23 % 
 % of Import 0 .33 % 0 .28 % 0 .28 % 0 .26 % 0 .24 % 0 .25 % 0 .27 % 
Singapore % of Export 2 .14 % 2 .25 % 2 .42 % 2 .52 % 2 .64 % 2 .89 %  
 % of Import 2 .21 % 2 .33 % 2 .26 % 2 .33 % 2 .35 % 2 .60 %  
Korea % of Export 1 .91 % 1 .93 % 2 .07 % 2 .30 % 2 .07 % 2 .25 % 2 .18 % 
 % of Import 2 .38 % 2 .51 % 2 .57 % 2 .57 % 2 .37 % 2 .59 % 2 .41 % 
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Continued, Appendix Table 5c: Asia-19`s share of world service sector trade by country… 
Taiwan % of Export 0.99 % 0.99 % 0.95 % 0.93 % 0.89 % 1.04 % 1.06 % 
 % of Import 1.30 % 1.17 % 1.06 % 0.93 % 0.88 % 1.02 % 1.02 % 
Thailand % of Export 0.77 % 0.83 % 0.86 % 0.84 % 0.85 % 0.88 %  
 % of Import 1.07 % 1.17 % 1.15 % 1.22 % 1.08 % 1.21 %  
Vietnam % of Export 0.16 % 0.17 % 0.17 % 0.18 % 0.16 % 0.19 % 0.20 % 
 % of Import 0.18 % 0.18 % 0.21 % 0.21 % 0.24 % 0.27 % 0.29 % 
Macao % of Export 0.33 % 0.36 % 0.40 % 0.45 % 0.53 % 0.74 %  
 % of Import 0.10 % 0.11 % 0.14 % 0.15 % 0.15 % 0.20 %  
Source: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (through the CEIC database) and Word Development Indicators. Some variation in data availability for the independent countries the 
last years (2009-2011): Brunei has data only up to year 2009, Australia, Cambodia, China, India, Lao, Macao, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand have data up until year 2010. The 
remaining countries have a full series. 
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Appendix Table 6: Regressions on income convergence in Asia 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Log GDP/cap -0.0114
***
 -0.0178
**
 0.00205 -0.0142
***
 
 (-6.14) (-3.08) (0.81) (-5.62) 
     
Constant 0.157
***
 0.211
***
 -0.0356 0.181
***
 
 (9.51) (4.33) (-1.81) (7.70) 
N 85 85 12 15 
R
2
 0.280 0.244 0.0545 0.641 
Period Panel Panel; FE 1980-2012 2000-12 
Notes: The Table shows regressions of rates of growth (in proportions) on the logarithm of  initial GDP per 
capita. Column (1) considers. Column (2) use the same sample, but employs country specific dummies  (i.e. a 
fixed effects estimator) to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Columns (3) and (4) consider the periods 
1980-2012 and 2000-2012.  
 
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-values are reported in in parentheses. Significance denoted by * for 5 %, ** for 1 
% and *** for 0.1 %. 
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Appendix Table 7: Sector aggregation used for the analysis of trade 
3 sectors 4 sectors 8 sectors 
Short name Short name Short name HS chapters, 
headings or 
positions included 
Abbreviation in 
tables 
Commodities Agriculture Seafood 03, 051191, 
150410-20, 1603-
05, 230120 
fish 
Agriculture 01-24 except 
seafood 
agr 
Heavy industries Chemicals and 
plastic 
28-39 chem 
Oil and gas 2709-2711 oil 
Metals and other 
minerals 
25, 26, 27 ex. oil & 
gas, 72, 7401-13, 
75, 7601-14, 78-81 
metal 
Light industries Light industries Textile goods, shoes, 
leather goods, etc. 
41-43, 50-67 tex 
Other industries 40, 44-49, 68-71, 
73, 7414-19, 7615-
16, 82, 83, 91-97 
other 
Machinery and 
transport 
equipment 
Machinery and 
transport 
equipment 
Machinery 84, 85, 90 mach 
Transport 
equipment 
86-89 tran 
Note: HS refers to the Harmonized System of trade classification. Vintages HS1996 and HS2007 are used in the 
analysis 
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Appendix Table 8: Sector composition of trade in goods. 
For 16 Asian countries (2010). Figures in % of total exports/imports for each country. 
Note: See Appendix Table 7 for classification. 
Total exports 
 
total agr fish chem metal oil mach trans tex other 
Asia (16)   100 4 1 9 8 6 40 10 9 12 
Australia 100 10 0 6 51 10 5 2 2 9 
China 100 2 1 7 4 1 48 6 17 15 
Hong Kong 100 4 0 12 6 1 20 0 5 52 
Indonesia 100 14 2 6 24 17 10 3 9 16 
India 100 8 1 12 11 17 8 7 14 21 
Japan 100 0 0 11 7 2 42 23 1 8 
Cambodia 100 2 0 0 0 0 3 2 58 35 
Korea, Rep. 100 1 0 11 7 7 43 22 3 6 
Myanmar 100 16 4 0 1 39 0 0 5 35 
Malaysia 100 16 4 0 1 39 0 0 5 35 
New Zealand 100 11 0 8 3 16 46 1 2 12 
Taiwan 100 53 4 5 5 5 7 1 4 14 
Philippines 100 1 1 15 6 5 55 4 5 9 
Singapore 100 6 1 3 5 1 41 4 3 6 
Thailand 100 2 0 12 2 16 52 3 1 6 
Vietnam 100 10 4 9 3 4 34 10 5 21 
Total imports 
 
total agr fish chem metal oil mach trans tex other 
Asia (16)   100 5 1 11 12 17 35 4 4 10 
Australia 100 5 1 12 3 13 29 14 5 16 
China 100 4 0 12 17 13 37 5 3 7 
Hong Kong 100 3 1 6 2 3 59 1 10 15 
Indonesia 100 8 0 13 8 20 28 8 5 8 
India 100 4 0 10 10 29 17 3 1 24 
Japan 100 7 2 10 12 25 24 3 6 9 
Cambodia 100 7 0 7 4 7 14 8 41 12 
Korea, Rep. 100 4 1 10 16 25 30 3 3 7 
Myanmar 100 8 0 12 9 22 19 9 8 13 
Malaysia 100 8 0 12 9 22 19 9 8 13 
New Zealand 100 7 0 10 9 9 47 5 1 10 
Taiwan 100 10 0 14 3 15 24 13 6 13 
Philippines 100 4 0 15 14 17 38 2 2 7 
Singapore 100 11 0 10 7 16 42 6 2 6 
Thailand 100 3 0 7 2 26 46 4 1 8 
Vietnam 100 4 1 12 11 16 33 5 3 14 
Source: Own calculations based on data from WITS/COMTRADE. 
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Appendix Table 9: The magnitude of trade flows in Asia, by country and sector. 
For 16 Asian countries (2010). Figures in % of total Asia (16) exports or imports. 
Note: See Appendix Table 7 for classification. 
Note: Shaded rows/columns show sector/country shares. 
Total exports of Asia (16) 
 
total agr fish chem metal oil mach trans tex other 
Asia (16)   100.0 3.9 0.9 9.1 7.8 5.8 40.1 9.5 8.6 12.2 
Australia 4.5 0.5 0.0 0.3 2.3 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 
China 34.4 0.7 0.3 2.4 1.3 0.4 16.4 1.9 5.8 5.1 
Hong Kong 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Indonesia 3.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.6 
India 4.8 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.7 1.0 
Japan 16.8 0.1 0.0 1.9 1.2 0.3 7.0 3.8 0.2 1.4 
Cambodia 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Korea, Rep. 10.2 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.7 0.7 4.4 2.2 0.3 0.6 
Myanmar 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Malaysia 4.3 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.7 2.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 
New Zealand 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Taiwan 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.3 0.3 3.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 
Philippines 1.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Singapore 7.7 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.1 1.2 4.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 
Thailand 4.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 1.4 0.4 0.2 0.9 
Vietnam 1.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.3 
Total imports of Asia (16) 
 
total agr fish chem metal oil mach trans tex other 
Asia (16)   100.0 4.9 0.8 10.6 11.6 17.4 35.0 4.3 4.1 10.2 
Australia 4.1 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.5 1.2 0.6 0.2 0.6 
China 28.0 1.2 0.1 3.3 4.9 3.6 10.4 1.4 0.7 1.8 
Hong Kong 9.6 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.3 5.7 0.1 0.9 1.4 
Indonesia 2.9 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 
India 7.6 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.7 2.2 1.3 0.2 0.1 1.8 
Japan 15.0 1.1 0.3 1.4 1.8 3.7 3.6 0.4 1.0 1.4 
Cambodia 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Korea, Rep. 9.2 0.4 0.1 0.9 1.5 2.3 2.7 0.3 0.3 0.7 
Myanmar 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Malaysia 3.6 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.7 0.2 0.1 0.4 
New Zealand 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Taiwan 5.4 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.9 2.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 
Philippines 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Singapore 6.7 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.2 1.8 3.1 0.2 0.1 0.5 
Thailand 3.9 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.6 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 
Vietnam 1.8 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Source: Own calculations based on data from WITS/COMTRADE. 
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Appendix Table 10: Annual growth rates for trade in goods by country and sector, 2000-2010. For 15 
Asian countries (2010). Figures in %, based on data in constant USD. 
Note: See Appendix Table 7 for classification. 
Note: Shaded rows/columns show sector/country growth rates. 
Exports of Asia (15) 
 
total agr fish chem metal oil mach trans tex other 
Asia (15)   8.6 9.5 5.4 10.4 13.9 12.4 7.1 8.7 6.0 10.2 
Australia 10.0 3.7 -2.9 5.7 17.6 7.8 3.4 0.8 -1.4 10.2 
China 17.6 9.4 11.2 17.2 14.7 13.7 22.4 22.6 12.0 16.1 
Hong Kong -6.7 3.3 -13.8 2.9 5.1 13.6 -10.6 -28.3 -26.2 7.4 
Indonesia 7.3 16.5 2.6 7.7 19.7 3.9 1.8 19.0 1.0 5.2 
India 15.3 11.6 3.6 16.2 22.5 35.8 18.8 28.8 6.6 13.4 
Japan 2.5 5.1 6.7 5.4 8.9 24.2 0.0 3.3 -1.7 4.6 
Cambodia 12.4 25.2 -9.1 37.8 57.1 -10.7 36.4 34.5 9.8 16.2 
Korea, Rep. 8.0 7.1 -0.8 10.8 12.0 10.2 7.5 12.8 -5.4 5.6 
Malaysia 4.9 13.7 6.6 10.2 13.0 10.1 1.6 11.7 -1.4 6.3 
New Zealand 6.4 8.9 2.5 -0.4 3.4 13.3 4.9 4.3 -1.1 4.1 
Taiwan 3.5 3.2 -0.2 9.7 7.0 20.9 2.9 2.5 -5.3 1.4 
Philippines 0.8 5.8 2.4 11.2 11.2 2.0 -5.2 9.5 -10.1 2.3 
Singapore 7.4 6.9 -3.9 11.3 9.9 16.2 4.3 14.3 -3.7 11.1 
Thailand 8.5 9.9 2.8 12.2 9.6 13.2 6.4 19.9 0.2 12.8 
Vietnam 14.8 12.5 10.7 25.6 31.6 3.1 22.2 26.2 15.3 25.2 
Imports of Asia (15) 
 
total agr fish chem metal oil mach trans tex other 
Asia (15)   8.6 8.0 1.5 9.2 14.6 12.0 7.1 10.1 1.6 8.0 
Australia 8.3 10.2 6.6 7.3 11.7 14.2 6.5 6.7 5.5 8.9 
China 16.8 19.1 10.7 14.3 23.5 20.7 15.9 23.4 3.9 13.3 
Hong Kong 5.1 4.9 2.2 1.6 0.7 11.5 8.2 1.8 -2.3 4.2 
Indonesia 12.5 10.8 10.4 8.6 13.4 13.7 16.4 11.9 8.0 10.7 
India 18.1 15.9 17.5 18.9 20.9 16.2 19.6 23.2 9.9 18.3 
Japan 3.8 1.6 -2.6 6.2 9.4 6.9 2.2 1.3 0.9 1.3 
Cambodia 10.5 7.2 1.1 9.9 8.9 3.9 12.2 14.9 11.8 11.4 
Korea, Rep. 7.8 7.0 6.3 9.1 13.1 9.3 4.8 14.0 4.1 7.1 
Malaysia 4.9 11.5 7.6 6.9 10.0 12.1 1.9 11.2 0.8 7.5 
New Zealand 5.7 9.1 4.6 4.9 3.8 9.9 4.3 3.8 4.4 5.6 
Taiwan 3.6 4.3 2.8 5.8 8.3 11.7 0.3 0.3 -1.3 4.2 
Philippines 2.4 7.5 1.5 3.5 4.6 6.6 -0.3 9.0 -6.1 2.3 
Singapore 6.3 6.4 3.3 7.0 6.0 14.9 3.2 7.0 -0.8 7.5 
Thailand 8.9 10.4 7.6 8.4 13.5 12.4 6.4 9.5 3.5 11.3 
Vietnam 15.8 21.2 27.1 15.8 22.4 10.9 17.8 7.1 12.0 20.4 
Source: Own calculations based on data from WITS/COMTRADE. 
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Table 11: Shares of Asia’s trade in goods 2010, and annual growth rates 2000-2010. For 
16/15 Asian countries.  
Note: Figures in percentages. Growth rates based on data in constant USD. 
Annual trade growth 2000-2010 
 
Exports Imports 
World Asia Other World Asia Other 
Asia (15)   8.5 9.4 7.6 8.6 8.8 8.4 
Australia 10.0 12.4 4.4 8.3 10.3 6.2 
China 17.6 15.2 19.7 16.8 15.5 18.5 
Hong Kong, China -6.7 -3.8 -10.0 5.1 5.4 4.2 
Indonesia 7.3 8.4 5.3 12.5 14.5 8.8 
India 15.3 18.4 14.3 18.1 23.1 16.4 
Japan 2.5 5.7 -0.6 3.8 5.1 2.6 
Cambodia 12.4 16.8 10.1 10.5 10.7 9.1 
Korea, Rep. 8.0 9.6 6.4 7.8 8.8 6.8 
Macao -19.6 -6.1 -21.9 6.9 3.7 16.3 
Malaysia 4.9 6.4 2.4 4.9 5.4 4.0 
New Zealand 6.4 7.3 5.1 5.7 7.5 3.2 
Taiwan 3.5 6.4 -1.1 3.6 3.8 3.4 
Philippines 0.8 3.9 -3.4 2.4 4.0 -0.4 
Singapore 7.4 9.3 3.6 6.3 6.2 6.4 
Thailand 8.5 10.5 6.0 8.9 9.8 7.4 
Vietnam 14.8 11.6 19.3 15.8 15.2 18.2 
Shares (%) of Asia’s trade 2010 
 
Exports Imports 
World Asia Other World Asia Other 
Asia19 --- Asia19   100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Australia 4.5 6.5 2.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 
China 34.4 26.1 44.2 27.9 25.8 30.7 
Hong Kong, China 0.3 0.4 0.3 9.6 13.6 4.1 
Indonesia 3.4 4.4 2.3 2.9 3.7 1.9 
India 4.8 2.5 7.5 7.6 4.3 12.0 
Japan 16.8 18.0 15.4 15.0 13.6 16.9 
Cambodia 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 
Korea, Rep. 10.2 10.4 9.9 9.2 8.4 10.3 
Macao 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Myanmar 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Malaysia 4.3 5.4 3.0 3.6 4.3 2.6 
New Zealand 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Taiwan 5.7 7.3 3.8 5.4 5.5 5.3 
Philippines 1.1 1.4 0.8 1.3 1.5 0.9 
Singapore 7.7 10.3 4.6 6.7 7.1 6.3 
Thailand 4.3 4.9 3.5 3.9 4.5 3.2 
Vietnam 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.8 2.5 0.9 
Source: Own calculations based on data from WITS/COMTRADE. 
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Appendix Table 12: Income inequality and poverty in Asian countries (latest available year) 
Country Gini Income share by quintile 
 
Extreme poverty Poverty 
  
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
 
Head- 
count 
Poverty 
gap 
Head- 
count 
Poverty 
gap 
Australia 35.19 5.90 12.01 17.20 23.57 41.32 
     Brunei Darussalam  
          China 42.06 4.67 9.74 15.31 23.19 47.09 
 
11.80 2.84 27.21 9.08 
Indonesia 38.14 7.27 10.71 14.85 21.18 45.98 
 
16.20 2.68 43.33 13.04 
India 33.90 8.54 12.14 15.69 20.82 42.81 
 
32.68 7.49 68.76 24.47 
Japan 24.85 10.58 14.21 17.58 21.98 35.65 
     Cambodia 36.03 7.93 11.39 15.28 20.95 44.45 
 
18.60 3.51 49.54 15.06 
Korea, Rep. 31.59 7.91 13.56 17.95 23.13 37.45 
     Lao PDR 36.74 7.64 11.33 15.29 20.90 44.84 
 
33.88 8.95 66.00 24.83 
Myanmar 
           Malaysia 46.21 4.54 8.65 13.72 21.64 51.45 
 
0.00 0.00 2.27 0.16 
New Zealand 36.17 6.45 11.37 15.81 22.61 43.76 
     Philippines 42.98 5.98 9.42 13.87 21.04 49.69 
 
18.42 3.72 41.53 13.78 
Singapore 42.48 5.04 9.42 14.55 22.02 48.97 
     Thailand 39.37 6.76 10.50 14.62 21.45 46.67 
 
0.38 0.04 4.05 0.68 
Vietnam 35.57 7.42 11.52 15.81 21.84 43.41 
 
16.85 3.75 43.36 13.53 
Data source: World Development Indicators. 
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Appendix Table 13: Sector and country shares of trade in goods 1996 and 2012, in 
Norway’s trade with Asia-19 
Based on figures in 2012 constant $ (using the US GDP deflator) 
Sector share of trade 
 
Exports to Asia-19 Imports from Asia-19 
 
1996 2004 2012 1996 2004 2012 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Seafood 18.7 17.2 10.6 0.5 0.4 0.7 
Agriculture 1.7 0.8 0.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Chemicals 5.5 7.8 8.2 3.6 3.5 5.1 
Oil&gas 7.6 11.6 26.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Metals/min. 9.3 13.1 8.8 3.4 1.9 2.5 
Textiles 0.7 0.6 0.3 17.7 17.8 16.4 
Machinery 29.0 30.1 32.8 30.1 39.8 40.0 
Transp. Eq. 3.5 13.0 2.2 26.1 17.4 14.8 
Other  6.6 5.7 5.8 15.9 16.7 18.1 
Country shares of trade 
 
Exports to Asia-19 Imports from Asia-19 
 
1996 2004 2012 1996 2004 2012 
Asia-19 100 100 100 100 100 100 
ASEAN 22.3 14.2 18.0 23.0 12.0 13.5 
China/Japan/Kor 52.2 66.5 69.6 58.4 71.7 75.9 
Aus/NZ/India 7.8 7.0 6.5 6.8 4.4 5.0 
Australia 4.5 3.7 3.3 3.6 1.2 0.8 
Brunei 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
China 7.9 21.0 19.9 18.2 38.3 54.5 
Hong Kong 5.1 8.3 2.2 4.6 3.6 1.0 
Indonesia 2.0 0.5 1.1 1.7 1.6 1.2 
India 2.4 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.8 3.9 
Japan 35.2 26.6 12.6 34.9 26.2 13.8 
Cambodia 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Korea, Rep. 9.1 18.9 37.1 5.3 7.2 7.6 
Lao PDR 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Macao 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Malaysia 2.0 1.1 1.9 2.5 3.0 2.3 
New Zealand 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 
Taiwan 12.4 3.8 3.8 6.9 7.9 4.3 
Philippines 3.8 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.2 
Singapore 7.6 10.7 10.1 14.9 2.3 3.1 
Thailand 6.2 1.2 2.5 2.7 3.0 3.9 
Vietnam 0.2 0.3 1.3 0.6 1.4 2.6 
Data source: Own calculations based on data from WITS/COMTRADE. 
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Appenbdix Table 14: Growth rates for Norway's trade in goods with Asia-19 by country,  
and country shares 1996 and 2012. 
 
Share of total trade  
with Asia-19 
Growth rates  
 
Exports Imports 1996-2012 2005-2012 
 
1996 2012 1996 2012 Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Asia-19 100 100 100 100 7.8 6.6 13.8 8.0 
Australia 4.5 3.3 3.6 0.8 5.8 -2.6 9.8 3.9 
Brunei 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 12.8 20.5 27.6 -11.9 
China 7.9 19.9 18.2 54.5 14.3 14.1 14.6 12.2 
Hong Kong 5.1 2.2 4.6 1.0 2.3 -3.0 0.4 -8.8 
Indonesia 2.0 1.1 1.7 1.2 3.9 4.2 18.9 2.5 
India 2.4 3.0 2.9 3.9 9.3 8.6 8.1 12.9 
Japan 35.2 12.6 34.9 13.8 1.1 0.6 3.9 0.1 
Cambodia 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 -31.1 22.4 -47.4 16.5 
Korea, Rep. 9.1 37.1 5.3 7.6 17.7 9.0 25.7 8.0 
Lao PDR 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 -27.1 -10.6 -28.3 -9.6 
Macao 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 -9.9 -11.0 -9.5 -26.4 
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 -8.3 51.8 -22.7 
Malaysia 2.0 1.9 2.5 2.3 7.4 6.1 27.0 4.2 
New Zealand 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.3 -1.7 7.0 0.0 9.0 
Taiwan 12.4 3.8 6.9 4.3 0.1 3.4 18.7 0.6 
Philippines 3.8 1.0 0.5 0.2 -1.0 1.9 29.4 -7.2 
Singapore 7.6 10.1 14.9 3.1 9.7 -3.3 4.5 11.1 
Thailand 6.2 2.5 2.7 3.9 1.9 9.1 29.5 13.9 
Vietnam 0.2 1.3 0.6 2.6 22.4 16.6 37.7 18.1 
Source: Own calculations based on data from WITS/COMTRADE. 
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Appendix Table 15: Sector shares in Norway’s trade in goods with Asia-19, 1996-2012 
 
Country 
Year 
Exports Imports 
Total fish agr chem oil metal tex mach tran other Total fish agr chem oil metal tex mach tran other 
Asia-19 
1996 100 18.7 1.7 5.5 7.6 9.3 0.7 29.0 3.5 6.6 100 0.5 2.1 3.6 0.0 3.4 17.7 30.1 26.1 15.9 
2004 100 17.2 0.8 7.8 11.6 13.1 0.6 30.1 13.0 5.7 100 0.4 2.1 3.5 0.0 1.9 17.8 39.8 17.4 16.7 
2012 100 10.6 0.4 8.2 26.1 8.8 0.3 32.8 2.2 5.8 100 0.7 2.1 5.1 0.1 2.5 16.4 40.0 14.8 18.1 
Australia  
1996 100 5.5 6.8 3.8 0.0 5.5 0.2 19.9 3.3 11.3 100 0.0 10.3 24.4 0.0 60.2 0.3 3.5 0.5 0.6 
2004 100 3.7 9.6 2.5 0.0 6.2 0.7 60.6 1.4 15.2 100 0.1 33.2 4.0 0.0 38.9 1.0 15.9 2.6 4.2 
2012 100 6.4 4.8 1.7 0.0 4.0 0.3 26.5 38.4 10.7 100 0.4 19.6 22.0 0.0 16.7 1.8 30.7 4.0 4.7 
Brunei 
1996 100 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 3.2 0.0 72.1 4.7 7.9 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
2004 100 0.0 0.0 32.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 38.3 6.6 22.2 
          
2012 100 1.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 87.7 0.5 10.0 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
China 
1996 100 3.6 0.0 2.5 0.0 1.1 0.1 48.4 0.6 2.9 100 0.3 1.5 3.7 0.0 3.3 52.5 13.8 5.2 18.8 
2004 100 16.3 0.0 6.4 22.4 11.8 0.6 24.9 13.9 3.6 100 0.3 1.0 4.2 0.0 2.9 31.3 37.7 1.9 20.3 
2012 100 15.7 0.1 14.5 2.8 21.4 0.4 32.6 1.4 3.6 100 0.4 1.7 4.3 0.0 2.4 22.4 45.5 3.9 19.1 
Hong Kong 
1996 100 15.3 1.3 2.6 0.0 21.1 7.0 36.5 1.3 10.1 100 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.4 0.0 53.1 29.1 0.3 14.0 
2004 100 8.4 0.1 1.2 0.0 28.9 2.7 16.3 39.9 2.3 100 0.4 0.3 2.0 0.0 0.2 23.5 30.4 24.0 17.4 
2012 100 38.3 0.9 8.8 0.0 13.0 2.0 31.4 0.9 4.5 100 0.1 0.3 5.4 0.5 0.6 25.5 32.2 3.6 30.2 
Indonesia 
1996 100 0.4 4.3 2.6 0.0 6.7 0.4 41.6 0.1 8.2 100 0.1 9.4 2.3 0.0 0.8 38.8 10.0 0.2 38.1 
2004 100 13.2 2.3 11.3 0.0 8.2 0.3 46.8 0.0 17.9 100 1.6 4.8 1.2 0.0 0.0 27.3 17.3 3.0 44.5 
2012 100 11.4 0.1 9.9 0.0 1.9 2.7 38.6 10.3 12.1 100 0.5 3.5 4.9 0.0 0.1 40.4 19.6 3.8 27.1 
India 
1996 100 0.1 0.9 5.6 0.0 6.1 1.4 61.2 4.3 9.4 100 1.0 12.2 6.0 0.0 3.8 64.9 1.1 0.1 11.0 
2004 100 0.4 0.2 3.4 0.0 22.7 1.6 38.4 30.7 2.6 100 0.6 10.7 2.5 0.0 5.8 54.1 5.9 0.6 16.8 
2012 100 0.2 0.0 4.4 9.5 24.5 0.4 41.3 1.3 2.8 100 0.7 6.3 6.4 0.0 2.8 37.7 9.6 21.8 14.6 
Japan 
 
1996 100 42.9 2.8 10.8 0.0 14.0 0.2 13.5 3.4 7.8 100 0.1 0.1 3.3 0.0 1.5 0.4 40.0 33.9 20.6 
2004 100 38.6 1.4 18.6 1.0 16.1 0.1 14.6 2.6 7.0 100 0.0 0.1 3.7 0.0 0.1 0.3 37.5 45.1 13.1 
2012 100 24.7 1.4 12.2 26.6 8.5 0.1 12.4 1.0 11.2 100 0.1 0.2 5.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 32.3 40.1 21.5 
Cambodia 
1996 100 78.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.9 0.0 12.1 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2004 100 90.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.1 0.0 8.5 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 
2012 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 98.0 0.1 1.3 0.1 
Korea, Rep.  
1996 100 4.9 0.3 2.3 0.0 7.0 1.1 59.0 16.8 5.0 100 2.6 0.4 3.2 0.0 0.3 13.9 51.0 13.5 13.8 
2004 100 4.1 0.0 1.0 34.6 4.9 0.4 48.8 1.1 5.0 100 0.7 0.6 3.2 0.0 0.1 6.1 35.9 44.0 9.2 
2012 100 1.8 0.1 1.4 52.6 1.7 0.1 36.4 0.3 4.1 100 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.2 2.0 36.4 55.0 4.4 
Continues next page…. 
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Continued Appendix Table 15: Sector shares in Norway’s trade in goods with Asia-19… 
 Year 
Exports Imports 
 
Total fish agr chem oil metal tex mach tran other Total fish agr chem oil metal tex mach tran other 
Lao PDR 
1996 100 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 90.2 4.5 0.1 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.6 1.2 0.0 1.1 
2004 100 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 5.0 93.7 0.1 0.0 100 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2012 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 96.2 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 10.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.4 9.0 0.0 0.0 
Macao 
1996 100 37.2 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 27.6 2.4 3.3 27.8 100 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 97.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 
2004 100 71.9 1.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 6.8 7.1 1.9 10.8 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.1 0.8 0.0 0.1 
2012 100 61.1 9.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.6 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 19.6 56.9 0.0 23.1 
Myanmar 
1996 100 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.8 0.0 68.4 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 1.2 97.9 
2004 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.5 0.0 0.0 70.5 
2012 100 0.0 0.0 9.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 84.5 0.0 5.2 100 0.8 2.1 7.5 0.0 0.0 37.4 34.4 0.0 17.8 
Malaysia 
 
1996 100 10.5 1.9 3.5 0.0 16.2 1.5 18.5 0.7 10.4 100 0.2 6.1 1.6 0.0 0.1 10.6 52.9 2.1 26.4 
2004 100 6.9 0.9 3.6 0.0 7.3 0.1 46.7 26.0 8.4 100 0.1 3.4 3.5 0.0 0.0 2.3 68.6 0.6 21.1 
2012 100 5.8 0.1 5.0 0.0 0.8 0.4 63.9 1.9 10.6 100 0.0 0.6 7.2 0.0 0.6 1.6 63.8 11.2 14.8 
New Zealand 
1996 100 0.3 1.3 2.4 0.0 2.0 3.5 67.7 4.0 5.1 100 0.9 68.3 2.6 0.0 0.4 9.9 13.7 0.8 3.3 
2004 100 1.8 3.8 5.5 0.0 1.8 5.9 56.3 13.7 11.2 100 5.4 61.7 1.5 0.0 0.2 8.8 20.0 0.3 1.9 
2012 100 18.6 0.4 1.9 0.0 2.1 3.0 31.0 12.2 12.4 100 1.3 50.3 2.1 0.0 12.1 3.3 24.2 0.7 5.5 
Taiwan 
1996 100 7.8 0.4 0.7 60.7 6.1 0.2 4.9 0.1 3.7 100 1.6 0.2 2.3 0.0 0.3 4.2 58.4 13.2 19.4 
2004 100 16.6 0.3 11.4 2.3 42.5 0.2 14.9 1.0 10.8 100 0.0 0.1 2.5 0.0 0.3 3.4 69.8 7.5 16.2 
2012 100 18.6 0.2 3.8 64.1 3.9 0.0 5.8 0.1 2.3 100 0.8 0.3 2.8 0.0 2.8 2.9 58.3 12.4 19.5 
Philippines 
1996 100 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 90.7 1.1 1.5 100 0.1 17.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 26.2 33.2 1.0 20.7 
2004 100 16.2 5.2 3.6 0.3 0.5 0.4 60.6 1.4 11.7 100 2.3 6.9 0.6 0.0 0.0 8.0 65.1 6.3 10.5 
2012 100 9.1 0.7 70.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 5.1 0.8 0.8 100 1.2 13.2 4.2 0.0 0.6 18.5 51.1 0.4 10.7 
Singapore 
1996 100 5.8 0.2 6.4 0.0 9.6 0.5 44.4 2.2 9.4 100 0.1 0.2 1.6 0.0 0.1 0.5 18.7 77.4 1.2 
2004 100 3.3 0.1 3.8 0.0 2.7 0.2 44.7 41.4 3.7 100 0.3 0.4 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.7 87.7 0.9 5.5 
2012 100 3.6 0.1 17.5 0.0 14.5 0.2 54.3 1.4 7.2 100 0.2 0.6 31.0 2.5 22.5 0.8 25.6 13.8 2.8 
Thailand 
1996 100 1.7 1.5 1.2 0.0 2.4 0.1 17.6 1.1 2.8 100 4.2 13.2 2.5 0.0 0.6 25.2 33.6 2.6 17.8 
2004 100 38.5 1.3 5.8 0.0 6.8 0.6 27.9 3.0 16.1 100 4.4 13.1 3.6 0.0 0.5 17.5 40.9 0.7 19.0 
2012 100 22.2 0.7 1.6 0.0 1.6 0.2 23.8 0.3 16.5 100 6.0 9.3 1.8 0.0 0.2 8.3 28.7 6.8 38.9 
Vietnam 
1996 100 4.3 0.2 1.9 0.0 2.2 4.6 33.9 12.4 16.9 100 4.3 1.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 76.9 0.0 0.0 17.0 
2004 100 39.6 0.0 6.7 0.0 6.6 2.3 35.8 0.2 8.9 100 1.7 2.0 0.7 0.0 0.2 71.3 1.3 6.0 16.8 
2012 100 54.4 0.1 2.0 0.0 1.3 0.9 24.7 0.6 3.1 100 4.8 3.4 1.6 0.0 0.1 37.8 24.2 16.5 11.7 
Source: Calculated from WITS/COMTRADE data. 
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Appendix Table 16: Norway’s share in China’s exports and imports of goods 2007-2012 (% of total) 
See Appendix Table 7 for classification 
Imports 
 
tot agr chem fish mach other met oil tex tran 
2007 0.19 0.01 0.28 3.89 0.18 0.12 0.20 0.09 0.02 0.03 
2008 0.21 0.00 0.38 3.69 0.28 0.21 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.05 
2009 0.33 0.00 0.42 5.62 0.36 0.23 0.43 0.11 0.03 0.08 
2010 0.25 0.00 0.39 6.63 0.25 0.15 0.31 0.07 0.02 0.10 
2011 0.22 0.00 0.49 5.53 0.21 0.12 0.24 0.08 0.02 0.14 
2012 0.18 0.00 0.41 5.44 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.02 0.01 0.09 
Exports 
 
tot agr chem fish mach other met oil tex tran 
2007 0.18 0.09 0.20 0.13 0.09 0.26 0.06 0.02 0.39 0.27 
2008 0.18 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.04 0.33 0.38 
2009 0.22 0.11 0.20 0.09 0.08 0.25 0.06 0.03 0.28 1.54 
2010 0.18 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.09 0.23 0.06 0.03 0.27 0.69 
2011 0.20 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.21 0.06 0.11 0.26 1.19 
2012 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.21 0.57 
Source: Calculated from WITS/COMTRADE data. 
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Appendix Table 17. Norway`s total outward FDI stock, by region and in Asian countries (million NOK). 
Region 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
World Total 180266 239691 301076 337629 327916 381316 488827 629089 754070 789184 948421 977141 1075618 1169466 
 Yearly growth  33,0 % 25,6 % 12,1 % -2,9 % 16,3 % 28,2 % 28,7 % 19,9 % 4,7 % 20,2 % 3,0 % 10,1 % 8,7 % 
OECD countries Total 164265 197192 238666 257987 261673 294136 375626 496760 559025 558535 669735 697858 748543 874209 
 % of world total 91,1 % 82,3 % 79,3 % 76,4 % 79,8 % 77,1 % 76,8 % 79,0 % 74,1 % 70,8 % 70,6 % 71,4 % 69,6 % 74,8 % 
EU countries Total 126544 156557 195394 204319 206114 232837 306378 355450 428067 456580 541493 574862 613324 763429 
 % of world total 70,2 % 65,3 % 64,9 % 60,5 % 62,9 % 61,1 % 62,7 % 56,5 % 56,8 % 57,9 % 57,1 % 58,8 % 57,0 % 65,3 % 
Netherlands Total 14988 15992 18137 19100 24830 24089 38836 53489 63838 103770 115375 78644 92286 175335 
 % of world total 8,3 % 6,7 % 6,0 % 5,7 % 7,6 % 6,3 % 7,9 % 8,5 % 8,5 % 13,1 % 12,2 % 8,0 % 8,6 % 15,0 % 
Sweden Total 33486 54021 56046 65046 59948 66086 91238 89446 111698 117781 129495 125430 133761 138007 
 % of world total 18,6 % 22,5 % 18,6 % 19,3 % 18,3 % 17,3 % 18,7 % 14,2 % 14,8 % 14,9 % 13,7 % 12,8 % 12,4 % 11,8 % 
 
Australia Total 802 735 2082 -2287 -2705 -1453 2264 2625 2386 3658 5998 -3046 4398 7357 
 % of world total 0,44 % 0,31 % 0,69 % -0,68 % -0,82 % -0,38 % 0,46 % 0,42 % 0,32 % 0,46 % 0,63 % -0,31 % 0,41 % 0,63 % 
Brunei Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Philippines Total -15 -22 10 -4 7 8 199 57 53 79 327 979 73 34 
 % of world total -0,01 % -0,01 % 0,003 % -0,001 % 0,002 % 0,002 % 0,04 % 0,01 % 0,01 % 0,01 % 0,03 % 0,10 % 0,01 % 0,003 % 
Hong Kong Total 325 418 370 551 432 306 1024 656 641 444 661 926 539 556 
 % of world total 0,18 % 0,17 % 0,12 % 0,16 % 0,13 % 0,08 % 0,21 % 0,10 % 0,09 % 0,06 % 0,07 % 0,09 % 0,05 % 0,05 % 
India Total 23 52 45 63 58 51 192 114 289 327 6161 4942 497 1186 
 % of world total 0,01 % 0,02 % 0,01 % 0,02 % 0,02 % 0,01 % 0,04 % 0,02 % 0,04 % 0,04 % 0,65 % 0,51 % 0,05 % 0,10 % 
Indonesia Total 91 135 192 199 218 202 146 326 344 161 454 -443 496 671 
 % of world total 0,05 % 0,06 % 0,06 % 0,06 % 0,07 % 0,05 % 0,03 % 0,05 % 0,05 % 0,02 % 0,05 % -0,05 % 0,05 % 0,06 % 
Japan Total 146 212 180 167 321 370 951 388 498 362 466 401 510 616 
 % of world total 0,08 % 0,09 % 0,06 % 0,05 % 0,10 % 0,10 % 0,19 % 0,06 % 0,07 % 0,05 % 0,05 % 0,04 % 0,05 % 0,05 % 
Cambodia Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
China Total 322 340 322 600 729 514 878 613 1965 870 1501 1890 2082 3309 
 % of world total 0,18 % 0,14 % 0,11 % 0,18 % 0,22 % 0,13 % 0,18 % 0,10 % 0,26 % 0,11 % 0,16 % 0,19 % 0,19 % 0,28 % 
Lao PDR Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Malaysia Total 142 182 220 196 115 124 157 423 1065 1110 1737 1582 1674 1348 
 % of world total 0,08 % 0,08 % 0,07 % 0,06 % 0,04 % 0,03 % 0,03 % 0,07 % 0,14 % 0,14 % 0,18 % 0,16 % 0,16 % 0,12 % 
Myanmar Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Continued next page… 
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Continued Appendix Table 17. Norway`s total outward FDI stock… 
Region 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
New Zealand Total 192 181 2472 1557 1528 62 1523 1660 2724 1585 1427 1500 1426 1475 
 % of world total 0,11 % 0,08 % 0,82 % 0,46 % 0,47 % 0,02 % 0,31 % 0,26 % 0,36 % 0,20 % 0,15 % 0,15 % 0,13 % 0,13 % 
Singapore Total 1397 2035 11202 20110 8334 14237 24000 32374 60879 69213 102022 99596 107338 106955 
 % of world total 0,77 % 0,85 % 3,72 % 5,96 % 2,54 % 3,73 % 4,91 % 5,15 % 8,07 % 8,77 % 10,76 % 10,19 % 9,98 % 9,15 % 
Korea Total 88 144 143 188 1073 1007 1604 1996 3128 2273 1467 1453 1630 1560 
 % of world total 0,05 % 0,06 % 0,05 % 0,06 % 0,33 % 0,26 % 0,33 % 0,32 % 0,41 % 0,29 % 0,15 % 0,15 % 0,15 % 0,13 % 
Taiwan Total 0 0 15 5 2 7 8 0 24 9 7 0 9 17 
 % of world total 0,000 % 0,000 % 0,005 % 0,001 % 0,001 % 0,002 % 0,002 % 0,00 % 0,003 % 0,001 % 0,001 % 0,00 % 0,001 % 0,001 % 
Thailand Total 1349 1386 1494 1585 1899 2656 3326 4011 5240 6319 7130 6993 7350 8353 
 % of world total 0,75 % 0,58 % 0,50 % 0,47 % 0,58 % 0,70 % 0,68 % 0,64 % 0,69 % 0,80 % 0,75 % 0,72 % 0,68 % 0,71 % 
Vietnam Total 0 230 65 325 526 481 594 500 487 358 610 718 556 612 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,10 % 0,02 % 0,10 % 0,16 % 0,13 % 0,12 % 0,08 % 0,06 % 0,05 % 0,06 % 0,07 % 0,05 % 0,05 % 
ASEAN Total 2964 3946 13183 22411 11099 17708 28422 37691 68068 77240 112280 109425 117487 117973 
 % of world total 1,64 % 1,65 % 4,38 % 6,64 % 3,38 % 4,64 % 5,81 % 5,99 % 9,03 % 9,79 % 11,84 % 11,20 % 10,92 % 10,09 % 
"+3" Total 556 696 645 955 2123 1891 3433 2997 5591 3505 3434 3744 4222 5485 
 % of world total 0,31 % 0,29 % 0,21 % 0,28 % 0,65 % 0,50 % 0,70 % 0,48 % 0,74 % 0,44 % 0,36 % 0,38 % 0,39 % 0,47 % 
"16-countries" Total 4537 5610 18427 22699 12103 18259 35834 45087 79058 86315 129300 116565 128030 133476 
 % of world total 2,52 % 2,34 % 6,12 % 6,72 % 3,69 % 4,79 % 7,33 % 7,17 % 10,48 % 10,94 % 13,63 % 11,93 % 11,90 % 11,41 % 
Source: Statistics Norway (SSB). 
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Appendix Table 18. Norway`s total inward FDI stock, by region and from Asian countries (million NOK). 
 
Region 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
World Total 194700 236600 267800 294400 298000 327100 479547 516700 599008 679466 799356 871819 1005179 1068190 
 Yearly growth  21,5 % 13,2 % 9,9 % 1,2 % 9,8 % 46,6 % 7,7 % 15,9 % 13,4 % 17,6 % 9,1 % 15,3 % 6,3 % 
OECD-
countries 
Total 189000 225700 249000 269200 272800 293700 425754 466749 525542 560656 617851 661257 779464 825982 
 % of world total 97,1 % 95,4 % 93,0 % 91,4 % 91,5 % 89,8 % 88,8 % 90,3 % 87,7 % 82,5 % 77,3 % 75,8 % 77,5 % 77,3 % 
EU-countries Total 132700 171900 206500 225300 220400 246600 307978 331548 396793 411283 466077 519726 641801 671625 
 % of world total 68,2 % 72,7 % 77,1 % 76,5 % 74,0 % 75,4 % 64,2 % 64,2 % 66,2 % 60,5 % 58,3 % 59,6 % 63,8 % 62,9 % 
Netherlands Total 49000 52700 53500 52100 47500 55000 37773 39548 54862 52349 45004 70011 93464 119117 
 % of world total 25,2 % 22,3 % 20,0 % 17,7 % 15,9 % 16,8 % 7,9 % 7,7 % 9,2 % 7,7 % 5,6 % 8,0 % 9,3 % 11,2 % 
Sweden Total 25700 40100 43700 55100 52100 74000 104408 113233 114038 115421 126150 136642 152490 173302 
 % of world total 13,2 % 16,9 % 16,3 % 18,7 % 17,5 % 22,6 % 21,8 % 21,9 % 19,0 % 17,0 % 15,8 % 15,7 % 15,2 % 16,2 % 
 
Australia Total 252 627 348 329 263 256 181 37 194 4624 3664 1975 2316 5338 
 % of world total 0,13 % 0,27 % 0,13 % 0,11 % 0,09 % 0,08 % 0,04 % 0,01 % 0,03 % 0,68 % 0,46 % 0,23 % 0,23 % 0,50 % 
Brunei Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Philippines Total 9 -39 -102 32 36 6 77 0 0 0 0 2 1 -2 
 % of world total 
0,005 
% 
-0,02 % -0,04 % 0,01 % 0,01 % 
0,002 
% 
0,02 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
0,0002 
% 
0,0001 
% 
-0,0002 % 
Hong Kong Total 25 31 89 127 69 -5 38 2 4 46 128 95 234 586 
 % of world total 0,01 % 0,01 % 0,03 % 0,04 % 0,02 % 0,00 % 0,01 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,01 % 0,02 % 0,01 % 0,02 % 0,05 % 
India Total 3 -3 -2 -20 -27 4 3 2 11 10 80 79 121 45 
 % of world total 
0,002 
% 
-0,001 % -0,001 % -0,01 % -0,01 % 
0,001 
% 
0,001 % 
0,0004 
% 
0,002 
% 
0,001 % 0,01 % 0,01 % 0,01 % 0,004 % 
Indonesia Total -2 0 0 -11 -23 78 0 0 26 0 0 0 28 35 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % -0,01 % 0,02 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Japan Total 3463 4404 4200 4039 3361 2575 3475 3579 3075 2905 3840 4945 5094 6361 
 % of world total 1,78 % 1,86 % 1,57 % 1,37 % 1,13 % 0,79 % 0,72 % 0,69 % 0,51 % 0,43 % 0,48 % 0,57 % 0,51 % 0,60 % 
Cambodia Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
China Total -33 38 -23 -17 -10 13 913 344 46 2 1690 19210 21536 14654 
 % of world total -0,02 % 0,02 % -0,01 % -0,01 % -0,003 % 
0,004 
% 
0,19 % 0,07 % 0,01 % 
0,0003 
% 
0,21 % 2,20 % 2,14 % 1,37 % 
Lao PDR Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
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Continued Appendix Table 18. Norway`s total inward FDI stock… 
Region 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Malaysia Total 4 2351 7 11 4 0 0 2 27 15 6 153 92 151 
 % of world total 
0,002 
% 
0,99 % 0,003 % 0,004 % 0,001 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
0,0004 
% 
0,005 
% 
0,002 % 0,001 % 0,02 % 0,01 % 0,01 % 
Myanmar Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
New Zealand Total -4 -1 -1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 13 1 
 % of world total 
-0,002 
% 
-0,0004 
% 
-0,0004 
% 
0,0003 
% 
0,0003 
% 
0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,01 % 0,001 % 0,0001 % 
Singapore Total 200 176 329 211 431 -6 9445 1194 2769 4799 9548 10145 12417 20426 
 % of world total 0,10 % 0,07 % 0,12 % 0,07 % 0,14 % -0,002 % 1,97 % 0,23 % 0,46 % 0,71 % 1,19 % 1,16 % 1,24 % 1,91 % 
Korea Total -82 -58 6 3 4 -51 1 5 5 122 7012 7928 8457 7730 
 % of world total -0,04 % -0,02 % 0,002 % 0,001 % 0,001 % -0,02 % 
0,0002 
% 
0,001 % 
0,001 
% 
0,02 % 0,88 % 0,91 % 0,84 % 0,72 % 
Taiwan Total 0 9 -1 8 -12 6 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 0 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,004 % -0,0004 % 0,003 % -0,004 % 
0,002 
% 
0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
0,0001 
% 
0,0001 
% 
0,0003 
% 
0,00 % 
Thailand Total -8 -9 -1 -8 22 -5 0 1 0 0 574 0 2803 2890 
 % of world total -0,004 % -0,004 % -0,0004 % -0,003 % 0,007 % -0,002 % 0,00 % 
0,0002 
% 
0,00 % 0,00 % 0,07 % 0,00 % 0,28 % 0,27 % 
Vietnam Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
ASEAN Total 203 2479 233 235 470 73 9522 1197 2822 4814 10128 10302 15345 23500 
 % of world total 0,10 % 1,05 % 0,09 % 0,08 % 0,16 % 0,02 % 1,99 % 0,23 % 0,47 % 0,71 % 1,27 % 1,18 % 1,53 % 2,20 % 
China, Japan, 
Korea 
Total 3348 4384 4183 4025 3355 2537 4389 3928 3126 3029 12542 32083 35087 28745 
% of world total 1,72 % 1,85 % 1,56 % 1,37 % 1,13 % 0,78 % 0,92 % 0,76 % 0,52 % 0,45 % 1,57 % 3,68 % 3,49 % 2,69 % 
"Asia-16" Total 3802 7486 4761 4570 4062 2870 14095 5164 6153 12477 26414 44489 52882 57629 
 % of world total 1,95 % 3,16 % 1,78 % 1,55 % 1,36 % 0,88 % 2,94 % 1,00 % 1,03 % 1,84 % 3,30 % 5,10 % 5,26 % 5,40 % 
Source: Statistics Norway (SSB). 
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Appendix Table 19. Norway`s return on total outward FDI, by region and for Asian countries (million NOK). 
Region 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
World Total 31783 76312 54775 60852 51053 27024 66153 46258 
 Yearly growth  140,1 % -28,2 % 11,1 % -16,1 % -47,1 % 144,8 % -30,1 % 
OECD-countries Total 14004 49317 21343 16822 11471 4922 29658 14924 
 Share of world total 44,1 % 64,6 % 39,0 % 27,6 % 22,5 % 18,2 % 44,8 % 32,3 % 
EU-countries Total 12200 41749 25046 18707 6773 3209 25238 10809 
 Share of world total 38,4 % 54,7 % 45,7 % 30,7 % 13,3 % 11,9 % 38,2 % 23,4 % 
Netherland Total 2450 14368 4518 9534 3523 -3037 443 5311 
 Share of world total 7,7 % 18,8 % 8,2 % 15,7 % 6,9 % -11,2 % 0,7 % 11,5 % 
Sweden Total 3353 5066 5541 205 3165 2101 11934 3725 
 Share of world total 10,5 % 6,6 % 10,1 % 0,3 % 6,2 % 7,8 % 18,0 % 8,1 % 
 
Australia Total 181 181 -2483 308 440 904 90 366 
 Share of world total 0,57 % 0,24 % -4,53 % 0,51 % 0,86 % 3,35 % 0,14 % 0,79 % 
Brunei Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Philippines Total 1 -8 -13 1 -3 79 -12 13 
 Share of world total 0,003 % -0,01 % -0,02 % 0,002 % -0,01 % 0,29 % -0,02 % 0,03 % 
Hong Kong Total 418 162 155 58 93 96 43 57 
 Share of world total 1,32 % 0,21 % 0,28 % 0,10 % 0,18 % 0,36 % 0,07 % 0,12 % 
India Total 6 10 84 42 9 -13 -31 13 
 Share of world total 0,02 % 0,01 % 0,15 % 0,07 % 0,02 % -0,05 % -0,05 % 0,03 % 
Indonesia Total -25 -11 13 68 35 -12 0 -4 
 Share of world total -0,08 % -0,01 % 0,02 % 0,11 % 0,07 % -0,04 % 0,00 % -0,01 % 
Japan Total -10 -43 38 -4 579 7 -2 23 
 Share of world total -0,03 % -0,06 % 0,07 % -0,01 % 1,13 % 0,03 % 0,00 % 0,05 % 
Cambodia Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
China Total 39 771 38 53 215 215 174 159 
 Share of world total 0,12 % 1,01 % 0,07 % 0,09 % 0,42 % 0,80 % 0,26 % 0,34 % 
Lao PDR Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Malaysia Total -12 31 266 36 202 -109 -58 33 
 Share of world total -0,04 % 0,04 % 0,49 % 0,06 % 0,40 % -0,40 % -0,09 % 0,07 % 
Myanmar Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
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Continued Appendix Table 19. Norway`s return on total outward FDI… 
Region 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
New Zealand Total 111 124 -196 149 106 85 56 63 
 Share of world total 0,35 % 0,16 % -0,36 % 0,24 % 0,21 % 0,31 % 0,08 % 0,14 % 
Singapore Total 775 1399 4850 10012 5301 4730 4192 5 
 Share of world total 2,44 % 1,83 % 8,85 % 16,45 % 10,38 % 17,50 % 6,34 % 0,01 % 
Korea Total 111 471 -1186 1195 351 291 314 228 
 Share of world total 0,35 % 0,62 % -2,17 % 1,96 % 0,69 % 1,08 % 0,47 % 0,49 % 
Taiwan Total 0 0 1 1 -2 0 0 3 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,002 % 0,002 % -0,004 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,01 % 
Thailand Total 42 40 54 47 1051 -2 149 51 
 Share of world total 0,13 % 0,05 % 0,10 % 0,08 % 2,06 % -0,01 % 0,23 % 0,11 % 
Vietnam Total -3 -6 0 5 8 -5 243 194 
 Share of world total -0,01 % -0,01 % 0,00 % 0,01 % 0,02 % -0,02 % 0,37 % 0,42 % 
ASEAN Total 778 1445 5170 10169 6594 4681 4514 292 
 Share of world total 2,45 % 1,89 % 9,44 % 16,71 % 12,92 % 17,32 % 6,82 % 0,63 % 
"+3" Total 140 1199 -1110 1244 1145 513 486 410 
 Share of world total 0,44 % 1,57 % -2,03 % 2,04 % 2,24 % 1,90 % 0,73 % 0,89 % 
"16-countries" Total 1216 2959 1465 11912 8294 6170 5115 1144 
 Share of world total 3,83 % 3,88 % 2,67 % 19,58 % 16,25 % 22,83 % 7,73 % 2,47 % 
Source: Statistics Norway (SSB). 
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Appendix Table 20. Returns on total inward FDI in Norway, by investor region and for Asian countries (million NOK). 
Region 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
World Total 46153 77776 97985 99730 96549 75093 83714 91973 
 Annual growth  68,5 % 26,0 % 1,8 % -3,2 % -22,2 % 11,5 % 9,9 % 
OECD-countries Total 45071 74117 93134 94478 91235 72840 77369 89457 
 Share of world total 97,7 % 95,3 % 95,0 % 94,7 % 94,5 % 97,0 % 92,4 % 97,3 % 
EU-countries Total 30518 51476 64312 64237 47107 53307 52243 64741 
 Share of world total 66,1 % 66,2 % 65,6 % 64,4 % 48,8 % 71,0 % 62,4 % 70,4 % 
Netherland Total 2800 7196 10168 12724 7882 14121 14856 15000 
 Share of world total 6,1 % 9,3 % 10,4 % 12,8 % 8,2 % 18,8 % 17,7 % 16,3 % 
Sweden Total 3779 14890 13292 22996 12997 17855 3474 15125 
 Share of world total 8,2 % 19,1 % 13,6 % 23,1 % 13,5 % 23,8 % 4,1 % 16,4 % 
France Total 7663 9148 10433 9654 15313 8748 15975 12687 
 Share of world total 16,6 % 11,8 % 10,6 % 9,7 % 15,9 % 11,6 % 19,1 % 13,8 % 
 
Australia Total 18 34 143 193 27 37 49 121 
 Share of world total 0,04 % 0,04 % 0,15 % 0,19 % 0,03 % 0,05 % 0,06 % 0,13 % 
Brunei Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Philippines Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Hong Kong Total 1 1 1 1 5 0 3 20 
 Share of world total 0,002 % 0,001 % 0,001 % 0,001 % 0,01 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,02 % 
India Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Indonesia Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Japan Total 477 532 -83 578 982 -125 260 11 
 Share of world total 1,03 % 0,68 % -0,08 % 0,58 % 1,02 % -0,17 % 0,31 % 0,01 % 
Cambodia Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
China Total 0 0 0 0 0 364 344 377 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,48 % 0,41 % 0,41 % 
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Continued Appendix Table 20. Returns on total inward FDI in Norway… 
Lao PDR Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Malaysia Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Myanmar Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
New Zealand Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Singapore Total 32 250 250 -48 280 30 525 814 
 Share of world total 0,07 % 0,32 % 0,26 % -0,05 % 0,29 % 0,04 % 0,63 % 0,89 % 
Korea Total 0 0 0 0 301 479 422 761 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,31 % 0,64 % 0,50 % 0,83 % 
Taiwan Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Thailand Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Vietnam Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
ASEAN Total 32 250 250 -48 280 30 525 814 
 Share of world total 0,07 % 0,32 % 0,26 % -0,05 % 0,29 % 0,04 % 0,63 % 0,89 % 
"+3" Total 477 532 -83 578 1283 718 1026 1149 
 Share of world total 1,03 % 0,68 % -0,08 % 0,58 % 1,33 % 0,96 % 1,23 % 1,25 % 
"16-countries" Total 527 816 310 723 1590 785 1600 2084 
 Share of world total 1,14 % 1,05 % 0,32 % 0,72 % 1,65 % 1,05 % 1,91 % 2,27 % 
Source: Statistics Norway (SSB). 
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Appendix Table 21. Norwegian-controlled enterprises abroad; Enterprises, Employed People and Turnover (in million NOK), by region and Asian countries. 
Region Enterprises Employed people Turnover 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 
World Total 2072 2834 3119 3228 201503 223281 239011 250641 774105 748097 879201 1046335 
 Yearly growth  36,8 % 10,1 % 3,5 %  10,8 % 7,0 % 4,9 %  -3,4 % 17,5 % 19,0 % 
Europe Total 1440 2044 2230 2312 127800 138282 143626 150295 467896 464323 522256 621948 
 % of world total 69,5 % 72,1 % 71,5 % 71,6 % 63,4 % 61,9 % 60,1 % 60,0 % 60,4 % 62,1 % 59,4 % 59,4 % 
Nordic 
countries 
Total 649 970 1027 1053 49118 54879 61473 62318 221164 229260 260829 321518 
 % of world total 31,3 % 34,2 % 32,9 % 32,6 % 24,4 % 24,6 % 25,7 % 24,9 % 28,6 % 30,6 % 29,7 % 30,7 % 
Asia Total 306 364 432 425 37707 38756 46174 48317 93772 94440 120578 135748 
 % of world total 14,8 % 12,8 % 13,9 % 13,2 % 18,7 % 17,4 % 19,3 % 19,3 % 12,1 % 12,6 % 13,7 % 13,0 % 
 
Australia Total 19 30 32 35 2677 3701 3350 3015 12074 11184 12795 16492 
 % of world total 0,92 % 1,06 % 1,03 % 1,08 % 1,33 % 1,66 % 1,40 % 1,20 % 1,56 % 1,49 % 1,46 % 1,58 % 
Brunei Total 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,03 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Philippines Total 7 7 6 9 0 118 0 211 0 1182 0 703 
 % of world total 0,34 % 0,25 % 0,19 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,05 % 0,00 % 0,08 % 0,00 % 0,16 % 0,00 % 0,07 % 
Hong Kong Total 15 13 15 15 432 424 536 187 1826 1301 1393 1340 
 % of world total 0,72 % 0,46 % 0,48 % 0,46 % 0,21 % 0,19 % 0,22 % 0,07 % 0,24 % 0,17 % 0,16 % 0,13 % 
India Total 20 31 32 36 3200 4751 7232 7522 1277 1758 2755 4720 
 % of world total 0,97 % 1,09 % 1,03 % 1,12 % 1,59 % 2,13 % 3,03 % 3,00 % 0,16 % 0,23 % 0,31 % 0,45 % 
Indonesia Total 7 9 9 11 830 848 986 1032 758 899 1138 1571 
 % of world total 0,34 % 0,32 % 0,29 % 0,34 % 0,41 % 0,38 % 0,41 % 0,41 % 0,10 % 0,12 % 0,13 % 0,15 % 
Japan Total 11 13 19 21 121 132 266 278 1288 960 1469 1409 
 % of world total 0,53 % 0,46 % 0,61 % 0,65 % 0,06 % 0,06 % 0,11 % 0,11 % 0,17 % 0,13 % 0,17 % 0,13 % 
Cambodia Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
China Total 46 57 76 77 5491 5321 7965 9175 7099 6688 9385 12353 
 % of world total 2,22 % 2,01 % 2,44 % 2,39 % 2,73 % 2,38 % 3,33 % 3,66 % 0,92 % 0,89 % 1,07 % 1,18 % 
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Lao Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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 % of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Malaysia Total 23 26 33 29 3694 3366 3847 4006 10810 12152 13050 14497 
 % of world total 1,11 % 0,92 % 1,06 % 0,90 % 1,83 % 1,51 % 1,61 % 1,60 % 1,40 % 1,62 % 1,48 % 1,39 % 
Myanmar Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % of world total 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 
New Zealand Total 7 9 9 8 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 121 
 % of world total 0,34 % 0,32 % 0,29 % 0,25 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,02 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,01 % 
Singapore Total 76 96 117 119 3209 3404 4655 5296 26360 25519 40522 45155 
 % of world total 3,67 % 3,39 % 3,75 % 3,69 % 1,59 % 1,52 % 1,95 % 2,11 % 3,41 % 3,41 % 4,61 % 4,32 % 
Korea Total 12 15 17 17 737 954 979 884 1559 1452 1859 1928 
 % of world total 0,58 % 0,53 % 0,55 % 0,53 % 0,37 % 0,43 % 0,41 % 0,35 % 0,20 % 0,19 % 0,21 % 0,18 % 
Thailand Total 22 24 25 25 7159 7080 6740 6807 13644 14485 16832 18107 
 % of world total 1,06 % 0,85 % 0,80 % 0,77 % 3,55 % 3,17 % 2,82 % 2,72 % 1,76 % 1,94 % 1,91 % 1,73 % 
Vietnam Total 7 8 9 8 440 543 597 810 266 396 340 548 
 % of world total 0,34 % 0,28 % 0,29 % 0,25 % 0,22 % 0,24 % 0,25 % 0,32 % 0,03 % 0,05 % 0,04 % 0,05 % 
"16-
countries" 
Total 257 325 385 395 27558 30218 36617 39075 75135 76675 100145 117604 
 
Share of world 
total 
12,4 % 11,5 % 12,3 % 12,2 % 13,7 % 13,5 % 15,3 % 15,6 % 9,7 % 10,2 % 11,4 % 11,2 % 
ASEAN Total 142 170 200 201 15332 15359 16825 18162 51838 54633 71882 80581 
 
Share of world 
total 
6,9 % 6,0 % 6,4 % 6,2 % 7,6 % 6,9 % 7,0 % 7,2 % 6,7 % 7,3 % 8,2 % 7,7 % 
"+3" Total 69 85 112 115 6349 6407 9210 10337 9946 9100 12713 15690 
 
Share of world 
total 
0,97 % 1,09 % 1,03 % 1,12 % 1,59 % 2,13 % 3,03 % 3,00 % 0,16 % 0,23 % 0,31 % 0,45 % 
Source: Statistics Norway (SSB). 
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Appendix Table 22. Norwegian-controlled enterprises in Asia; Enterprises, Employed People and Turnover (in mill. NOK), by sector. 
Sector Enterprises Employed people Turnover 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 
All industries Total 306 364 432 425 37707 38756 46174 48317 93772 94440 120578 135748 
 
Share of 
global 
14,8 % 12,8 % 13,9 % 13,2 % 18,7 % 17,4 % 19,3 % 19,3 % 12,1 % 12,6 % 13,7 % 13,0 % 
 Yearly growth  19,0 % 18,7 % -1,6 %  2,8 % 19,1 % 4,6 %  0,7 % 27,7 % 12,6 % 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
Total 6 4 10 11 : : : : : : : : 
 Share of total 2,0 % 1,1 % 2,3 % 2,6 %         
Mining and quarrying Total 25 34 35 29 1059 1291 1434 1109 20798 20468 21209 20254 
 Share of total 8,2 % 9,3 % 8,1 % 6,8 % 2,8 % 3,3 % 3,1 % 2,3 % 22,2 % 21,7 % 17,6 % 14,9 % 
Manufacturing Total 113 135 163 159 11186 11805 16503 17334 24365 24193 37900 49434 
 Share of total 36,9 % 37,1 % 37,7 % 37,4 % 29,7 % 30,5 % 35,7 % 35,9 % 26,0 % 25,6 % 31,4 % 36,4 % 
Electricity and gas, water 
supply, sewerage, waste 
Total 4 5 4 4 : : : : : : : : 
 Share of total 1,3 % 1,4 % 0,9 % 0,9 %         
Construction Total 0 1 3 4 0 : : : 0 : : : 
 Share of total 0,0 % 0,3 % 0,7 % 0,9 % 0,0 %    0,0 %    
Wholesale and retail 
trade 
Total 21 28 21 18 794 862 654 598 2310 2031 1831 1488 
 Share of total 6,9 % 7,7 % 4,9 % 4,2 % 2,1 % 2,2 % 1,4 % 1,2 % 2,5 % 2,2 % 1,5 % 1,1 % 
Transportation and 
storage 
Total 86 85 108 108 3913 3643 3973 5582 10881 9945 16237 15528 
 Share of total 28,1 % 23,4 % 25,0 % 25,4 % 10,4 % 9,4 % 8,6 % 11,6 % 11,6 % 10,5 % 13,5 % 11,4 % 
Accommodation and food 
service activities 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of total 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 
Information and 
communication 
Total 24 33 39 41 : : : : : : : : 
 Share of total 7,8 % 9,1 % 9,0 % 9,6 %         
Financial and insurance 
act. 
Total 7 8 10 9 44 875 129 69 57 232 301 113 
 Share of total 2,3 % 2,2 % 2,3 % 2,1 % 0,1 % 2,3 % 0,3 % 0,1 %     
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Continued Appendix Table 22. Norwegian-controlled enterprises in Asia… 
Sector Enterprises Employed people Turnover 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Real estate activities Total 2 2 1 1 : : : : : : : : 
 Share of total 0,7 % 0,5 % 0,2 % 0,2 %         
Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 
Total 16 28 33 35 3005 3065 3364 3625 2940 2630 3198 3598 
 Share of total 5,2 % 7,7 % 7,6 % 8,2 % 8,0 % 7,9 % 7,3 % 7,5 % 3,1 % 2,8 % 2,7 % 2,7 % 
Administrative and 
support service activities 
Total 2 1 5 6 : : 48 82 : : 71 33 
 Share of total 0,7 % 0,3 % 1,2 % 1,4 %   0,1 % 0,2 %   0,1 % 0,02 % 
Other industries Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Share of total 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 
Source: Statistics Norway (SSB). 
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Appendix Table 23. Norwegian-controlled enterprises abroad: The average number of persons and total turnover per firm in 2011, by region and in Asian 
countries. 
Country Average persons per firm Average turnover per firm (million NOK) 
World 78 324 
Europe 65 269 
Nordic countries 59 305 
Asia 114 319 
 
Australia 86 471 
Brunei 0 0 
Philippines 23 78 
Hong Kong 12 89 
India 209 131 
Indonesia 94 143 
Japan 13 67 
Cambodia 0 0 
China 119 160 
Lao 0 0 
Malaysia 138 500 
Myanmar 0 0 
New Zealand 5 15 
Singapore 45 379 
Korea 52 113 
Thailand 272 724 
Vietnam 101 69 
"16-countries" 99 298 
ASEAN 90 401 
"+3" 90 136 
Source: Statistics Norway (SSB). 
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Appendix Table 24. Norway`s services trade with Asia by sector and country, 2012 (BPM6). In million NOK. 
Country 
Total 
Services 
Transport Travel Communication Construction Insurance Financial 
Computer & 
Information 
Royalties 
& 
License 
fees 
Other 
Business 
Personal, 
Cultural & 
Recreational 
Governm. 
Services, 
n.i.e 
Indonesia Balance 242 338 -178 0 1 1 0 -1 0 82 0 0 
 Export 737 533 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 202 0 0 
 Import 495 195 178 0 0 1 0 1 0 120 0 0 
Malaysia Balance 847 270 -264 30 8 2 0 21 15 772 -6 0 
 Export 1 514 425 0 30 8 2 0 114 15 919 0 0 
 Import 666 155 264 0 1 1 0 93 0 148 6 0 
Thailand Balance -1 256 76 -1 498 28 0 1 2 35 1 101 -1 0 
 Export 433 79 0 37 0 1 2 53 5 180 0 0 
 Import 1 689 154 1 498 10 0 1 0 18 5 79 1 0 
Vietnam Balance 0 28 -89 5 0 0 0 -1 0 57 0 0 
 Export 114 38 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 71 0 0 
 Import 114 10 89 0 0 0 0 1 0 14 0 0 
Myanmar Balance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Export 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Import 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines Balance -125 26 -125 17 -3 0 9 -14 9 -44 0 0 
 Export 138 78 0 17 2 1 9 1 9 20 0 0 
 Import 263 53 125 0 5 0 0 15 0 65 0 0 
Lao PDR Balance 12 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 
 Export 14 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 
 Import 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Cambodia Balance -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 0 
 Export 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Import 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Singapore Balance 906 1 187 0 45 114 26 219 113 88 -877 -8 0 
 Export 6 016 2 395 0 57 135 43 219 157 88 2 919 3 0 
 Import 5 110 1 208 0 12 21 16 0 44 0 3 797 11 0 
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Continued Appendix Table 24. Norway`s services trade with Asia by sector and country… 
Country 
Total 
Services 
Transport Travel Communication Construction Insurance Financial 
Computer & 
Information 
Royalties 
& 
License 
fees 
Other 
Business 
Personal, 
Cultural & 
Recreational 
Governm. 
Services, 
n.i.e 
Brunei Balance 689 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 682 0 0 
 Export 693 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 683 0 0 
 Import 3 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Korea Balance 791 886 0 6 -1 482 3 0 29 0 1 354 -5 0 
 Export 3 618 1733 0 10 144 4 0 47 0 1 678 0 0 
 Import 2 826 847 0 5 1 625 2 0 19 0 324 5 0 
Japan Balance 38 -513 140 13 -121 2 3 30 11 499 -26 0 
 Export 2 525 1 347 140 14 9 4 9 133 16 856 1 0 
 Import 2 486 1860 0 1 130 1 6 103 5 354 27 0 
China Balance 2 252 828 -261 11 127 26 1 -94 -2 1 753 -137 0 
 Export 4 829 1 814 0 17 254 42 1 51 1 2 647 1 0 
 Import 2 577 986 261 7 127 16 0 145 3 893 138 0 
India Balance 484 527 -89 5 13 3 1 -219 0 248 -5 0 
 Export 1 535 763 0 9 14 5 1 55 2 686 0 0 
 Import 1 051 236 89 4 2 2 0 274 2 438 5 0 
Australia Balance 2 942 2 358 -835 20 50 12 2 106 2 1 235 -7 0 
 Export 5 948 3 568 0 26 52 20 2 131 7 2 139 4 0 
 Import 3 006 1 210 835 6 3 7 0 24 4 904 11 0 
New 
Zealand 
Balance 139 108 0 0 0 0 0 -4 0 35 0 0 
 Export 235 174 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 59 0 0 
 Import 96 66 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 24 0 0 
Hong Kong Balance -391 -110 0 -9 3 10 21 48 0 -327 -26 0 
 Export 246 25 0 0 0 17 21 50 0 128 2 0 
 Import 637 135 0 9 3 6 0 2 0 456 28 0 
ASEAN Balance 1 316 1 779 -2 154 124 118 30 230 153 112 779 -15 0 
 Export 9 659 3 556 0 146 147 49 230 325 117 5 006 3 0 
 Import 8 343 1 777 2 154 22 29 19 0 172 5 4 227 18 0 
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Continued Appendix Table 24. Norway`s services trade with Asia by sector and country… 
Japan, 
Korea, 
China 
Balance 3 083 1 201 -121 28 -1475 31 4 -36 9 3 610 -168 0 
 Export 10 972 4 894 140 41 407 50 10 231 17 5 181 2 0 
 Import 7 889 3 693 261 13 1 882 19 6 267 8 1 571 170 0 
Source: Statistics Norway (SSB). 
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Appendix Table 25. Norway’s five most important services trade partners in Asia in 2012, for each services sector (BPM6). 
Rank Total Services Transport Travel Communication Construction Insurance Financial 
Computer & 
Inform. 
Royalties & 
License fees 
Other 
Business 
EXPORT 
1 Singapore Australia Japan Singapore China Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore 
2 Australia Singapore - Thailand Korea China Hong Kong Japan Japan China 
3 China China - Malaysia Singapore Australia 
Japan & 
Philippines 
Australia Malaysia Australia 
4 Korea Korea - Australia Australia Hong Kong 
Thailand, 
China & 
Australia 
Malaysia Philippines Korea 
5 Japan Japan - 
China & 
Philippines 
India India - India Australia Malaysia 
IMPORT 
1 Singapore Japan Thailand Singapore Korea 
Singapore & 
China 
Japan India 
Japan & 
Thailand 
Singapore 
2 Australia Australia Australia Thailand Japan Australia - China Australia Australia 
3 Korea Singapore 
Malaysia & 
China 
Hong Kong China Hong Kong - Japan China China 
4 China China Indonesia China Singapore 
Korea & 
India 
- Malaysia India Hong Kong 
5 Japan Korea Philippines Australia Philippines 
Indonesia, 
Malaysia, 
Thailand & 
Japan 
- Singapore - Japan 
Source: Statistics Norway (SSB). 
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Appendix Table 26. The Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG): Investments in Asia-16 and shares by 
country and type of investment (based on market value 2012). 
Country 
Type of 
Investment 
Market value  
of investments 
(in billion NOK) 
Number of 
investments 
Total market 
value of the whole 
fund (world) 
(in billion NOK) 
Total market 
value of 
investments 
in Asia & 
Oceania 
(in billion NOK) 
Share of 
total 
investments 
in Asia & 
Oceania 
Share of 
total 
investments 
for the whole 
fund (world) 
Indonesia 
       
 
Equity 5,542 55 2 336 
  
0,24 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
7,507 1 1 455 
  
0,52 % 
 
Total 13,051 56 3 816 583,5 2,24 % 0,34 % 
Malaysia 
       
 
Equity 10,232 79 2 336 
  
0,44 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
5,378 2 1 455 
  
0,37 % 
 
Total 15,610 81 3 816 583,5 2,68 % 0,41 % 
Singapore 
       
 
Equity 13,676 98 2 336 
  
0,59 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
0,402 6 1 455 
  
0,30 % 
 
Total 18,077 104 3 816 583,5 3,10 % 0,47 % 
Thailand 
       
 
Equity 5,754 44 2 336 
  
0,25 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
6,729 4 1 455 
  
0,46 % 
 
Total 12,484 48 3 816 583,5 2,14 % 0,33 % 
Vietnam 
       
 
Equity 0 
not invested 
in 
2 336 
  
0,00 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
0 
not invested 
in 
1 455 
  
0,00 % 
 
Total 0 
not invested 
in 
3 816 583,5 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Philippines 
       
 
Equity 3,278 36 2 336 
  
0,14 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
0,0065 1 1 455 
  
0,0004 % 
 
Total 3,285 37 3 816 583,5 0,56 % 0,09 % 
Myanmar 
       
 
Equity 0 
not invested 
in 
2 336 
  
0,00 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
0 
not invested 
in 
1 455 
  
0,00 % 
 
Total 0 
not invested 
in 
3 816 583,5 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Brunei 
       
 
Equity 0 
not invested 
in 
2 336 
  
0,00 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
0 
not invested 
in 
1 455 
  
0,00 % 
 Total 0 
not invested 
in 
3 816 583,5 0,00 % 0,00 % 
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Continued Appendix Table 26. The Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG)… 
Laos 
       
 
Equity 0 
not invested 
in 
2 336 
  
0,00 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
0 
not invested 
in 
1 455 
  
0,00 % 
 
Total 0 
not invested 
in 
3 816 583,5 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Cambodia 
       
 
Equity 0 
not invested 
in 
2 336 
  
0,00 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
0 
not invested 
in 
1 455 
  
0,00 % 
 
Total 0 
not invested 
in 
3 816 583,5 0,00 % 0,00 % 
China 
       
 
Equity 37,847 303 2 336 
  
1,62 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
5,801 4 1 455 
  
0,40 % 
 
Total 43,648 307 3 816 583,5 7,48 % 1,14 % 
India 
       
 
Equity 14,325 122 2 336 
  
0,61 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
7,359 3 1 455 
  
0,51 % 
 
Total 21,684 125 3 816 583,5 3,72 % 0,57 % 
Japan 
       
 
Equity 124,426 1243 2 336 
  
5,33 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
105,856 9 1 455 
  
7,28 % 
 
Total 230,281 1252 3 816 583,5 39,46 % 6,03 % 
South-
Korea        
 
Equity 39,332 229 2 336 
  
1,68 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
23,463 16 1 455 
  
1,61 % 
 
Total 62,796 245 3 816 583,5 10,76 % 1,65 % 
Australia 
       
 
Equity 53,322 261 2 336 
  
2,28 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
29,834 22 1 455 
  
2,05 % 
 
Total 83,156 283 3 816 583,5 14,25 % 2,18 % 
New 
Zealand        
 
Equity 1,108 20 2 336 
  
0,05 % 
 
Fixed 
Income 
3,438 6 1 455 
  
0,24 % 
 
Total 4,546 26 3 816 583,5 0,78 % 0,12 % 
Source: NBIM. 
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Appendix Table 27. Norway`s total aid by region, measured in billion NOK. 
Region 
Amount of aid 1960-2012, 
measured in billion NOK 
(constant 2012 NOK) 
Percentage 
share of total 
aid 1960-2012 
Amount of aid in 2012, 
measured in billion NOK 
Percentage share 
of total aid in 
2012 
Africa 152,2 27,9 % 5,6 20,3 % 
America 23,3 4,3 % 2,1 7,6 % 
Europe 19,4 3,6 % 0,7 2,5 % 
Middle East 15,3 2,8 % 1,1 4,0 % 
Asia 75,2 13,8 % 2,7 9,8 % 
Oceania 0,28 0,05 % 0,009 0,03 % 
ASEAN 11,9 2,2 % 0,6 2,2 % 
China, 
Japan, Korea 
14,5 2,7 % 0,9 3,3 % 
Source: NORAD. 
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Appendix Table 28. Norwegian aid to Asia: Overview over total aid and shares by country and type, 2000-
2012 in current prices (2012 NOK). 
Recipient 
country 
Target area 
Total aid, 
2000-2005 
(in 1000 
NOK) 
Average 
aid, 2000-
2005 (in 
1000 NOK) 
Relative aid, 
average 
Total aid, 
2006-2012 
(in 1000 
NOK) 
Average 
aid, 2006-
2012 
(in 1000 
NOK) 
Relative aid, 
average 
Cambodia 
Economic 
development 
and trade 
41 340 6 890 17,86 % 52 107 8 685 22,60 % 
 Education 26 710 4 452 11,54 % 51 971 8 662 22,54 % 
 
Emergency 
assistance 
15 947 2 658 6,89 % 5 622 937 2,44 % 
 
Environment 
and energy 
399 66 0,17 % 484 81 0,21 % 
 
Good 
governance 
98 786 16 464 42,68 % 82 799 13 800 35,91 % 
 
Health and 
social services 
43 645 7 274 18,86 % 37 533 6 256 16,28 % 
 
In donor costs 
and unspecified 
4 651 775 2,01 % 44 7 0,02 % 
Cambodia 
Total 
 231 478 38 580  230 561 38 427  
China 
Economic 
development 
and trade 
164 698 27 450 25,52 % 102 415 17 069 11,17 % 
 Education 29 167 4 861 4,52 % 49 250 8 208 5,37 % 
 
Emergency 
assistance 
7 105 1 184 1,10 % 52 140 8 690 5,69 % 
 
Environment 
and energy 
153 599 25 600 23,80 % 435 984 72 664 47,54 % 
 
Good 
governance 
78 310 13 052 12,13 % 143 016 23 836 15,59 % 
 
Health and 
social services 
171 840 28 640 26,63 % 127 348 21 225 13,89 % 
 
In donor costs 
and unspecified 
40 644 6 774 6,29 % 6 851 1 142 0,75 % 
China Total  645 363 107 560  917 004 152 834  
India 
Economic 
development 
and trade 
118 630 19 772 17,57 % 243 294 40 549 21,41 % 
 Education 90 276 15 046 13,37 % 16 710 2 785 1,47 % 
 
Emergency 
assistance 
79 987 13 331 11,84 % 16 538 2 756 1,46 % 
 
Environment 
and energy 
222 404 37 067 32,93 % 255 855 42 643 22,52 % 
 
Good 
governance 
43 719 7 287 6,47 % 136 885 22 814 12,05 % 
 
Health and 
social services 
103 457 17 243 15,32 % 461 907 76 984 40,66 % 
 
In donor costs 
and unspecified 
16 897 2 816 2,50% 4 913 819 0,43 % 
India Total  675 371 112 562  1 136 102 189 350  
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Continued Appendix Table 28. Norwegian aid to Asia… 
Recipient 
country 
Target area 
Total aid, 
2000-2005 
(in 1000 
NOK) 
Average 
aid, 2000-
2005 (in 
1000 NOK) 
Relative aid, 
average 
Total aid, 
2006-2012 
(in 1000 
NOK) 
Average 
aid, 2006-
2012 
(in 1000 
NOK) 
Relative aid, 
average 
Indonesia 
Economic 
development 
and trade 
161 834 26 972 26,33 % 56 104 9 351 7,60 % 
 Education 39 777 6 629 6,47 % 19 252 3 209 2,61 % 
 
Emergency 
assistance 
151 118 25 186 24,58 % 33 955 5 659 4,60 % 
 
Environment 
and energy 
114 308 19 051 18,59 % 392 721 65 453 53,22 % 
 
Good 
governance 
96 261 16 044 15,66 % 214 093 35 682 29,01 % 
 
Health and 
social services 
41 687 6 948 6,78 % 19 147 3 191 2,59 % 
 
In donor costs 
and unspecified 
9 712 1 619 1,58 % 2 695 449 0,37 % 
Indonesia 
Total 
 614 697 102 450  737 967 122 995  
Laos 
Economic 
development 
and trade 
26 827 4 471 9,89 % 6 291 1 048 2,62 % 
 Education 22 591 3 765 8,33 % 30 472 5 079 12,69 % 
 
Emergency 
assistance 
1 179 196 0,4345 %  0 0,00 % 
 
Environment 
and energy 
74 527 12 421 27,47 % 121 885 20 314 50,78 % 
 
Good 
governance 
51 014 8 502 18,80 % 49 285 8 214 20,53 % 
 
Health and 
social services 
85 799 14 300 31,63 % 30 432 5 072 12,68 % 
 
In donor costs 
and unspecified 
9 366 1 561 3,45 % 1 662 277 0,69 % 
Laos Total  271 302 45 217  240 027 40 005  
Malaysia 
Economic 
development 
and trade 
2 485 414 8,24 % 5 832 972 15,98 % 
 
Environment 
and energy 
 0 0,00 % 7 339 1 223 20,12 % 
 
Good 
governance 
5 331 888 17,67 % 9 710 1 618 26,62 % 
 
Health and 
social services 
1 615 269 5,35 %  0 0,00 % 
 
In donor costs 
and unspecified 
20 740 3 457 68,74 % 13 596 2 266 37,27 % 
Malaysia 
Total 
 30 171 5 028  36 476 6 079  
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Continued Appendix Table 28. Norwegian aid to Asia… 
Recipient 
country 
Target area 
Total aid, 
2000-2005 
(in 1000 
NOK) 
Average 
aid, 2000-
2005 (in 
1000 NOK) 
Relative aid, 
average 
Total aid, 
2006-2012 
(in 1000 
NOK) 
Average 
aid, 2006-
2012 
(in 1000 
NOK) 
Relative aid, 
average 
Myanmar  
Economic 
development 
and trade 
13 893 2 316 5,79 % 65 417 10 903 7,98 % 
 Education 705 117 0,29 % 35 629 5 938 4,34 % 
 
Emergency 
assistance 
100 820 16 803 42,06 % 339 286 56 548 41,37 % 
 
Environment 
and energy 
 0 0,00 % 18 160 3 027 2,21 % 
 
Good 
governance 
70 134 11 689 29,26 % 218 794 36 466 26,68 % 
 
Health and 
social services 
44 118 7 353 18,40 % 135 241 22 540 16,49 % 
 
In donor costs 
and unspecified 
10 049 1 675 4,19 % 7 526 1 254 0,92 % 
Myanmar 
Total 
 239 719 39 953  820 052 136 675  
Philippines 
Economic 
development 
and trade 
52 152 8 692 41,50 % 11 707 1 951 1,72 % 
 Education 781 130 0,62 % 175 29 0,03 % 
 
Emergency 
assistance 
16 774 2 796 13,35 % 7 324 1 221 1,09 % 
 
Environment 
and energy 
6 222 1 037 4,95 % 554 418 92 403 81,63 % 
 
Good 
governance 
22 371 3 729 17,80 % 80 549 13 425 11,86 % 
 
Health and 
social services 
24 800 4 133 19,74 % 12 987 2 164 1,91 % 
 
In donor costs 
and unspecified 
2 553 426 2,03 % 11 988 1 998 1,77 % 
Philippines 
Total 
 125 652 20 942  679 147 113 191  
Thailand 
Economic 
development 
and trade 
28 146 4 691 22,36 % 12 763 2 127 14,86 % 
 Education 3 214 536 2,55 % 1 479 247 1,72 % 
 
Emergency 
assistance 
52 853 8 809 41,98 % 4 837 806 5,63 % 
 
Environment 
and energy 
1 651 275 1,31 % 2 422 404 2,82 % 
 
Good 
governance 
4 342 724 3,45 % 27 462 4 577 31,98 % 
 
Health and 
social services 
4 835 806 3,84 % 10 165 1 694 11,84 % 
 
In donor costs 
and unspecified 
30 847 5 141 24,50 % 26 756 4 459 31,15 % 
Thailand 
Total 
 125 888 20 981  85 884 14 314  
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Continued Appendix Table 28. Norwegian aid to Asia… 
Recipient 
country 
Target area 
Total aid, 
2000-2005 
(in 1000 
NOK) 
Average 
aid, 2000-
2005 (in 
1000 NOK) 
Relative aid, 
average 
Total aid, 
2006-2012 
(in 1000 
NOK) 
Average 
aid, 2006-
2012 
(in 1000 
NOK) 
Relative aid, 
average 
Viet Nam 
Economic 
development 
and trade 
143 240 23 873 28,19 % 563 068 93 845 45,66 % 
 Education 89 780 14 963 17,67 % 151 465 25 244 12,28 % 
 
Emergency 
assistance 
21 346 3 558 4,20 % 19 625 3 271 1,59 % 
 
Environment 
and energy 
97 399 16 233 19,17 % 87 734 14 622 7,11 % 
 
Good 
governance 
56 651 9 442 11,15 % 146 679 24 447 11,89 % 
 
Health and 
social services 
89 147 14 858 17,54 % 249 889 41 648 20,26 % 
 
In donor costs 
and unspecified 
10 553 1 759 2,08 % 14 781 2 464 1,19 % 
Viet Nam 
Total 
 508 115 84 686  1 233 241 205 540  
Asia Regional 
Economic 
development 
and trade 
143 480 23 913 11,39 % 149 749 24 958 13,84 % 
 Education 60 116 10 019 4,78 % 71 663 11 944 6,6250 % 
 
Emergency 
assistance 
513 342 85 557 40,78 % 98 727 16 454 9,13 % 
 
Environment 
and energy 
181 302 30 217 14,40 % 305 537 50 923 28,25 % 
 
Good 
governance 
210 291 35 049 16,71 % 330 006 55 001 30,51 % 
 
Health and 
social services 
143 863 23 977 11,43 % 104 795 17 466 9,699 % 
 
In donor costs 
and unspecified 
6 360 1 060 0,51 % 21 233 3 539 1,96 % 
Asia Regional 
Total 
 1 258 753 209 792  1 081 710 180 285  
Source: NORAD. 
 
